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Knowledge-based businesses (Kl3Bs) have the potential to make a significant 
contribution to peripheral regions with marginal economies, such as Newfoundland and 
Labrador. I lowcver, traditional lending approaches generally emphasize tangible 
collateral sind historical performance. As a result, new knowledge-based firms, whose 
assets arc primarily intangible, experience difficulty with access to financing. Financial 
institutions have responded by implementing specialized approaches to address the 
needs of KUlis. This exploratory study is designed to increase our understanding of 
institutional lending to K1313s, particularly at the start-up stage. Following a review of 
the literature a research framework was developed to explore the demand-side 
perspectives ofentrepreneurs and the supply-side perspectives of*lending institutions. 
A mail survey to entrepreneurs was employed to determine the roles played by 
chartered banks and government agencies in financing KBBs and to ascertain 
entrepreneurs' perceptions of financial institutions. Results indicate KBBs experience 
greater difficulty obtaining financing from chartered banks. Further, K1313s perceive 
batiks to follow traditional risk assessment processes, emphasizing collateral. Findings 
suggest eilbrts by banks to cater to K1313s have been less than successlül. 
Supply-side data were obtained from interviews with senior managers in banks 
and government agencies and from business plan reviews and follow-up interviews 
with account managers. Simultaneous verbal protocols were used to examine risk 
assessment processes in six banks and four government agencies. I lypothetical 
business proposals were presented to account mangers for initial review and subsequent 
due diligence. Data obtained at two stages of assessment were analyzed using 
consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, hierarchical clustering, and standard 
multivariate techniques. 
Findings confirm chartered hanks have cstablishcd specialized approaches to 
deal with KBJ3s. I lowcvcr, thcrc is no evidence to indicate any differential effects on 
Kl5UUs as a result of identified organizational variablcs. Thcrc is evidence among 
specialized account managers ofdif(crences in risk assessment of KBBs and ofa 
COinnfon lending culture that reflects the needs of KI3I3s. Evidence ol'a common 
lending culture is also evident among traditional bankers and among government 
agencies that share an economic development mandate. Findings also confirm 
chartered banks are more concerned with financial aspects of the proposed ventures and 
perccivc higher lcvcls of risk than government account managers. 
Overall, findings provide important insights into institutional lending and have 
significant implications for theory, management practice and public policy. This study 
is one of very few to explore lending; and borrowing from the perspective of K1313s and 
from the perspective of government agencies. Study validity is enhanced considerably 
by reviewing lending decisions in context and with reference to specific proposals. The 
use ol'cultural consensus theory to examine loan evaluation and risk assessment 
represents a significant contribution to understanding theory on lending to KBBs. 
Lending practices ol'chartered banks, while evolving to meet the needs of 
KBBs, have not nict expectations and may need to be reexamined. Entrepreneurs in 
Kl3l3s are advised to seek out KI313 specialists to enhance the likelihood of obtaining 
financing. Government should take steps to ensure expertise is available to deal with 
K1313s and to encourage financial institutions, especially banks, to extend efforts to 
provide specialized assistance to the K1313 sector. Finally, additional research is needed 
to confirm findings from this study and to increase their generalizability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Iulroducliou 
1' 
As traditional sectors, such as manufacturing, primary resources and 
construction have declined, there has been an increasing interest in the potential of 
firms in new "knowledge-based" sectors to serve as "engines of growth", particularly in 
the computer, semi-conductor, telecommunication and biomedical industries (Beck, 
992). These so-called knowledge-based businesses (Kl3l3s)' are especially important 
to peripheral regions and areas with marginal economics, since they offer the potential 
to overcome many of the barriers to entry and competitive disadvantages faced by 
traditional businesses in such regions. Nonetheless, the start-tip and growth of these 
knowledge-intensive firms has created at least one major challenge for their owners - 
access to capital. 
Traditionally, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have faced 
significant problems accessing financing. Some of these problems have been self- 
imposed and reflect entrepreneurs' attitudes, predispositions and knowledge, while 
others reflect lending and investing policies that often limit the small firm's ability to 
access various sources of debt and equity. Risk assessment practices, especially in the 
case of lending institutions, have been based on traditional models that often emphasize 
collateral and the track record of the entrepreneur. The major problem, especially for 
start-up firms in the emerging sectors of the knowledge-based economy, is that a 
' Definitions of a knowledge-based business and a knowledge-based industry are discussed in section 1.3 
in this chapter. 
capital-based approach to risk assessment constrains their ability to access bank 
financing. For many oftlicse firms, their primary assets are intangible and difficult to 
value, thus Ihiling to satisfy requirements for asset-based security. The problem is 
compounded for the start-up firm by the absence of any history and by the difficulties 
of making reliable estimates of tüture perllormance. The end result is ollen a mismatch 
between institutional guidelines and policies and the reality of the new knowledge- 
based firm. 
In the absence of collateral to support debt financing, especially from banks, 
entrepreneurs rely on equity sources to finance the start-up of their ventures. I-lowcver, 
for most new small firms, sources of equity are generally limited to the personal 
financial capabilities of the entrepreneur, which are easily exhausted. Public equity 
sources, such as the stock market, have little to offer new small firms since access 
generally requires an established history of earnings and demonstrated financial 
stability. Similarly, formal venture capital very often is directed to projects at 
particular stages ofdevelopnicnt (Carter and Van Aukcn, 1994) and to firms in specific 
industry sectors (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Further, small firms arc unlikely to attract 
venture capital unless they require substantial amounts of capital and offer the 
opportunity for extraordinary returns to venture capitalists (Maier and Walker, 1987). 
A growing body of evidence, compiled over the last twenty years, indicates an 
informal market for risk capital comprised of"business angels" is playing a significant 
role in financing new and expanding small firms in some jurisdictions. Beginning with 
the seminal work of Wetzel (1981) in the United States, others have investigated the 
role of business angels in the United Kingdom (I larrison and Mason, 1992; Mason and 
larrison, 1994; Mason and I larrison, 1996a), Sweden (Landstrom, 1995) and Canada 
(Riding el a!., 1993). 1 lowcvcr, evidence of the impact of the informal market for risk 
II 
capital has been limited primarily to more highly developed regions and to areas with 
significant clusters of industrial and business activity (Aram, 1987; haar, Starr and 
MacMillan. 1988, Nciswandcr, 1985; Tymcs and Krasncr, 1983). 
In light of the problems oFaccess to capital Faced by small firms, especially at 
the start-up stage, governments in some countries, including Canada, have introduced a 
variety of financial measures over the years to help small businesses (Gracey, 2001; 
Riding and Haines, 2001). In Canada, the chartered banks represent the single largest 
source of credit to SMEs, while government is often seen as a lender of last resort. As 
a result, both groups arc under increasing pressurc to respond appropriately to the needs 
of SMEs, especially those considered to represent the best prospects For economic 
growth X knowledge-based firms. 
Together, the banks and government agencies face the challenge of having to 
respond to the financial needs of knowledge-based industries without having the 
experience or know-how of their more traditional lending practices. There have thus 
been attempts to specialise, following assessments of the needs of Kßi3s. For example, 
the study Financing the New Economy (Industry Canada, 1994a) was undertaken in 
recognition of the critical importance of access to financing to the success of 
knowledge-based small Grins. This report made specific recommendations to improve 
access to capital to exhort-oriented and knowledge-based businesses. A number oi'the 
chartered banks have responded by implementing specialized lending units with 
account managers trained to deal with applications from non-traditional sectors. These 
units have been established in a number of areas of major Kßß concentration, but are 
problematic in a number of ways. First, they do not service peripheral locations, such 
as Newfoundland and Labrador. Second, little is still known about the extent to which 
I. 
the risk assessment approaches used by the banks in general have been modified and 
how elTectivc they have been in adequately assessing risk in knowledge-based firms. 
As interest in knowledge-based sectors grows, there has been a corresponding 
increase in the need to provide specialist support of this kind lbr knowledge-basal 
industries, though intervention on behalf of this group remains low in proportion to the 
total financial assistance provided to small firms. As a result, risk assessment practices 
by banks and government agencies are still relatively undeveloped for knowledge- 
based businesses. 
The primary aims of the present study are to further our understanding of the 
Financing requirements of knowledge-based SMEs and to examine the risk assessment 
approaches utilized by the banks and government agencies when assessing applications 
liar Financing From firms in knowledge-based industries, especially at the start-up stage. 
An understanding of the processes and related decision criteria should be useful to the 
development of a risk assessment model for use in delivering financial assistance 
programs to knowledge-based firms. Such a model could help to stimulate growth in 
the knowledge-based sector by permitting lenders and economic development agencies 
to increase their activity in this area and by assisting entrepreneurs to better anticipate 
and manage their financial requirements. 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the elements underlying the aims of 
this research, briefly discusses previous research, provides details of the scope and 
purpose of the study, describes the research setting, and provides an outline of the 
thesis. 
1.1 The Role of Small and Medium-Sized Firms in the Economy 
Since the release of the seminal work of David Birch (1979 and 1981) in the 
United Slates, there has been increasing recognition of the role of small and medium- 
sized enterprises in the economics of most industrialized countries. In Canada, a 1990 
report by Industry, Science and Technology Canada provides one of the earliest 
confirmations that businesses with annual revenues of less than $5 million are major 
contributors to the economy, accounting For a significant portion of the sales (28%) and 
profits (27%) of all firms in Canada. The impact ofSMlis on employment (42%) and 
job creation (81%) has been even more pronounced. More recent data (Arend e[ (IL, 
1997; Industry Canada, 1995b) indicate that, including the self-employed, more than 99 
percent of all businesses in Canada are small businesses and these firms account for 
approximately 38 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. 
SMEs are similarly having a significant impact on the economics of Atlantic 
Canada' (Gorman and King, 1998). in terms or employment, the small business 
share has remained strong, despite considerable volatility in the region and in the 
country over the period from 1989 to 1995. The SME share of total employment in 
Canada increased from 54 percent in 1989 to 56 percent in 1995, while in Atlantic 
Canada the share remained steady at 51 percent over the same period (Atlantic 
Canada Opportunities Agency, 1998). The most recent data (Gorman and King, 
1998) also confirm the growing importance of the micro-firm category (firms with 
fewer than five employees). Over the six-year period covered in this study, the 
percentage ofall firms accounted for by the micro-firm category increased from 
' The most easterly region in Canada consisting of four provinces: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince 
Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador. 
74.5% to 78.7%. This category was the major contributor to growth in the number 
of l irms, experiencing the largest increase in the number of firms and accounting 
liar almost all o1. the increase in the number of Iirius in the region over the period. 
As in previous studies (ACOA, 1996), the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador 
continues to lead the Atlantic region in both business entry and exit rates. 
1.2 hic Knowledge-Based Economy 
Coincident with the growth in the small business sector and the recognition 
of its importance is the growing consensus among policy-makers and academics 
that most industrialized economies are increasingly becoming "knowledge-based" 
(Smith, 2000). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the term "knowledge-based economy" recognizes the 
important role ol'knowledge and technology in economic growth (OECD, 1996a). 
Knowledge, both as an input and an output, is increasingly seen as a key source of 
job creation, competitive advantage and long-term growth. 
The report Groii'ing Sincr1113ursinesses (Industry Canada, 1994b) identified a 
number of characteristics of (lie emerging economy in Canada. Not surprisingly, 
knowledge intensity is one of these salient characteristics and is considered to be a 
significant competitive advantage for many of the companies that will succeed in this 
new economy. Recent evidence confirms the Canadian economy is becoming more 
knowledge-based and technology-intensive (Gera and Mang, 1997) and more skill 
intensive (Gera and Mass9,1996). The authors analyze Canada's industrial structure 
' Entries are defined as businesses that cater a region=s economy during the period, while exits are firms 
that have lcf the economy during the period. Entry rates and exit rates arc calculated by dividing the 
number of new firms or exiting firms by the number of firms that existed at the beginning of the period. 
1' 
over the twenty-year period from 1971 to 1991 using a Statistics Canada input/output 
model that is based on the previous work of the OECD (1992). 1 lowever, the Canadian 
study examines more closely the role played by the emerging industries of the new 
cconuiiny where innovation depends largely on knowledge, technology and skills. 
(Findings from the two studies confirm that structural change has occurred in Canada 
and that the economy has moved up the knowledge intensity scale. There also has been 
a significant shill in employment away From the traditional sectors X primary, 
manulficturing and construction X to the service sector. However, despite the decline 
in manufacturing employment, the studies also highlight that four manufacturing 
IIKKIustries X cuntputcrs uitcl Office equipment, aircrall manulitcturing, rubber and 
plastics, and pharmaceuticals X were in the top 10 fastest growing industries, 
rcinlbrcing the läct that the use and production of knowledge is not limited to the 
service sector. 
In combination, the two studies provide considerable evidence of a shift 
towards a knowledge-based economy and of the growing importance of knowledge- 
based industries. In all sectors, including manufacturing, services and resources, 
industries which require high-knowledge have outpaced those with more modest 
knowledge requirements. Further, employment in these high-knowledge industries 
appears Ihr less susceptible to cyclical downturns. 
1.3 Defining Knowledge-Based Businesses 
While there appears to be agreement on the need to address the problem of 
access to capital for these potentially high growth ventures, a major problem has 
emerged. Nobody really knows how to dehne "knowledge-based" industries (K131) or 
41 
knowledge-based businesses, and there is a wide divergence of agreement among the 
various lending organisations (Ilnrris, 2000). As pointed out by Ilowitt (1996; 10), "we 
have no generally accepted empirical measures of such key theoretical concepts as the 
stock of technical knowledge, human capital, the resource cost of knowledge 
acquisition, the rate of innovation or the rate of obsolescence ol'old knowledge. " 
In the absence of standard economic methods to measure knowledge, a number 
of delinitions of KUIs have been put Forward. Industry Canada Focuses on the use of 
inlornnation or other advanced technology and scientific research to deline knowledge- 
based sectors. On that basis, 20 industries, as defined in the Standard Industrial 
Classilication (SIC) codes used by Statistics Canada, are considered to represent the 
knowledge-based sectors ('f'able I. 1). 
Table 1.1 
Knowlcclgc-Based Industry Scclors4 
sic uhistry 
0239 1 
32.11 1 r_ &--aircraft parts irn iT Al 
3341 cord slaver. radio and television manufacturing 
Telecommunications and eauinment industry 
3352 Electronic a and 
3361 Electronic u'e and peripheral eauinment industrv 
i G2 l-c rouicSLMLC I_or ,, skusi. D. Q s-machine jndo ' 
3381 Sýll1Cl c1ý LrýL11cýý1c&. s1S)1Q. and busJl1Css-cuiiluni. c. Iit 
3369 Communications and cueruv wire and c' industry 
3741 rmacculical and medical indiý stry 
1 and gontrollinu 
instruments 
3912 Other l 
4814 Cable television 
4812 i 'e munications carriers 
4839 Other telecommunications 
7721 Conimitcr services 
7759 
9611 Motion oicture and video recording 
9619 7 
KUIs as dclincd by Industry Canada. 
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The federal government, using work by Lee and I las (1996), categorizes 55 
SICs as high, medium or low knowledge-intensity (Table 1.2). Lee and I las utilize 
research and development and human capital indicators to measure knowledge- 
intensity and to define knowledge-intensive industries. A third definition, developed 
lbr the venture capital industry, defines KBIs as including the following: biotechnology 
and information technology, communications, electronics, energy and environmental 
technology and some industrial equipment, including advanced materials. 
Table 1.2 
Knowledge Intensity Groups 
Scientific & prolcssionil equipment 
Communication & other clcctrunics 
Aircrall & harts 
Computer & related services 
Business machines 
Engineering & scientific services 
Pharmaceutical & medicine 
Electrical power 
Machinery 
Relined petroleum R coal products 
C\Ianagemcnt consulting services 
Educntiunal services 
I lealth & social services 
Pipeline transportation 
Other business services 
Oilier transportation equipment 
Other electrical & electronics 
Primary metals (non-ferrous) 
Textiles 
Communication 
Paper & allied products 
Mining 
Rubber 
Plastics 
Primary metals (rerrous) 
Non-metallic muincial products 
Wholesale trade 
Crude petroleum & natural gas 
Fabricated metal products 
Motor vehicles & parts 
Food 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Finance, insurance & real estate 
Other utilities 
Services incidental to mining 
Other services 
Printing & publishing 
Construction 
Amusement & recreation 
Fishing & trapping 
Wood 
Furniture & Iixtures 
Logging & forestry 
Transportation 
Storage & warehousing 
Agriculture 
Retail trade 
Personalservices 
Quarry. sand pits & mining 
Accommodations 
Clolliing 
Leather 
The Canadian Bankers Association (CBA) has adopted the 20 SIC code 
classilication for reporting data on lending to the knowledge-based sector and has been 
collecting separate statistics on the KIM market since the third quarter of 1996. 
I lowcvcr, a recent study completed for the CBA by Thompson Lightstone and 
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Company Ltd. (1998) indicates that the SICs do not necessarily reflect the views of 
entrepreneurs. Self-identification by entrepreneurs in this study indicated that 68 
percent felt their businesses were knowledge-based whereas only four percent were 
considered KBI under the Industry Canada definition. 
The implication of the proliferation of definitions of KBBs and KBIs is that the 
banks and government agencies likely take different approaches to meeting the needs of 
these firms. In addition, the agendas and mandates or the various financial institutions 
differ. The resulting diversity is no doubt reflected in the lending practices and risk 
assessment approaches of these key organizations and is open to empirical 
investigation. It is far more interesting and important at this stage ol'research to assess 
ho%v the various partners in the financing process perceive and use the term 
"knowledge-based" than it is to arrive at an objective definition of a KI3B or a K13I. 
The present study uses the classification developed by Lee and Has (1996) and 
input obtained from a survey of entrepreneurs to define knowledge-intensive industries. 
Details ol'the approach used to classify firms by level ofknowledge-intensity are 
provided in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Small Firm Acccss to Capital 
Recognition of the role of small and medium-sized enterprises has precipitated a 
growing amount of research on small business and entrepreneurship. One area, in 
particular, that has received considerable attention from the academic, business and 
government communities, is the Financing of SMEs. The reason for the interest in this 
area is that the continual creation and expansion of small businesses depends, in part, 
on their ability to secure appropriate financing. Many of the studies in this area have 
I0 
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identilied problems encountered by SMEs in obtaining both debt (Small Business 
Working Committee, 1994) and equity financing (Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 
1988). These problems rellect issues from both the demand-side (entrepreneurs) and 
the supply-side (lenders and investors) and often relate to agency and information 
asymmetry problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, the reluctance of small 
firm entrepreneurs to seek equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984) has placed added 
importance on the role ol'debt linancing. Further, small firm financing decisions may 
be strongly inlluciuced by managerial choice, which largely rellects the values and 
goals oC the entrepreneurs (Barton and Matthews, 1989). 
Recent research confirms that debt financing plays a major role in supporting 
Canada's SMI: s with 90 percent using some form ofdebt compared to 74 percent using 
equity sources (Thompson, Lightstone and Company, 1998). Although the use ol'otlier 
debt sources is increasing, this study also indicates that banks or other Financial 
institutions continue to be the key source of debt financing, utilized by 63 percent of 
SMEs. In Atlantic Canada, the chartered banks are even more important providers of 
SMI: (lebt financing accounting For 65 percent ol'total SML (lebt financing compared to 
53 percent for Canada as a whole (Shutt and Vanasse, 1999). 
Research also confirms that access to financing is more problematic for 
knowledge-based firms and that, as a result, SME growth and contribution to job 
creation is being constrained in this high potential sector of the economy (Industry 
Canada, 1994a). While the same proportion of knowledge-based SMEs use debt to 
finance their business as reported by SMEs in total, the median reported debt load from 
financial institutions is below the SME norm (Thompson, Lightstone and Company, 
1998). Further, this same study confirms that the use of equity financing by 
knowledge-based SMEs is greater than for SMEs overall and that knowledge-based 
SMEs are considerably less satisfied with their main financial institution than; ire SMEs 
in general. 
Very ollen, lenders and investors indicate that the risks associated with 
knowledge-based ventures are too great. Not surprisingly, the small business operator 
has a much more positive view of the company's prospects and the level of risk 
attached to a financing request. Further, not only are there differences in perspectives 
between entrepreneurs and lenders, entrepreneurs generally lack the financial skills to 
relate to the process that lenders follow in evaluating an application For financing and 
do not understand how lenders price and manage loans (Wynant and I latch, 1990). 
Notwithstanding the dil'Ieritig perspectives o('cntrcprcncurs mid Iitianciers. 
there is considerable agreement that risk evaluation is a critical task associated with the 
provision of financing to small and medium-sized firms. It is also clear that the 
emerging role ol'the knowledge-based firm and the gradual shill from physical to 
intellectual assets suggests that a more comprehensive approach to risk evaluation is 
required (Ibrahim, 1997a and I997b). In a similar light, the Industry Canada (I994a) 
report, entitled Financing 11w New Economy, recommended that the chartered banks 
should continue efforts to establish technology centres to service knowledge-based 
small firms and should provide training to account managers on how to assess 
knowledge-based companies. While it appears that considerable progress has been 
made in these areas in the last three years (Groupe Secor Inc., 1998), it is not clear to 
what extent the risk assessment approaches used by the banks have been modified and 
how effective they have been in adequately assessing risk in knowledge-based firms. 
Further, there is limited information on the process used by government funding 
agencies when reviewing applications for financing from firms in this critical growth 
sector ot'thc new economy. 
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1.5 'traditional Lending Approach 
The literature on bank lending reveals that financial institutions are low-risk 
lenders. The banks acknowledge this fact. Canadian chartered banks target loan losses 
of0.5 percent to 1.0 percent of their total loan portfolio. In addition, the banks are 
quick to point out the dilliculties ol'servicing the SML sector, citing low-margins and 
high turnover rates of small business. 
The fcdcral and provincial governments provide a variety of financial support 
programs targeted to Canadian SMEs. In most instances, the focus of that support has 
shilled in the last live years Isom providing subsidies and grants to providing low 
interest loans and loan guarantees. As a result, the majority 01'governincnt linancial 
support closely resembles traditional lending. 
Credit decision-making includes two main components: risk assessment and 
loan structuring. Risk assessment refers to the process of evaluating the risks 
associated with a loan request. Loan structuring refers to the determination of the terms 
and features attached to the loan. Risk assessment is operationalized through the 
application of credit parameters generally referred to as the "Cs" of credit. The number 
of factors varies; however, the traditional approach (l lays, 1977) includes the following 
parameters: capacity, capital, collateral, character and conditions or circumstances. 
Capacity represents the extent to which the organization is able to meet its obligations 
and is usually reflected in the cash flows of the business. Capital refers to the equity of 
the business, or the investment of the entrepreneur, and provides a measure of the firm's 
ability to weather setbacks. Collateral refers to the assets (business and personal) that 
are available as security in the event of delault. Character refers to the intent and 
commitment of the entrepreneur to repay the loan and includes her/his track record. 
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Bankers sometimes refer to "character" as the borrower's honesty, integrity and 
willingness to deal with the bank in a reasonable fashion (Wynant and IIatch, 1991). 
Conditions or circumstances is a catchall for a number of internal and environmental 
factors that may affect the borrower's ability to repay, including, but not limited to, the 
Ibllowing: the proprietary nature of the product, competition, size of market, and 
industry climate and trends. 
'There appear to be diverging views on the relative importance of these 
parameters. Bank critics suggest that the banks overemphasize collateral. There is 
some empirical evidence to indicate that character and capacity are the factors of 
primary importance to the banks (Petty and Upton, 1997; Fabowale el cal., 1991; 
Wynant and I latch, 1991). There is littic consensus of opinion from entrepreneurs, 
although their perceptions appear consistent with the views of the critics (Petty and 
Upton, 1997). Determining the relative importance of these factors is further 
complicated by the fact that there are clearly multivariate associates among the live 
variables (Riding and Swill, 1993). Each of these lactors encompasses a myriad of 
measures including objective information and criteria, and subjective and qualitative 
impressions. 
The second component of credit decision-making is loan structuring. Decisions 
related to the structure of the loan include the amount of financing, the pricing of the 
loan, the repayment terms, the collateral required, and the conditions imposed on the 
business. The latter specifies the type and timing of information that the business must 
provide to enable the lender to monitor the loan. It also includes any restrictive 
covenants that the lender employs to adjust for the risk in small business lending 
(Apilado and Millington, 1992). Bankers indicate that these terms are not set 
independently but jointly, so as to achieve the appropriate risk/return profile (Wynant 
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and I latch, 1991). Further, some bankers indicate that loan structuring can be used to 
turn an otherwise unacceptable loan into an acceptable one. 
The evaluation and structuring of loans to SMEs are complex and ollen 
judgmental tasks. Credit decision-making by account managers does not occur in 
isolation. The banks' philosophies and commitment to SMEs provide an overall 
framework within which account managers interact with, and provide service to, 
entrepreneurs. The lending decision is also a process of interaction between the 
account managers' experiences and the banks' rules and guidelines (Fletcher, 1995a). 
As such, lending decisions rellcet credit decision-making processes, bank policies and 
i1000LIIIl I11IanliagC1'S' intuition L111Cl jtlLlgCI11Cllt. 
1.6 Previous Research 
Although there has been a considerable research effort directed to the small firm 
sector, research focused on knowledge-based SMEs is extremely limited. Similarly, 
while much attention has been dcvotcd to various aspccts olsmall firm financing, there 
is a general paucity of research which examines the risk assessment processes and 
decision criteria employed by lending institutions, particularly with respect to the 
knowledge-based sector. Nonetheless, there is a body of literature that provides a 
theoretical framework and some empirical findings that are useful to the present study. 
As noted previously, asymmetric information is a fundamental issue underlying 
inancinb relationships (Stiblitz and Weiss, 1981). Petit and Singer (1985) discuss the 
problems of asymmetric information and agency costs and their impact on the 
availability and cost of debt for small firms. Essentially, the entrepreneur (agent) is the 
primary source of information in the small firm. In addition, the entrepreneur has 
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Provinces. The province consists on an island portion (Newfoundland) and Labrador, 
which adjoins the Province of Quebec. There are more than 700 communities in the 
province, scattered along some 17,000 kilometres of coastline. The provincial 
population is relatively small with slightly more than 550,000 residents (1996 census), 
2.9 percent fewer than the 1991 census figure. Approximately 32 percent of the 
11opulation live in the St. John's Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), which includes the 
two largest cities in the province, St. John's and Mount Pearl. Outmigration, especially 
of the younger and more educated, has been a significant problem for the province. 
Almost 80 percent of those who left the province in the live-year period ending in 1996 
were under the age of 35, and 65 percent had some post-secondary training. The 
average annual unemployment rate in Newfoundland and Labrador is the highest in the 
country and has been for sonic years, falling consistently in the 17 to 20 percent range. 
Traditionally, the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador has been based 
almost exclusively on the fishing industry and particularly on the harvesting of the 
North Atlantic codlish. In 1991, in recognition of significantly depleted cod stocks, a 
moratorium was placed on the lishing of Atlantic cod. Subsequent moratoria were 
extended to other major broundfish stocks. As a result, the traditional fishing economy 
has all but disappeared. However, significant restructuring and diversification into 
higher value shellfish, such as shrimp and crab, have resulted in an industry that 
presently has a higher landed value for all fish species than at any previous time in the 
province's history. 
In light of the problems experienced as a result of overreliance on a single 
industry, the province has been actively pursuing a strategy of diversification for a 
number of years. The province's strategic economic plan is outlined in the document, 
Change and Challenge (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1992) and is 
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based on the premise that technological changes, especially in telecommunications, and 
the opening up of new markets in the global economy, have created new economic 
opportunities in sectors such as, information technology, health, and adventure tourism. 
'T'oday, the economy of the province is most aptly described as a diversified resource- 
based economy with significant wealth generation and employment in a number of 
sectors, including the following: Iishcries and aquaculture; mining; forestry; 
hydroelectricity; oil and gas; manufacturing; construction; tourism; agriculture and 
secondary lbod processing; technical and information industries; and a host of public, 
professional and business services. 
Recent research by the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) indicates 
the knowledge-based sector is making a significant contribution to economy of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (APEC, 1997). Estimates by APEC indicate high 
knowledge-intensive firms account for 14 percent of business sector gross domestic 
product (GDP) while the medium knowledge-intensity group accounts for an additional 
61 percent. In terms ol'employment, the percentages arc I1 and 35 percent 
respectively. Further, over the period from 1983 to 1995, high-knowledge firms 
accounted for 47 percent of the new jobs. 
As indicated previously, the entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. The province consistently leads the Atlantic region in the 
rate of business start-ups (ACOA, 1994; ACOA; 1996; ACOA; 1998). The most recent 
data indicate an average entry rate in excess of 24 percent for the six-year period 
ending in 1995. This compares to rate of 19.4 percent for the Atlantic region and 14.9 
for the country. I lowevcr, over the same period, Newfoundland and Labrador also had 
the highest average exit rate at 23.5 percent compared to 18.6 for the region and 14.5 
for the country. The province also exhibited the highest rate of growth in self- 
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employment over the period, an increase of 22.8 percent compared to 15.8 percent for 
Atlantic Canada and 19.4 percent for Canada. 
There are a number of financial institutions and government departments and 
agencies in the province that provide financial assistance to SMEs. The present study 
focuses on the following organizations: chartered banks, including Bank of Montreal 
(13MO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CII3C), I ISBC Bank Canada (I-IS13C), 
Royal Bank ol'Canada (RIIC), Scotiahank (S13) and 'T'oronto 1)oniinion Bank (ii)); the 
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA); the Business Development Bank of 
Canada (13DC); the Department of Development and Rural Renewal (DORR); and the 
Department of Industry, Trade and 'Technology (DITT)'. A brief overview of each 
organization follows. 
As indicated previously, the chartered banks are the major source of debt 
financing for SMEs in Canada and the situation is no different in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Although all banks, with the exception of I ISBC, have established 
specialized lending centres to deal specifically with knowledge-based SMEs, none of 
these centres are located in the province. In the vast majority of cases, commercial 
credit applications are handled by local account managers, who draw upon the 
specialized expertise of lenders located outside the province as required. 
The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) is one of four regional 
economic development agencies and initiatives established by the federal government 
to support local economic development. These organizations work closely with other 
SM1: stakeholders, including the private sector, to provide access to capital, 
information and skills development. Although involved in a number of 
lcderal/provincial initiatives, ACOA's Business Development Program (BDP) is 
A mcrgcr between the I)DRlt and the DI'I"I' was announced on February 13,2001. The new 
department is known as Industry, Trade and Rural Development. 
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targeted specifically to small and medium-sized enterprises. The BD! ' offers interest 
free, unsecured loans that can be used for a variety of purposes, including start-up, 
expansion and modernization, research and development, training, productivity and 
quality improvements, marketing and trade development and consulting advice. The 
maximum level of assistance is 50 percent for capital costs, including working capital 
to support start-tips, expansions and modernizations, and 75 percent for operating costs 
such as training, marketing, consulting and quality assurance. 
The Business Development Bank of'Canada (BDC) is a Crown corporation that 
oilers financial, counselling, mentoring and management training services through a 
network of more than 80 branches across Canada. The BDC is not a bank; it does not 
accept deposits but it does provide commercial loans and innovative financial products 
specifically designed to meet the needs ot'small and medium-sized enterprises. Thus, 
the [3DC plays 'a complementary rather than a competitive role with the chartered banks 
and other private sector financial institutions. For example, the 13DC plays a significant 
role in reducing the uncertainty and high risk, perceived by the banks and investors in 
general, of lending to knowledge-based small businesses, by offering term loans to 
Atop-up_ existing working capital loans. In addition, the BDC has formed a number of 
strategic alliances with other linancial institutions' and economic development agencies 
to deliver innovative financial services to targeted sectors of the economy, such as 
knowledge-based businesses, tourism businesses, aboriginal-owned businesses and 
youth ventures. Financial services range from working capital loans to term loans to 
venture capital financing. Specific financial products reflect the mandate of meeting 
the needs of a diverse group of SMEs from micro businesses to high-growth, 
" For example, the Business Development Bank of Canada has an agreement with Toronto Dominion 
Bank to offer joint loan packages to innovative manufacturing, knowledge-based and export oriented 
businesses. 
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technology-intensive and export-oriented firms. 
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The Department of Development and Rural Renewal (DDRR) is the lead 
provincial agency ti)r small business development. The Strategic taitcrprise 
Development Program of the Department provides financial assistance in the form of 
term loans and equity participation to seed new business start-ups in strategic sectors, 
especially firms to be located in rural areas of the Province. The Focus is on firms that 
are either export-oriented or clearly demonstrate significant import replacement 
potential. Funding is intended to lever financing from other government and non- 
government sources. 
The Department of Industry, Trade and'I'cchnology administers the Economic 
Diversification and Growth Enterprises Program (EDGE) which offers generous tax 
incentives to encourage new or expanding businesses to locate in the Province. Under 
the [: DGL' program, companies making a minimum capital investment of $300,000 or 
producing incremental sales of$500,000 and creating ten new local jobs may qualify 
for a ten-year tax holiday from provincial corporate income tax, health and post- 
secondary education tax and retail sales tax. The program also includes a further five- 
year period over which these taxes are phased in at the rate of 20 percent of the basic 
rate annually. 
In summary, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador represents an ideal 
setting to explore lending to knowledge-based businesses. SMEs generally and Kßi3s 
specifically have made important contributions to the economy of the Province and 
offer significant potential for future growth. At the same time, access to equity sources 
at both the Formal and informal levels has been extremely limited. As a result, the 
chartered banks and government agencies play important roles in the provision of much 
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needed finance to the K1313 sector. All major Canadian chartered banks have a 
commercial lending presence in the Province, as does IISBC Bank Canada, one of the 
most active foreign banks in the Canadian marketplace. Similarly, government 
initiatives have been undertaken at both the federal and provincial lcvcls to support the 
start-up and expansion of small firms. To date, little is known about the risk 
assessment practices of chartered banks and government agencies, and the extent to 
which they reflect the needs ofknowledge-based businesses. The organizations in this 
Province have committed support to the proposed study, offering a rare opportunity to 
investigate approaches to institutional Icnding. 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis contains seven chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 
two reviews the literature. Chapter three presents the research framework and 
research questions. Chapter four discusses the research methodology and the methods 
ol*data collection and analysis. Chapter live presents and discusses demand-side 
findings from a survey of entrepreneurs. Chapter six presents and discusses supply- 
siele findings From interviews and business plan experiments conducted with 
individuals in lending institutions. Finally, alter summarizing the results, chapter seven 
discusses the implications for theory development, management practice and policy 
making, as well aq, limitations and recommendations for future research. 
24 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
Although the present study is exploratory in naturc, it draws upon litcraturc 
from several related cognate areas, including theoretical and empirical research on 
capital structure, credit rationing, coninicrcial landing, venture capital and intellectual 
capital. 
2.1 Capital Structure 
'theories of capital structure provide the point of departure for the study of 
lending to knowledge-based firms, as they encompass both demand-side and supply- 
side perspectives concerning the use ot'debt and equity for an optimal delineation 
between the two. Van der Wijst (1989), through an extensive literature review, 
identifies the following four theoretical determinants of financial structure: taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs and signalling effects. The impact of taxation and debt 
on the cost of capital and the market value of the firm is discussed in the seminal 
articles by Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963). Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
initially argue that the cost of capital and the market value of the firm are unaffected by 
the amount of debt in the capital structure assuming perfect capital markets and no 
taxes. In a subsequent correction paper (1963) they argue in support of more traditional 
financial theory (Solomon, 1963) which is based on the balancing of the tax savings 
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arising (iom the use of debt with the associated leverage or bankruptcy costs when 
allowing for corporate taxation. 
The static trade-oil hypothesis (Myers, 1984) is a more recent statement of the 
taxation and leverage approach and suggests that firms will minimize their financing 
costs and thus maximize firm value by increasing their use of debt until the present 
value of the tax savings from the interest deduction equals the present value of the 
expected costs associated with financial distress. Numerous studies have been 
undertaken that support and criticize Modigliani and Miller's initial arguments on the 
irrelevance of debt, including Robichek and Myers (1966), Stiglitz (1969), Kraus and 
Litzenbcrbcr (1973), and Dania (1978). Miller (1977) also argued that disadvantages 
associated with personal taxation may offset the corporate tax advantage of using debt, 
an issue that may have significant implications for small closely-held firms. 
In addition to theories of capital structure based on the tax savings and 
bankruptcy costs associated with the use of debt, a second area, that of agency costs, 
has generated considerable attention in the literature,. The concept of agency costs, as 
developed in the seminal article by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is based on principal- 
agent relationships wherein the firm's creditors and shareholders (principals) incur costs 
in order to monitor the actions of management (agent). Agency costs result from 
information asymmetry or unevenly balanced information (Akerlof, 1970). 
Information asymmetry underlies much of the study of agency costs, signalling and 
adverse selection. In the case of debt financing, borrowers possess "inside" information 
that is not available to lenders (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Time agency or monitoring 
costs increase the cost of capital to the firm since the principals will reduce the amount 
that they are willing to pay for a firm's securities by an amount equal to the agency 
costs that they expect to incur. As a result of these agency costs, Jensen and Meckling 
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(I 976) suggest that an optimal capital structure may exist even in the absence of taxes 
and bankruptcy costs. 
Jensen and Meckling identil'y three flictors that intlucuce the agency costs of 
debt: incentive effects; monitoring and bonding costs; and bankruptcy and 
reorganization costs. Incentive effects refer to the negative impact of the use of debt on 
(lie investment behaviour of the o%vner-manager. f; ssentially borrowers arc encouraged 
to invest in riskier projects resulting in opportunity wealth loss. Similarly, the use of 
debt is influenced by the monitoring costs incurred by creditors and the bonding costs 
incurred by the owner-manager. Finally, the existence ol'bankruptcy and 
reorganization costs help to explain why a firm's capital structure is not comprised 
entirely of debt. 
Related to agency cost theory is the concept ol'signalling. Ross (1977) 
suggests, among other things, that the financing decisions taken by management are 
signals of the firm's future performance. Decisions by management to issue equity 
send negative signals to investors about the firm's future ability to finance projects 
internally and to service new debt while decisions to issue debt send positive signals. 
Signalling is the direct result of information asymmetry wherein management possesses 
information not available to investors or potential investors. As with monitoring costs. 
the costs to generate the information required to reduce asymmetry may be high. 
Modern financial theory rests on assumptions of efficient capital markets. 
Markets are assumed to be frictionless and competitive. Buyers and sellers of capital 
have access to complete information about sources of funds and investment 
opportunities. Such is hardly the reality of the small firm environment (Van Auken, 
2001). Consequently, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have been 
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undertaken with a view to explaining the financing decision in the context of the small 
lirm. 
Stanger (1992) and others (Pettit and Singer, 1985; On, 1988) argue for the 
importance ofan agency perspective in explaining financial theory in small firms, 
suggesting that small firms differ frone large ones in two important respects: less 
separation of ownership and nianagenicnt, and more closely-lheld ownership in smaller 
firms. Closely associated with these differences is the potential Irr small firms to more 
easily change their asset structure (flexibility) and for greater inside information 
(asymmetry). Stanger argues that these differences have a significant impact on the 
application of nmodern financial theory to the small firm context. I Ic discusses standard 
Iinancial constructs in lour areas: financial objectives; investment decisions; financing 
decisions; and distribution decisions. Two of these, the financial objective of the firm 
and the financing decision, are of particular relevance fiere. 
Financial theory assumes that the objective of the firm is to maximize 
shareholder wealth. In the small firm, the owner's risk and lifestyle preferences, as well 
as the desire to maintain control place significant constraints on the ability to maximize 
the value of the firm and shareholder wealth. Similarly, the owner/manager's 
objectives can have a significant inllucnce oll small firm financing decisions. Barton 
and Matthews (1987 and 1988) argue that a strategy perspective might be much more 
useful than the traditional finance paradigm in explaining capital structure choice at the 
firm level. In highlighting the shortcomings oftraditional linancial theory in 
explaining capital structure, the authors suggest that such decisions are strongly 
influenced by managerial choice. In their view (Barton and Matthews, 1989) 
managerial choice, which includes values and goals, may be an even more important 
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determinant of capital structure in small firms and should be incorporated into a 
strategic decision Framework to fully understand financing decisions. 
Ou (1988) echoes the views of Stanger and Barton and Matthews in arguing for 
the integration of agency theory, inlbrnnation asymmetry and owner's objective function 
to examine the impact of lüctors affecting lenders' and borrowers' financing decisions. 
In terms of agency theory, the entrepreneur who borrows money enters into a contract 
with the Fender whereby the firm becomes an agent ofthe lender or principal. To 
reduce the problem of moral hazard (Arrow, 1963), lenders take a number of steps to 
ensure that the entrepreneur acts in their best interests, including monitoring the actions 
of the entrepreneur and placing restrictions on the entrepreneur's freedom to act. The 
lormer results in the lender incurring monitoring costs while the latter results in direct 
and indirect costs to the borrower. Direct costs consist of bonding costs to protect the 
lenders against potential loss while indirect costs include restrictions on the use of 
assets or the ability of the entrepreneur to obtain additional financing. Both types of 
restrictions limit the independence of the entrepreneur. Further, lenders oilcn require a 
personal guarantee as a way of mitigating the potential risk of the borrower misusing 
the assets of the business, thereby creating residual loss' and reducing firm value. 
To make a decision whether or not to enter into the contract, the lender requires 
certain information to evaluate the proposal and the firm's ability to repay, and to 
determine if the borrower is likely to act in the best interests of the lender. Such 
information may not be equally available to both parties. Information asymmetry 
results not only in' monitoring costs, related to the problem of moral hazard outlined 
previously, but also in additional costs to reduce the likelihood of adverse selection 
1 Residual loss is defined as "... a reduction in the principal's welfare due to a divergence between the 
decisions that agents take, and the decisions which would maximize the well'are of the principal" 
(Stanger, 1992; 5). 
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(L3inks el (il., 1992). Adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) refers to the errors that may 
result when lenders provide external financing. Two types of errors may arise: entering 
into a contract that turns out to be a failure and not entering into a contract that 
subsequently proves to be successful, i. e. Type I and Type 11 error. 
According to Ou (1988) inlbrmation asymmetry problems may be even more 
I)runuunml For . S111,111, young linos operating 
in dynamic sectors. The proprietary 
nature of products and processes is such that entrepreneurs are very reluctant to 
disclose information that may lall into the hands ofconipetitors. As a result, lenders 
face the choice of acquiring more information in order to evaluate the business 
opportunity or of relying on collateral security as a substitute for more information. 
The Ionner increases the indirect costs of borrowing while the latter may result in 
constraints on the firm's ability to access financing. 
Aug cal a/. (2000) investigate equity-related agency costs in small firms under 
different ownership and management structures and conclude, among other things, that 
external monitoring by banks may result in lower agency costs to shareholders. 
Ou also reiterates the importance of the owner's objective function by raising 
the issues of the growth and career aspirations of entrepreneurs. Objectives, such as 
personal independence and job satisfaction, ollen conflict with wealth accumulation. 
For example, the entrepreneur who is preoccupied with maintaining control is less 
likely to raise funds by selling equity and more likely to rely on debt financing. The 
result is that the capital structure of the small firm very often reflects the objectives and 
choices of the owner/entrepreneur rather than traditional financial theory. 
Utilizing a framework developed by Sprenger et al. (1982), van der Wijst 
(1989) presents an overview of financial structure determinants extracted from the 
empirical literature (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 
Financial Structure Determinants 
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Source: van der Wijst, 1989 
Of particular note, in the area of the firm's internal environment, is the concept 
olthe life cycle of the firm (Churchill and Lewis, 1983). A comprehensive 12-country 
study by Peterson and Shulman (1987) provides support for the concept or a life cycle 
of capital structure. The authors demonstrate that, as a result of declining agency and 
information costs and the increasing availability of financing sources, small firms 
evolve into a lower cost capital structure. Institutional sources and costs are influenced 
by industry type, growth, timing of payments, and organizational type and maturity. 
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This study also provides evidence of the influence of the external environment and in 
particular, the stage of economic development of the host country. Results from this 
preliminary work on life cycle hypothesis indicate that a blend of agency cost, 
inli)rmation asymmetry, static trade-off and pecking order theories are important in 
determining capital structure in small firms. 
Norton (1991), in examining small high growth limns at the post-1130 (initial 
public oftcring) stage, argues strongly for the need to incorporate management theory 
into research on capital structure decisions in small firms. Results from Norton's study 
indicate that a pecking order theory plays a much more important role in explaining 
capital structure decisions in small public firms than do bankruptcy costs, agency costs 
or information asymmetries. Essentially, pecking order theory suggests that 
entrepreneurs prefer internal sources of funds to external sources and prefer external 
debt to equity. Although he excluded managerial theories, Myers (1984) had 
previously argued for the role of pecking order theory in explaining financing choices. 
Van der Wijst (1989) also emphasizes the importance of information costs to 
small and young firms in a dynamic industry, since much of their expertise and 
knowledge is intangible and difficult to quantify. In a study of the investment activities 
of small business investment corporations (SBICs), which are private venture capital 
firms licensed and regulated by the U. S. Small Business Administration. Brewer el a!. 
(1996) lind significant support for the role of contracting (agency) theory in explaining 
investment decisions in small firms. Since SBICs provide both debt and equity 
Iinancinb, this study provides a unique opportunity to explore capital structure 
decisions. Characteristics of the firm that are correlated with agency conflicts are 
investigated to determine their impact on the use of debt or equity. Characteristics of 
SBICs are also examined. Results indicate that debt is more likely to be used to finance 
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projects that generate tangible assets and that allow little management discretion. 
Further, smaller firms are more likely to obtain debt than equity and the likelihood 
increases with the age ofthe firm. Finally, and perhaps most significant for the present 
research, firms whose value depends on growth opportunities or information, such as 
research and development, are less likely to receive debt financing. Conflicting results 
also indicate that firms in industries with more intangible assets arc more likely to 
receive debt. The authors are unable to Fully explain the apparent conflict in these two 
findings, suggesting that financing decisions may be more closely tied to the asset 
being funded in a particular transaction rather than to the total assets of the firm. 
Altliougli not exhaustive, these studies serve to illustrate the diversity and 
complexity of financing decisions in the small business environment and the 
fragmented nature of this literature. They also demonstrate that, as in the large firm 
ellicient market context, the explanation of how firms choose their capital structures 
remains, in Myers (1984) words, "the capital structure puzzle. " Nonetheless, these 
studies provide a useful framework for examining financing decisions from both a 
demand and supply-side perspective. 
2.2 Credit Rationing 
A considerable body of literature dealing with credit rationing has developed 
over the last forty years. Credit rationing is explained as follows. The law of supply 
and demand suggests that if the demand for loans exceeds the supply, the interest rate 
will rise thereby reducing demand and establishing equilibrium. In effect, interest rates 
act to clear the market and restore equilibrium. However, banks do not always increase 
rates. choosing instead to ration credit or provide less than is demanded by customers. 
33 
l; arly theoretical explanations of credit rationing can be traced back to the so-called 
Availability Doctrine (Rosa, 1951). Rosa argued that monetary policy could affect the 
availability of credit through its effect on lenders. Rosa's arguments led to considerable 
interest in credit rationing. Subsequent authors (Kareken, 1957; Hodgman, 1960) 
offered theoretical explanations that were primarily institutional and descriptive in 
nature and based largely on imperfections in (lie commercial loan market. None of the 
early models of credit rationing included consideration of the demand for loans and 
loan rates were assumed to be given exogenous! )'. The assumption was that credit 
availability was determined by the reaction of lenders to changes in yields on 
government securities. As a result, these theories did little to explain the composition 
of hank loan portfolios or lending decisions. 
Jaffe (1967 and 1971) was one of the first to incorporate a demand-side 
perspective into the theory of credit rationing, arguing that inlormation on loan supply 
by itself could not explain the existence of credit rationing. In an attempt to explain 
credit rationing by banks on a non-price basis, Jallc and Modigliani (1969) developed a 
model "... in which the bank must oller a uniform interest rate to difTercnt borrowers, 
though that rate may be chosen freely and the loan size may be varied across 
customers" (I hillier and lbrahimo, 1993; 274). This assumption is clearly inconsistent 
with the reality of loan markets and limits the explanatory power of their model. 
More recently, explanations of credit rationing have been drawn from research 
relating to information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard, as discussed in 
the previous section. Jaffe and Russell (1976) were the first to explore the role of 
information asymmetry in credit rationing. They developed a model of credit rationing 
based on imperfect information and uncertainty where borrowers have more 
information (asymmetry) about the likelihood of default than lenders and credit 
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rationing arises in response to the problem of adverse selection. However, as the 
authors point out, the model does not account for institutional arrangements, such as 
collateral requirements, down payment requirements or other non-price terms. In short, 
the actual market ii)r loans is quite diflcrvnt from the market depicted in the model. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also examined credit rationing under conditions of 
imperfect intbrmation. They argued that their work provided the first theoretical 
justification of true credit rationing. In their view, previous studies attempted to 
explain the relationship between interest rates and loan amounts exclusively on the 
basis of probability of delüult and adverse selection. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981; 394) 
"... reserve the term credit rationing for circumstances in which either (a) among loan 
applicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not, and the 
rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher rate; or 
(b) there arc identifiable groups of individuals in the population who, with a given 
supply of credit, arc unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a 
larger supply of credit, they would. " The authors argued the interest rate charged by 
the bank ali'ects the risk of a loan in two ways: the interest rate acts as a screening 
device and the interest rate affects the behaviour oftlhe borrower. On the one hand, an 
increase in interest rates discourages safer investors (adverse selection effect) while on 
the other hand, borrowers are encouraged to invest in riskier projects (incentive effect). 
As a result of these negative adverse selection and incentive effects, banks ration credit 
rather than raise interest rates. De Meza and Webb (1987) presented a conflicting 
theory of overinvestment rather than credit rationing resulting from a change in the 
assumption regarding returns. Stiglitz and Weiss assumed that all projects have the 
same expected return, whereas de Meza and Webb assumed that projects differ in 
expected returns. 
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l'hc use ol'collateral also has been posited as an alternative approach to credit 
rationing. Collateral in loan contracts can be of two types. The first involves pledging 
assets of the borrowing lion as security in the event ofdcrault. The second type 
involves the borrower pledging additional assets that would not normally be available 
to lenders, such as personal assets of the entrepreneur. It is the latter type that has been 
the rocus of the literature on the role of collateral. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) view 
collateral as a disincentive (kr the borrower to delimit and consider collateral in the 
same light as interest rates. 'I'herclbrc, increasing collateral requirements has the same 
potential negative effects as increasing interest rates. I lowever, they studied the effects 
of interest rates and collateral requirements separately. Bester (1987) allowed banks to 
simultaneously adjust interest rates and collateral requirements. 1 lc also ignored the 
impact of collateral on repayment and lbcusect on its role as a sorting and incentive 
mechanism to address the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Ile 
demonstrated that collateral can be used effectively to sort borrowers of different risk 
and to encourage investment in sailer projects. As a result, he concluded that sufficient 
collateral mitigated the need For lenders to ration credit. 
Chan and Kanatas (1985) also examined the role of collateral. Their 
perspective was the use of collateral under conditions of asymmetric valuations. In 
their view, collateral serves to remedy two types of asymmetries. The first is the case 
where lenders and borrowers have the same information but differ in their opinions 
about the value of projects. The second reflects the more traditional information 
asymmetry situation where differences in assessments and valuations are based on 
informational differences. A key assumption in their model is the absence of moral 
hazard. Chan and Kanatas (1985) argued that collateral could address the problem of 
differences of opinion as well as information asymmetry. In the case of different 
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opinions on valuations, collateral can serve as the observable variable on which the two 
parties can base a loan agreement. In the case of information asymmetry, collateral acts 
as a signal (Leland and Pyle, 1977) to lenders of the borrower's assessment of the 
project's quality. The transaction costs associated with providing collateral result in 
luglh quality borrowers offering more collateral. This argument differs from the 
traditional incentive role of collateral associated with the problem of moral hazard 
which suggests that low quality borrowers provide more collateral. The latter situation 
explains the use ofcollateral to address the problem of risk-averse lenders whereas, the 
use of collateral in the Chan and Kanatas model addresses uncertainties associated with 
valuation problems. 
A more recent discussion or moral hazard by Williamson (1986) focuses on the 
aspect of costly state verification (Townsend, 1979). In this situation, lenders know as 
much as borrowers about the riskiness of projects, but only borrowers are able to 
observe project returns costlcssly. Moral hazard results from the potential for 
borrowers to declare returns that are so low they lead to bankruptcy. Banks are forced 
to respond by incurring costly monitoring. 
In a subsequent paper on moral hazard and private information, Chan and 
Thakor (1987) examine the importance of assumptions concerning competitive 
equilibria in previous studies dealing with credit rationing. The authors point out that 
the concept of competitive equilibrium influences credit allocations. In the Jaffe and 
Russell (1976) model all rents accrue to borrowers, whereas in the Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) model all rents accrue to depositors. Chan and l'hakor (1987) demonstrate that 
in the former case, credit rationing does not result even if information asymmetry and 
moral hazard exist, as long as there is unlimited collateral. A critical underlying 
assumption is that lenders and borrowers agree on the value of the collateral, which as 
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indicated by Marro (1976) is not necessarily so. In the latter case, rationing may result 
under conditions of moral hazard and information asymmetry and as indicated in 
previous research (Chan and Kanatas, 1985) high-quality borrowers may oller more 
collateral. The authors acknowledge a significant limitation associated with the static 
nature of their model. As with previous models, this one does not capture the value of 
ongoing relationships between lenders and borrowers, that would likely affect 
incentives and moral hazard. 
l5uilding on work in the area ofadverse selection and moral hazard, Diamond 
(1989) in a seminal study explored the relationship between reputation formation and 
incentive effects. Borrowers with no track record represent a significant adverse 
selection problem, one that is difficult to mitigate with reputation effects and that likely 
results in paying higher interest rates. 't'hese borrowers also face ºnore severe incentive 
problems that result in choosing more risky and less valuable projects. Over time, 
acquired reputation serves to reduce the conflict of interest between lenders and 
borrowers and to reduce the problem of adverse selection. Reputation can have an 
immediate impact only in cases where adverse selection is minimal. One of the most 
significant implications of Diamond's model is that firms with short credit histories use 
bank borrowing and the associated influence on investment decisions to acquire their 
reputation. Further, Diamond is one of very few to consider bank-borrower 
relationships that extend beyond a single period. 
An additional aspect of moral hazard, examined in the work of Igawa and 
Kanatas (1990), involves the borrower's use of pledged assets. The authors suggest that 
while the use of collateral can effectively sort credit applicants and deal with the issue 
of adverse selection, it can also result in undesirable incentive effects. The potential for 
the lender to acquire assets of the borrower creates an incentive for the borrower to 
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"misuse" pledged assets, thereby reducing their value. Moral hazard results from the 
inability of the lender to observe the "care" exercised by the borrower in the use of the 
pledged assets. Interestingly, the authors do not appear to distinguish between business 
and personal assets as discussed previously. 
In summary, models of credit rationing, based on asymmetric information, 
assume that changes in interest rates have potential adverse effects on the quality of 
loans either through incentive effects or expected monitoring costs. As a result, banks 
control the quality of their loan portfolio by rationing credit rather than increasing rates. 
In cases where the bank can use alternate means to control loan quality, such as 
collateral requirements, credit rationing is unnecessary. 
The literature on credit rationing is highly theoretical. Few attempts have been 
made at a direct assessment of the empirical significance of credit rationing. The 
differing assumptions underlying the various models have diverging implications for 
theory and practice and limit their usefulness. For example, as I lillicr and Ibrahimo 
(1993) point out, the models typically assume that rationing takes the form of denying 
loans at any interest rate. It would be useful to examine the situation where loans are 
approved at amounts less than demanded. Similarly, the models assume that borrowers 
know more about the riskiness and outcomes of their projects than do lenders. This 
assumption is unlikely to hold in the case of many small and new firms, nor is it 
consistent with the specialized lending expertise and risk assessment processes of the 
chartered banks. Nonetheless, the various models of credit rationing offer insights into 
the significance of asymmetric information and the associated problems of adverse 
selection, moral hazard and monitoring costs in the credit market. Interestingly, one of 
the assumptions underlying credit rationing, that financial intermediation takes place 
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exclusively through (lie use of a standard debt contract, may be consistent witli' much of 
the small firm scclor of the cconomy. 
2.3 Commercial Lending 
The previous discussions or information asymmetry and agency costs provide a 
partial ti-ancwork within which to examinc the litcrature on risk asscssment processcs 
and decision criteria employed in commercial lending. Studies that develop and 
explore these aspects or the relationships between lenders and entrepreneurs arc 
considered in some detail in this section of the literature review. However, credit 
rationing and finance gaps generally, might also result from fundamental uncertainty 
and tiom lending models that are limited by bounded rationality and influenced by 
cognitive dissonance (Philpott, 1995). Further, there is some evidence in the literature 
to suggest that risk asscssmcnt and lending decisions are influenced by environmental 
(Leblebici and Salanik, 1981) and organizational factors (McNamara and Brotniley, 
1997) and by Icnutcrs' intuition (Jankowicz and I Iisrich, 1987). The majority oI' thesc 
studies are empirical and a substantial portion is related to small firms. However, as 
indicated by Mattson (1993), very few studies of bank decision-making have been 
made public. As a result, the empirical base is quite limited. As a first stage in the 
review ol'the literature on commercial Iciuling, it is useful to discuss a framework for 
credit decision-making and to examine the results or a number ofcompreliensivc 
studies of bank lending in Canada. 
latch and Wynant (1986) propose a loan evaluation and management model 
that consists of four stages: borrower risk assessment; estimating borrower's needs; 
structuring a loan package; and loan management which includes establishing aI liowV- 
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up control system. Risk assessment, which consists of an evaluation of the tir' u's Future 
prospects, is considered by the authors to be the most critical stage in the process. To 
conduct this assessment, the commercial lender must understand and assess the firm's 
economic and industrial environment and its internal strengths and weaknesses. Risk 
assessment also provides a framework for subsequently determining financing 
requirements and for managing risks. The second stage consists of determining 
financing needs and of assessing the sensitivity of the requirements to uncertainties 
identified in the risk assessment. The third stage involves structuring the terms of the 
loan, assuming one is lorthcoming. Loan terns consist of: the amount, the repayment 
provisions, the collateral required, the interest rate charged and loan covenants and 
conditions. In sum, the terns of the loan allow the lending institution to modify the 
risks in order to achieve the appropriate risk/return profile. The fourth stage is loan 
management and consists of the monitoring processes that the banks employ to manage 
their risk exposure. Such monitoring focuses on the key risks and uncertainties, 
identified in the risk assessment stage, and goes hand-in-hand with the loan covenants 
and conditions. A notable omission in this model is the organizational framework, 
including bank philosophies, policies and procedures. 
In a major study of banks and small business borrowers in Canada, Wynant and 
Hatch (1991) report on bank lending practices for small businesses. "This study 
explored, among other areas, three aspects of credit decision-making; namely, the 
process used to evaluate credit risks, the factors that distinguish acceptable from 
unacceptable applications and the terms and features of approved loans. Data 
collection consisted of interviews with, and surveys of, bankers and clients, 
examination of actual credit files, and review of training provided to account managers. 
Results indicate that the banks focus primarily on risk assessment and that cash flow 
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and collateral arc the two most important considerations in determining the level of 
risk. Potential revenues or returns and the amount of time required to manage the 
account (monitoring) were of secondary importance compared to the degree of risk. 
Collateral is considered to be necessary but not sufficient to obtaining financing. Risk 
ratings also reflect the character of the entrepreneur, the competitive structure ofthe 
firm's industry and the firm's ability to compete. Postponement of shareholder claims 
and lilt insurance on key principals are the most frequently used loan covenants. 
I lowever, other conditions cover a wide range of options. 
A more recent study (Thompson Lightstone and Co. Ltd., 1998), the third in a 
annual series designed to examine SME access to financing in Canada, explores the 
role of 70 variables in the account manager's loan approval decision. This study 
employs logistic multiple regression analysis and concludes, as in the two previous 
years, that the primary drivers of loan acceptance are ability to service the debt or cash 
Ilow, collateral, and the personal character or credibility of the entrepreneur. Except 
for the issue of account manager turnover, none of these studies specifically addressed 
the role of bank structure, philosophies or policies in lending decisions. 
fhc Wynant and I latch (1991) study provides some support for the role of the 
bank's organizational structure, commitment to small business, and the training and 
experience of account managers in the credit decision-making process. More 
specilically, this study found significant differences between the views of top 
management and account managers of the attractiveness of small business customers. 
Further, the skills and attitudes of bankers varied substantially, reflecting differences in 
experience, training and personality. Workload and tenure of account managers had an 
impact on risk assessment but not on lending terms. Similarly, collateral recluircniciits 
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varied with the account managers' lending experience, attitudes to risk-taking and 
knowledge or clients. 
From a client perspective, this study concludes "most small business managers 
have a poor understanding of the financing role of banks, and how applications are 
evaluated and managed" (Wynant and IIatch, 1991; 12). In addition, there are some 
significant differences as to the reasons for loan declines given by customers and those 
given by account managers. In particular, small business customers did not mention 
character, ability or credit history, although these factors were frequently cited in the 
credit files. As tlic authors suggest, "either the banker has not mentioned these 
considerations when justifying the bank's decision or the principal has chosen not to 
hear this aspect of the explanation" (Wynant and I latch, 1991; 301). The same 
differences were reported in the Thompson Lightstone and Company Ltd. study (1998). 
In addition, respondents in the latter study mentioned a numbcr of reasons not cited by 
account managers, the most notable being bank rules and requirements that are overly 
strict. 
Additional research on lending to small businesses is organized and discussed 
there in the following areas: studies that develop and examine lending models; studies 
that explore the underlying relationships between lenders and entrepreneurs; and 
studies that examine the factors influencing lending decisions and credit terms. 
2.3.1 Lending Models 
Doreen and Farhoomand (1983) propose a credit-scoring model for small firms 
that incorporates qualitative and quantitative factors. The authors argue that previous 
models either focused on predicting corporate bankruptcy (Altman, 1968) or on 
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commercial lending to large firms (Orgler, 1970) or limited their evaluation to4financial 
data (Edmister, 1971). They highlight three key differences between small business 
loans and commercial lending to large firms. First, credit histories and financial ratios 
are often less useful in evaluating small and especially, new firms. Second, it takes just 
as long to review an application from a small firm as a large firm. Therefore, the 
opportunity cost is greater, as loans are usually for lessor amounts. Third, personal 
characteristics and capabilities ofowllcr/managers are more important in evaluating 
loans to small firms. Model development starts with the "Cs" of credit and utilizes 
previous research to develop a list of potential factors that influence the extension of 
bank credit to small firms. A two-stage survey of financial institutions and subsequent 
discriminant analysis is used to develop the model. Respondents are drawn from 
commercial banks, finance companies, government departments, the Federal Business 
Development Bank (currently Business Development Bank of Canada) and venture 
capital firms. The most important contributing factors identified in this model include 
cofli pctitive situation, cash flow, owner/manager experience, equity, security, product, 
and communication skills. The authors also stress the importance of the judbcmciit of 
the account manager in the lending decision, although the model does not specifically 
incorporate this factor. 
McNamara and Bromilcy (1993) use data from one US bank to develop and 
validate a model that incorporates a multilevel risk-rating scale. They utilize logistic 
regression to overcome some of the questionable assumptions associated with other 
types of analysis. The major contribution of the model is that it demonstrates the 
feasibility of predicting risk for small commercial borrowers. I lowever, the model 
incorporates only financial measures or ratios, omitting such Ihclors as managCI ent, 
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thereby limiting its usefulness. Further, the model is of little use with startup 
or 
new 
firms with no financial history. 
Longnecker el al. (1997) review the literature on credit scoring and provide an 
overview of a number of approaches, including the Small Business Scoring Service 
(SBSS). SBSS was developed by Robert Morris Associates (an association of 
commercial loan officers and credit risk managers from over 3,000 member financial 
institutions) and Fair, Isaac and Co. (a computer software modeler). As in the case of 
McNamara and l3romilcy (1993), this model uses logistic regression and incorporates 
läctors such as financial condition, prior payment history, public filings, industry 
comparative data and company demographics. Some scoring models arc developed 
From prior performance data of similar businesses while others are based on the owner's 
prior payment performance. It is argued that the use of credit scoring reduces the cost 
of serving smaller clients and improves the accuracy of predicting loan performance. 
The authors suggest the most significant implication of credit scoring is that it permits 
banks to price loans according to risk, a practice that has been uncommon in the past. 
Further, they speculate that the reduction in personal contact associated with credit 
scoring may be detrimental to aspects of relationship banking. 
2.3.2 Banking Relationships and Information Asymmetry 
'I'Ihc significance and theoretical implications of information asymmetry and 
agency costs to the lending relationship have been discussed previously in the capital 
structure and credit rationing areas. The few studies that provide empirical evidence of 
the role and extent cal'thesc Iäctors in commercial lending are discussed briefly here. 
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I3inks cal a!. (I 992) attempted to mcasurc the extent cal' inCormatiun asymmetries 
that exist between firms and UK banks. Using a postal survey, respondents (4000 
tfirms) were asked to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of the information flows 
between the banks and their businesses. Respondents ranked the importance of four 
'actors (knowledge of business, knowledge of industry, knowledge of market and 
provides helpful advice) to the service relationship and then rated the banks' ability to 
Provide these services. The baps bctwcen what the liruis require and what they receive 
'vcrc analyzed at the aggregate level and by sector, size and growth rate to determine 
whether gaps are more pronounced for particular types of firms. Results indicate the 
gaps are more severe in terns of knowledge of industry and market, especially for 
firms in the manufacturing sector, for high growth firms and for declining lirnis. 
Smaller firms are also less satisfied in all three knowledge areas than are larger firms. 
The results of this research have implications for the provision of finance to small 
firms. As the authors indicate, it would appear the types of firms that require banks to 
take a more prospects-based approach are the very ones that are the most dissatisfied 
with the quality ol'services received. The concern is these perceptions may lead some 
firms to ignore traditional bank finance because they perceive the banks to be too 
poorly informed to understand their trading conditions. 
An exploratory study (Iauicw and I3inks, 1997) of banking relationships in the 
UK uses data from a survey of banks and small firms to examine the benefits that 
accrue to both groups from various forins of participation, including personal 
interaction, information sharing and responsible behaviour. Personal interaction refers 
to Victors such as trust, reliability, support and cooperation. information sharing 
consists of providing both in n oration that is required and voluntary infimuation 
inteudeci to enhance the service being hrovidcd. Responsible behaviour refers to the 
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ippropriate exercise of duties and responsibilities. Findings indicate firms benefit from 
j articipation through improved service quality and better financing terms and 
conditions. Banks benefit through higher levels of customer satisfaction and loyalty. 
While there are limitations arising from the use of firm data as a proxy for bank 
behaviour, the results suggest that participation can be a useful mechanism for reducing 
the problem of information asymmetry in banking relationships. The authors suggest 
that participation iüay be even more important to young, entrepreneurial firms with 
high growth aspirations. 
A recent study by Petty and Upton (1997) also examines the nature of the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and bankers. This study employs in-depth 
interviews with, and a survey of, bankers and entrepreneurs. The authors conclude 
relationships between bankers and owners affect the availability of financing but not 
the cost. The findings are based oil perceptions and, as a result, the authors 
acknowledge that they have not been able to confirm whether the facts support these 
pperceptions. This study also provides insights into the criteria used by bankers in 
making loans and in negotiating terms, which will be discussed in the next section or 
the literature review. 
One of very few studies to explore banking relationships in the context of 
technology-based small firms was conducted in the UK by Philpott (1995). Philpott 
utilizes send-structured interviews with high technology entrepreneurs to explore 
various aspects of the banking relationship. The underlying premise for the study is 
that high technology firms face significant information asymmetry problems as a result 
ol'technological uncertainty, bounded rationality and cognitive dissonance. These 
issues exacerbate adverse selection and moral hazard problems for finance providers 
and lürther constrain access to debt financing by small high technology firms. 
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Similarly, Philpott posits that collateral requirements pose significant problems for 
small high technology firms whose assets are predominantly intangible. Results 
indicate that entrepreneurs perceive banks to lack an understanding of the nature of 
technology businesses and of technology, and to use collateral requirements in lieu of 
technology assessment. This is evident even in the case of banks that have technology 
managers. The impact has been to constrain access to debt financing, thereby limiting 
the growth potential of these firms. The problem is compounded by the Jindinb that 
these firms are also Fundamentally opposed to the use of outside equity capital. 
Riding and Swill (1993) also use a sample ofsmall firms to compare the 
banking experiences of high technology businesses to firms that place relatively little 
reliance on technology. In contrast to Philpott (1995), they lind that none of the 
measures of borrowing experience indicate differences between technology-based firms 
and non-technology-based counterparts. Turndown rates, collateral demands and 
interest rates did not differ significantly between the two categories of firms. 
I louston and James (2001) examine whether financial constraints faced by 
publicly traded firms vary systematically with reliance on bank debt and with the 
number of banks used by a firm. Results confirm "... that a close banking relationship 
lowers the cost of external financing for projects in which exclusive reliance on bank 
financing is feasible (Ilouston and James, 2001; 372). 
2.3.3 Commercial Lending Processes and Decision Criteria 
A number of studies have examined lending decisions in an attempt to 
determine the relative importance of various factors to the decision whether or not to 
extend credit and to the associated loan terms and conditions. The vast majority of 
48 
these studies utilize the basic framework of the "Cs" of credit, namely capital, y 
collateral, conditions, capacity and character, and previous research to identify relevant 
criteria. With Few exceptions (Lcblcbici and Salancik, 1981; Fletcher, 1995a and 
I995l)McNamara and 13romilcy, 1997), these studies subsequently use surveys or, and 
interviews with, small business owners and bankers to determine the importance of 
these criteria. In some cases, the approach has been to examine reasons why banks 
decline requests (Robbie, 1986), while in other cases the focus has been on ranking 
(Petty and Upton, 1997) or rating the importance of factors (Ulrich and Arlow, 1981). 
In one case, simple frequency of mention (Gasse, 1990) is used as the measure of 
importance. The result has been a myriad of lists and criteria that provide some 
insights but Iittle conclusive evidence as to the importance of these criteria. Further, 
none of these studies has examined lending in the context of knowledge-based firms. 
Notwithstanding the limitations associated with much of the research in this 
area, there are some underlying themes and conclusions that are useful to the present 
research. First, it is clear that loan evaluation is a multidimensional process. Second, 
the large number of variables under study are interrelated and can be represented by a 
smaller number of independent Ibctors. Third, in the risk/return trade-orr, risk appears 
to outweigh return in importance to lenders. Fourth, risk is a Function of ability to 
service the debt or cash flow and collateral, although business conditions and the 
character of the entrepreneur influence risk assessment. In addition, some researchers 
(Leblebici and Salancik, 1981; Fletcher, 1995a and 1995b; McNamara and Bromiley, 
1997), as noted above, have taken a more grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) to examining the decision-making processes employed in commercial lending. 
As a result, these studies provide a broader context within which to view the lending 
process. A review of these studies follows. 
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The earliest of these studies, conducted by Leblebici and Salancik (19811), 
reports on the effects of environmental uncertainty on structure and decision making in 
the loan departments of 4l independent banks in the United States. Although the focus 
is on personal lending, the study provides useful insights into the effects of 
environmental diversity and volatility on information and decision processes in banks. 
Utilizing typologies of Thompson (1967) and others (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Duncan, 1972), the authors categorize environments in terms of their diversity (the 
range of an organization's activities) and their volatility (the rate of change among those 
activities). Diversity is a source of uncertainty tlhat can be anticipated, whereas 
volatility cannot. Loan officers were presented with hypothetical applications and 
asked to estimate perceived probability of repayment and perceived uncertainty of the 
probabilities. They were also asked to indicate the decision strategies they would use, 
the authorizations they would need and the additional information they would require in 
order to make a decision. Results indicate that the normal operations procedures used 
by the banks to process loans varied with the diversity, but not the volatility, of their 
environment. The banks' organizational structures and processes for handling loan 
requests take account of uncertainty arising from diversity. Volatility was associated 
with the uncertainty cxpcricnccd for particular decisions, and appears to be accounted 
Ior by the loan managers in their personal information acquisition strategics. 
The study by Fletcher (1995a and 1995b) is one of few to examine lending 
decisions under circumstances that resemble, as much as possible, actual lending 
conditions. To achieve this situation, the researcher took on the role of the entrepreneur 
and was interviewed by 38 bank managers in branches of three Scottish banks. The 
bank managers were provided with a business plan in advance of the interview. The 
interview and the funding decision, as well as subsequent interviews of bank managers 
50 
on the importance of various criteria, provided the data for comparative analysis. The 
Scottish study replicated a previous study by Deakins and llussain (1991) carried out in 
the West Midlands of England. Although the Scottish bankers were more favourably 
disposed to the proposal than the English bankers, the findings from both studies are 
remarkably similar. In both cases, financial information, leverage and collateral are the 
key Factors in the risk assessment process, suggesting a capital-based approached to 
lending. The most significant contributions of this study lie in the methodology. The 
qualitative approach permits insight into the decision-making process, providing details 
that would be impossible to ascertain through a standard interview process. This 
approach also enables a comparison between banks' stated policies and procedures and 
the actual practices of account managers, although in this study, the extent to which 
bankers used such'guidelines was not investigated specifically. Finally, data collection 
under conditions that mirror actual lending decisions minimizes the problems 
associated with recall and with individuals indicating one thing and doing something 
quite different. 
A third study (McNamara and l3romiley, 1997) that utilizes data From actual 
decisions investigates organizational and cognitive influences on risk assessment in 
commercial lending. More specifically, this study examines two organizational 
variables: pressure for profitability and degree of formalization of decision processes, 
and three cognitive variables: ambiguity avoidance, cognitive reactions to portfolio 
effects, and the fads-and-fashions effect (excitement associated with certain industries). 
Results from this study make a strong case for the influence of organizational factors on 
risk assessment in commercial lending. While both organizational and cognitive 
variables influence decision-making in commercial lending, organizational factors 
appear to dominate. The organizational pressure for profitability resulted in newer 
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borrowers and borrowers requesting larger loans receiving more favourable treatment. 
These findings are clearly at odds with those supporting ambiguity avoidance (Ellsberg, 
1961) and risk aversion related to loan size (Kahncman and Lovallo, 1993). The data 
also support the influence of standardization or formalization of decision processes on 
risk assessment. Standardization of the loan review process appeared to increase the 
sensitivity of lenders to the risk presented by borrowers. The most significant cognitive 
variable emerging 1 om the data related to the lads-and-fashions effect. Lenders were 
more favourable in their treatment of firms in exciting industries, notwithstanding the 
läct that many loan officers indicated they avoided such industries because they arc too 
risky. Finally, one of the most interesting findings and significant implications of the 
study is that the primary organizational effect found resulted from informal practices 
rather than the formal organizational policies and procedures. 
In discussing the implications of their findings concerning the fads-and-fashion 
effect, McNamara and 13romiley (1997; 1084) suggest that "This pattern demonstrates 
how the addition of complex and subjective analysis by an expert (the banker) actually 
hurl the quality of the judgement. " Judgement and intuition is investigated further in 
two additional studies. Research by Jankowicz and Ilisrich (1987) explores the role of 
intuition in small business lending decisions. Findings from this study indicate two of 
the live "C's", capacity and character, depend largely on the intuitive judgement of the 
loans officer. Gasse (1990) in comparing decision-making for small business loans in 
general to new business loans in particular, concludes that judgement or intuition takes 
on greater importance in the latter cases. 
One of the more recent studies analyzing the criteria used by bank officers in 
evaluating venture proposals is a study by Reitan and Waagp (1998). Although the 
focus of this study is on the evaluation criteria used in screening loan applications, its 
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main contribution results from the use of gap analysis to examine the ability of bank 
o('ficcrs to assess the various criteria. Results indicate that bank officers perceive their 
ability to evaluate important criteria related to business strategy, such as market 
potential. customer need and competitive advantage, to be quite low. Similarly, they 
report low levels of ability to evaluate criteria they perceive as being of lessor 
importance, such as new technology, new markets and demonstrable concepts (i. e. 
prototypes). In combination, these findings have significant implications for new 
technology-based ventures and for firms operating in new markets. The study also 
makes a useful contribution by building on research undertaken in the venture capital 
industry. As the authors point out, this was done in light of the limited research made 
available on commercial bank lending. 
The studies of the lending process and lending criteria discussed to this point 
are concerned primarily with the decision whether or not to extend credit. Additional 
research has focused more specifically on decisions concerning the terms and 
conditions associated with commercial loans. For example, Fabowale, Riding and 
Swift (1991) develop and validate a multivariate model of the factors influencing the 
terms of bank credit. Results of this research indicate that rates on loans to small 
businesses are primarily determined by a single dimension - capacity. In general, it was 
('ound that rates were not associated with the availability of collateral, the industrial 
sector of the firm, the urban or rural location, rates of sales growth, the organizational 
form of the business, the gender of the owner, the previous credit record of the owners, 
the age of the firm, or the financial management of the firm. The authors conclude by 
raising the question, "Could it be, that in the highly centralized banking environment in 
which most Canadian small businesses must operate, that the 5 C's are reduced to a 
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single C and that character, collateral, conditions, and capital are less important than 
capacity? " (Fabowalc el al., 1993; 39). 
Apilado and Millington (1992) explore the use of restrictive loan covenants and 
risk adjustment in lending to small businesses. Covenants are used by banks to address 
agency problems and to mitigate risks. Typical covenants relate to dividend policy, 
liquidity, profitability and leverage. Results demonstrate that more loan covenants are 
used with small Firms and that small firms have substantially higher interest rates in 
addition to more covenants. The authors conclude that small firms may be paying 
interest rate premiums that arc unwarranted given the propensity of banks to also use 
more covenants. One outstanding question arising From this study is whether or not 
banks make a connection between the interest rate charged and the use of covenants? 
Rosman and Bedard (1999) investigate loan structuring decisions including the 
use ol'collateral and covenants using computerized process tracing. Findings from 
their research confirm that loan structure decisions may be contingent on the way loan 
officers analyze information. 
Research into commercial lending, although not focused on knowledge-based 
businesses, makes a number of useful contributions to the present study. First, it 
provides a framework that can be adapted for use in examining institutional lending 
decisions in the context of KBBs. Second, it provides a limited empirical body of 
evidence on the financing experiences ofsmnall firms against which lindings from the 
present study may be compared. Third, it identifies supply-side factors and lending 
criteria that can be explored in terms of lending to knowledge-based businesses. 
Finally, a few studies use a grounded approach to examine decision-making; processes, 
suggesting a broader context within which to explore lending to KBBs. 
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2.4 Venture Capitalist Decision-Making Processes and Criteria 
Venture capital is broadly dclined as A... capital which is not secured by assets 
and is invested in or loaned to a company by an outside investor" (Association of 
Canadian Venture Capital Companies, 1992; 7). Previous research related to venture 
capital investment is considered here for a number of reasons. Unlike the banking 
situation, there is a considerable body of literature on venture capital decision-making 
processes and criteria. As discussed previously, at least one study (Reitan and Waagp, 
1998) has been able to utilize this research in the commercial lending context. Further, 
there are similarities between venture capital investing and lending, especially in terms 
of inflormation asymmetry, agency costs and monitoring, although a notable difference 
concerns the absence of collateral or security. In some cases, venture capitalists 
actually provide debt as well as equity. 
The high risk associated with the provision of venture capital is such that firms 
with fewer tangible assets have very often been the beneficiaries of such investment. 
Technology-based ventures with high requirements for investment in research and 
development and long lead times to achieve commercial viability are good examples. 
In 1997, investment by members of the Canadian Venture Capital Association in 
technology-based ventures accounted for 63 percent of the businesses financed 
(Canadian Venture Capital Association, 1997). Further, it appears that venture capital 
investments in smaller firms (annual revenues of less than $5 million) have increased 
to the point where they accounted for a majority (51%) of the funds invested in 1997. 
't'hese technology-based small firms represent a significant portion of firms in the 
knowledge-based'sectors that are the focus of the present research. Finally and equally 
noteworthy, is the fact that the availability of venture capital for early stage investment 
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leas increased by more than livcl'uld over the last three years, indicating an increasing 
propensity for venture capitalists to provide seed and start-up financing. The result is 
the need for venture capitalists to assess firms with little or no history and with few 
tangible assets, a situation not unlike that faced by the banks when lending to 
knowledge-based businesses. 
Although the literature on venture capital investing is more extensive than the 
available research on commercial lending, it is also highly fragmented. With Few 
exceptions (Fried and I lisrich, 1994; I lall and I Cofer, 1993; Shepherd, 1997), the vast 
majority of the studies of venture capital investing are survey-based and involve 
respondents rating or ranking predetermined decision criteria (Johnson, 1979; 
Kryzanowski and Giraldcau, 1977). Most studies focus on venture capitalists, although 
some also examine the perceptions of entrepreneurs (Bruno and Tyebjce, 1983). 
Participants arc usually asked to indicate the importance of various factors to the 
decision to invest but in some cases the focus is the factors underlying negative 
decisions (Johnson, 1979). Only a few studies utilize a decision-making framework or 
process model to investigate factors at different stages in the process (Bruno and 
'I'ycbjec, 1984; l3oocock and Woods, 1997). With few exceptions (Pence, 1981; 
Sandberg, 1987 and 1988; Zacharakis, 1998; Zacharakis and Sheppard, 2001), most 
examine criteria without reference to particular decisions or specific proposals. Still 
others replicate previous studies in an attempt to compare practices in various countries 
(Knight, 1986 and 1990). Finally, a few of the studies deal with technology-based 
firms (Pence, 1981; 'fyebjee and Bruno, 1981) and sectors such as biotechnology 
(Bogle and Ruber, 1992), providing insights into potential differences related to the 
intangible nature of the assets of investee firms. An overview of this research follows, 
including limitations and implications for the present research. 
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In one of the earlier studies, Kryzanowski and Giraldeau (1977) employ a 
survey to compare the selection criteria of Canadian and American venture capitalists. 
I'articipants the asked to provide a relative ranking of risk criteria by allocating points 
(weightings) to a number of risk components of a venture capital investment. The 
results suggest that hoth groups consider (lie assessment ol'inanagement to be the most 
important criterion. Key components of management include the financial commitment 
of the entrepreneur, managerial competence, and integrity and reliability. Other factors 
identified in order of importance included: product, market, track record, physical 
security, variance in prolitability and years in existence of tlhe company. One 
respondent provided the following observation with respect to the difficulties and 
limitations associated with abstract assessments, "... nor do I think it is possible to 
objectively weigh different factors on a theoretical basis, although you might be able to 
do it given a particular situation" (Kryzanowski and Giraldcau, 1977; 33). A 
subsequent study (Johnson, 1979) that focused on the reasons why entrepreneurs are 
denied financing by Small Business Investment Corporations (SBICs) and venture 
capital firms cane to a similar conclusion regarding the primary importance of 
management. 
A study by 7'yebjee and Bruno (1981) represents the first attempt to integrate 
research on three aspects of venture capital investment: the management process in 
venture capital firms, including decision processes and work flow; the relationship 
between evaluative criteria and actual decisions; and market efficiency and the 
risk/return trade-off. This research, conducted in stages, provides insights into the 
processes and criteria employed in deal evaluation and risk evaluation. A rank ordering 
of evaluative factors in terms of their association with a positive investment decision 
confirms the importance of management quality. The degree of innovation, the stage of 
57 
product development and the nature of the market receive little emphasis. A föllow-up 
study (Bruno and Tycbjcc, 1983) to determine perceptions of entrepreneurs who are 
denied financing by venture capitalists indicates similar reasons, although the 
entrepreneurs were less likely to ascribe the reason for denial to their own management 
limitations. 
A subsequent study by Tycbjee and Bruno (1984), that models the investment 
process of venture capitalists, distinguishes between factors that are important at two 
stages: screening and evaluation. At the screening stage, the Ibllowint; factors are 
important: the size of the investment and the policy ortlie rund, the technology and the 
market sector, the geographic location or the venture and the stage or financing. At the 
evaluation stage, venture capitalists rated deals on the basis of 23 factors. A five-factor 
solution explains 60.4 percent of the variation. "These are: market attractiveness 
including size, growth, need and accessibility; product dil1crcntiation, including 
uniqueness, legal protection and high profit margin; managerial capabilities including 
breadth of functional management skills and favourable references; environmental 
threat resistance, including changing technology, sensitivity to economic conditions 
and barriers to entry; and cash-out potential or opportunity to liquidate. The two 
tiictors with the greatest impact on risk perceptions were lack of management 
capabilities and resistance to environmental threats. Similarly, two factors had the most 
significant impact on expected return: attractive market conditions and a highly 
differentiated product. A follow-up validation indicates that the model may 
underreprescnt the importance of the quality of the management team in the initial 
screening process: Also, there was considerable disagreement with the statistical 
results suggesting that the quality of the management influences risk but not expected 
return. One very interesting observation came from a respondent who indicated not 
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l ormally distinguishing between risk and return, as was implicitly assumed in the 
formulation. The other important contribution of this paper is the empirical support for 
ý1 model of the venture capital decision process. Such models have been developed in 
J'revious research oll venture capital (I lolilnan, 1972; Poindexter, 1976; Timmons and 
(iumpert, 1982; Wells, 1974), and posit a sequential process of venture capital activity 
consisting of the Following stages: deal origination; deal screening; deal evaluation; 
deal structuring; and post investnment activities. 
Pence (1981) provides a useful framework for investigating the investment 
decision-making processes or venture capitalists, especially in the traditional areas of 
return on investment, risk and liquidity. This study is based on investments in start-up, 
technologically innovative enterprises and utilizes hypothetical venture proposals. The 
research design is particularly interesting. Three venture plans were designed which 
included information in eight categories that venture capitalists evaluate in making their 
investment decisions. The eight categories were determined through initial interviews 
with venture capitalists and reflected three primary factors that venture capitalists 
considered important: management qualifications; financial projections and related 
market information; and potential exit opportunities. Second interviews, following the 
review of the venture plans, resulted in the compilation of 2l categories for recording 
venture capitalists' responses. Risk and return measures were also included. 
A 1985 article by Macmillan, Siegel and Narasilima, provides a follow-up and 
comparison to Tycbjcc and Bruno's 1981 study. This study employs survey 
Methodology to identify and explore 27 criteria grouped into six areas: two related to 
the entrepreneur, and one each related to the product, the market, the venture team and 
financial. Factor analysis employing the concept of managing risk is used to identify 
six risk categories as follows: competitive risk, bailout risk, investment risk, 
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Management risk, implementation risk and lcadcrship risk. The authors conclude that 
the major shift that has occurred since Tybjee and Bruno's (1981) study is that venture 
capitalists have reduced their expectation of specific skills (marketing, technical, etc. ) 
on the part of the entrepreneur and shifted these expectations to the venture team. A 
UK study (Dixon, 1991) providcs further evidence orthc importance of the 
management team to reducing risk and increasing potential returns from venture capital 
investments. 
A 1986 study by Knight replicates the MacMillan et al. study (1985) and 
cunilýarcs ('uiýaclian venture capitalists lu their US counterparts. 'Miere arc some slight 
differences but generally the results arc remarkably similar. A 1990 study by Knight 
extends the analysis to include Asia and 1'surope and concludes that all groups have 
similar concerns and rank the criteria in a similar way, with few exceptions. The 
entrepreneur's personality and experience rate much higher in general than the product 
or market characteristics or linancial considerations. This is especially true of the 
Canadian firms. Knight (1994) provides sonic longitudinal data in a follow-up study 
four years later in Canada in which he indicates that responses had moved upward on 
all dimensions, much closer to the US responses. However, he concludes high 
technology investments arc not nearly as popular with venture capitalists in Canada as 
in the US. 
A subsequent study by Macmillan el al. (1987) provides u useful link between 
selection criteria and subsequent performance. This study identifies two critical criteria 
that are predictors of venture success, not identified in the previous study (Macmillan et 
ul., 1985): market acceptance and competitive threat. The conclusion drawn is that the 
I'actors identified in the earlier study were not good predictors, not because of having 
limited value but because the venture capitalists had already applied them in the 
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screening process to weed out undesirable ventures. This finding reinforces the 
importance of examining factors at various stages in the investment process. 
A 1987 study by Khan utilizes two noncompensatory actuarial models, 
conjunctive and disjunctive, to model both venture capitalists' judgements (expected 
eºutcoliles) and the environment (actual outcomes). A disjunctive decision Process 
places strong emphasis on one or two attributes in judging a potential investment. A 
conjunctive process ensures that a prospective investment is satisfactory at a minimum 
level on each attribute. Results indicate that conjunctive models were generally 
superior predictors. Furtlher, the environment-based conjunctive and disjunctive 
models were tar more successful predictors than the judgement-based models, 
suggesting that support systems to aid venture capitalists are entirely feasible. In 
arriving at their judgements, venture capitalists emphasized the entrepreneur's desire for 
success and the nature of the product. The most important variable in the environment- 
based model was the creativity/ingenuity of the entrepreneur. Predictor variables were 
drawn From a review of the literature and from interviews with a sample of prominent 
venture capitalists. 
A pilot study by Sandberg, Sehweiber and I Iofcr (1988) explores the use of 
verbal protocols to determine venture capitalist decision criteria. The authors argue 
that human decision making cannot be understood by simply studying final decisions; 
"examining decision processes, rather than merely criteria, is vital to capturing venture 
capitalists' wisdom. " The message is that perceptual, emotional and cognitive 
processes must also be studied to gain a greater understanding of human decision 
making. The authors conclude that greater understanding of decision processes could 
help to identify noncompensatory criteria and the conditions governing contingent 
criteria or weightings. 
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A study by Florida and Kenney (1988), although not directly related to 
venture 
capital decision making, raises the issue of the importance of contact networks and 
information to both deal flow and investment monitoring and goes a long way toward 
extplaiining why venture capitalists cluster together. Clustering of knowledge-based 
businesses may have implications for lending structures and decision-making processes 
(Nordicity Group Ltd, 1997). 
Rea (1989) surveys venture capitalists in an attempt to compare the factors that 
underlie successful negotiations fur seed/start-up financing to those that explain flailed 
negotiations. Results indicate that market opportunities with significant growth 
potential are much more important than product factors in successful negotiations. 
Failed negotiations -arc explained largely by the lack of crcdibility of the plan and the 
management team. 
I Iisric: h and Jankowicz (1990) employ repertory grid structure to explore the 
role of intuition in venture capital decisions. This study makes comparisons to similar 
work by the authors studying small business loan decisions (Jankowicz and I lisrich, 
1987). One way in which the venture capitalists differ from the loans officers is their 
low cognitive complexity -a remarkably high proportion of the construct variance 
relates to a single theme - that of adegtuacy of management. The authors conclude that 
this difference may be attributable to the level of the decision-maker (seniority ol'role) 
- more senior in the case of the venture capitalists and more junior in the case of the 
loans oflicer, and cite work by Isenor (1984) to support this conclusioin. 
A 1992 study by Bogle and Ruber explores venture capital linancing of the 
biotechnology sector. The authors conclude that venture capitalists are more interested 
in late rather than early-stage stage firms and approach biotechnology investments in 
much the same way as other investments, heavily weighting the personal qualities and 
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experience of the entrepreneur, the presence of a balanced management team and the 
existence of strong business and management skills. Unfortunately, they perceive these 
competencies to be largely missing from the sector. 
A 1993 study by Rosman and O'Neill compares the decision behaviour 
(information acquisition strategies) of venture capitalists that provide debt financing 
(mezzanine Iinancing) to commercial lenders. Using a computer-based experiment, the 
authors conclude that venture capitalists showed a stronger preference for strategic data 
and less interest in historical financial data. Both groups minimized the use of financial 
forecasts and followed decisions processes persistently across different types of 
companies (startup and well established). 
A 1993 study by l lall and I lotcr uses verbal protocol analysis to explore the 
decision-making processes used by venture capitalists. The study recognizes the 
multistage, multicriteria and multiperson nature of the venture evaluation process and 
argues for the use of a research approach (verbal protocols) that captures the füll range 
of data nuances and conditionality. The findings contradict much of the previous 
research with respect to the importance of the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and 
the strategy of the proposed venture (at least during the early stages of the venture 
evaluation process). 
Schilit and Chandran (1993) explore the potential contribution of decision 
making and organization theory to the venture capital decision process. The authors 
argue that research in this area has concentrated on its organizational and 
environmental aspects but not on its individual or social-psychological aspects. Much 
of the research has found support for a rational decision-making approach from the 
economics and behavioral literature in which investors make decisions based on the 
risk/return nature ofthe investment opportunities. The authors conclude that the 
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transactional or mechanical aspects of venture capital funding can be explained 
adequately by theories of economics and finance, but the human aspect, or more 
precisely, the process of decision making itself, can be explained better by organization 
theory. 
Carter and Van Auken (1994) examine the importance to potential investors of 
the stage of development of venture firms and its relationship to project evaluation 
criteria. Based on 69 surveys of US venture capitalists, the authors conclude investors 
have preferences Irr projects that arc in particular stages of development and 
investment criteria differ between those who prefer early-stage investments and those 
who prefer later stage investnments. The former are less interested in the management 
of risks than the latter but are more concerned with liquidity. Early-stage investors 
appeared more willing to exercise control and replace management ifnecessary. 
Fried and I lisrich (1994) furthcr explore the criteria and process that venture 
capitalists use to evaluate potential investments. The authors identify 15 criteria that arc 
generic to all venture capitalists. These criteria are based on the three basic constructs 
idcntiticd by 1lisrich and Jaukowicz (1990): concept, management and returns. Results 
are compared to the findings of MacMillan et cd. (1985) on criteria and to Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984) on the process model. The paper makes a very useful contribution to 
research methodology by employing case research, grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) and replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Landstrom (1994) argues that previous research has been largely descriptive and 
makes a strong case for examining the venture capital investment process in a decision 
theory framework. The author provides an overview of the decision theory literature in 
the areas of decision process theories (rational decision theories, political decision 
theories, action rational theories) and cognitive-oriented theories (cognitive maps, 
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cognitive style) and decision making under risk and uncertainty (expected utility, 
attitude toward risk, prospect theory). Using case study research and survey studies, 
the author presents results which indicate the importance of "momentary relationship" 
(intuition, social attraction and trust) and thus action rationality in the venture capital 
decision-making process. The venture capitalist's risk management strategy also seems 
to constitute an important explanatory variable to determine the type of decision 
rationality used. Venture capitalists that rely on portfolio theory (broader investment 
strategy) appear to utilize decision rationality whereas venture capitalists that use an 
operative risk management strategy (narrowly delincd as to market and products) 
appear more likely to use action rationality. 
A recent UK study (Boocock and Woods, 1997) focuses on the activities of a 
single fund to explore the relationship between investment criteria and the stages of the 
investment process. Results confirm that the decision-making process is multi-staged 
and that different criteria arc considered at each stage. I lowevcr, three criteria appear 
important: the specific requirements of the Bind, the market and management. The 
model demonstrates that it is not possible to deal independently with the two issues of 
the decision-making process and evaluation criteria. 
More recently, Shepherd (1997 and 1999) and Zacharakis and Myer (1998) 
have questioned the reliability of results from research that assumes venture capitalists 
can accurately relate their own decision processes. Shepherd utilizes conjoint analysis 
to focus on concurrent rather than retrospective techniques for collecting and analyzing 
decisions. Results indicate that conjoint analysis provides a more valid assessment of 
respondents' decision making. Self-reports by venture capitalists overstated the least 
important and understated the most important criteria. Zacharakis and Myer (1998) use 
policy capturing technique in a controlled experiment to compare captured decision 
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policies to stated decision policies. Policy capturing required the venture capitlists to 
make a series of real time decisions based on various information factors. The authors 
conclude that people have a tendency to overstate the information they believe they 
relied upon and to use far less information (typically three to seven factors) to make a 
decision than they actually think they use. The findings from both studies confirm that 
venture capitalists arc not good at introspecting about their own decision process. 
Subsequent work by Zacharakis and Sheppard (2001) using policy capturing 
experiment provides evidence that venture capitalists arc ovcrconlidcnt when making 
investment decisions and that overconlidcnce has a negative impact on decision 
accuracy. Similarly, Zacharakis and Myer (2000) use policy capturing experiment to 
demonstrate the success of using actuarial decision models to improve venture capital 
investment decisions. The methodologies employed in these studies have the potential 
to identify the more relevant inlonnation Factors cited in previous research. 
The significant fi)cus of much of the previous research on the importance of 
management led Smart (1998) to study the methods that venture capitalists use to 
conduct human capital evaluations. I luman capital valuation is defined by the author as 
the "... process of appraising the human capital (people) in a venture. " The 
methodology consisted of interviews with venture capitalists using a fact-based 
questionnaire. Findings indicate considerable variation in the way venture capitalists 
conduct human capital valuations, although the work sample approach, consisting of 
sessions in which the venture capitalist "quizzes" the entrepreneur, is the preferred 
method. Reference interviews (discussions with others about the entrepreneur) and 
past-oriented interviews (focus on career history and accomplishments) are next in 
importance to work samples. Results confirm that venture capitalists consider this to be 
an extremely important area and devote considerable time to the task of human capital 
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assessment. Further, the use of past-oriented interviews and work samples were 
positively related to accuracy of the valuations. Although this study does not provide a 
elclinitive theory of human capital valuation, it does confirm that human capital can be 
appraised and the accuracy of the assessment depends on the method used. 
Finally, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is a growing body of 
research devoted to the study ofthe informal market for risk capital ollen referred to as 
"business angel" financing. In addition to providing evidence of the contribution of the 
inlfornial risk capital market to the start-up and growth of small firms, this research has 
examined aspects or investing and decision-making processes that may be useful to the 
study of KI3B lending (Aram, 1989; Fiet, 1991; Mason and Harrison, 1996a and 
1996b). For example, Aram (1989) explores the role of business angels in start-up and 
technology-based ventures, firms that represent a major focus of the present study. Fief 
(1991) compares how formal venture capitalists and informal investors manage agency 
risk and market risk. Agency risk relates to principal-agency theory discussed 
previously, while market risk relates to uncertainty associated with competitive 
conditions. Among other areas, Mason and I larrison (1996a and 199Gb) make 
important contributions to understanding the investment processes of business angels 
and to the relative importance of investment criteria at various stages in the evaluation 
process. The present study will also examine risk assessment at two stages of the 
lending process. 
In summary, the research in the venture capital area has much to offer in terns 
of understanding the decision-making processes and evaluative criteria of venture 
capitalists. Confirmation of the multi-staged nature of the investment process and of 
the relationship between the criteria and the process should be useful in examining 
lending processes and lending criteria. With the exception of Ilall and Ilofcr's (1993) 
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study, findings unanimously confirm the critical importance of the It' 
ciitrcprcncur/cntrcprcncurial tcani to the investment decision. Ilowever, the most 
significant contribution of this literature is the recognition and confirmation of the 
importance of examining actual decision processes. A number of methodologies 
appear to have been employed successfully in attempts to replicate the decision 
proccsses and minimize problcros associated with introspection. 
Notwithstai ding these contributions, there are some significant limitations 
associated with this body of research. Since the studies were conducted at different 
points in time, they may be affected differently by cyclical liictors that influence the 
venture capital industry. The use of diverse methodologies with dif(crcnt samples to 
explore different research questions raises concerns cif reliability. Categorization of' 
responses varied considerably across studies. In some cases, the unit of analysis was 
the venture capitalist, while in others it was the deal. Taken together, these limitations 
make comparisons clillicult and ollen impossible. In a number ofcases, biases were 
introduced through the use of predetermined criteria. Finally, as discussed previously, 
many of the studies relied exclusively on self=reported data, raising questions of 
validity. This problem was ollen compounded by the lack of a model or underlying 
theory. 
2.5 Valuation of Intellectual Capital and Knowledge-Based Assets 
The shill to a knowledge-based economy has resulted in increased attention 
being paid to the relationship between intangible assets and firm perlorniance (Miller, 
1996). Previously, in the absence olgencrally accepted methods Irr valuing 
intangibles and bccause of the high degree of subjectivity involved, the professional 
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accounting bodies had discouraged companies from capitalizing intangible assets. 
I Iowever, since the Arthur Anderson and Co. study (1992) that suggested approaches to 
dealing with these problems, an increasing number of firms are reporting intangible 
assets in their financial statements (Miller, 1996). While there is still resistance from 
financial institutions to basing lending decisions on the value of intangibles, there 
appear to be a growing number ol'commnmercial banks acknowledging that intangible 
assets can be collateralized in the same way as physical assets. 
The definition of intangible ranges From "the intellectual property rights of 
patents, trademarks, copyright and registered design; through contracts; trade secrets; 
public knowledge such as scicntilic works; to the people-dependent, or subjective 
resources of know-how; networks; organizational culture, and the reputation of product 
and company" (Arthur Anderson and Co., 1992). Growing interest from a number of 
constituencies in valuing intangibles has lead to some recent theoretical research 
(ßontis, 1996; Brooking and Motta, 1996; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Saint-Onge, 
1996; Stewart, 1997) on valuing intellectual capital and knowledge-based assets. As 
with the study by Smart (1998) dealing with human capital valuation discussed in the 
previous section, this research may be quite usc(ul in the context of lending to 
knowledge-based firms. As a result, brief summaries of the theoretical models are 
presented here. 
Edvinsson and Sullivan (1906) propose a model of the knowledge firm as a 
basis for managing intellectual capital. Underlying the model is a definition of 
intellectual capital as knowledge that can be converted into value. In discussing 
intellectual capital, the authors stress the importance of understanding knowledge in a 
business context. Business knowledge is of two types: codified knowledge, that which 
can be written down, transferred, and shared and tacit knowledge, that which can be 
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demonstrated but not codified. Further distinctions of knowledge include whe{her 
knowledge can be visualized, degree of complexity, and whether or not knowledge can 
stand alone. 
The model developed by Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996) includes four 
intellectual capital components: human capital, structural capital, intellectual property 
and complementary business assets. The authors define human capital as the collective 
capabilities of employees to solve customer problems. I Iuman capital is enabled by the 
lirm's structural capital or intellectual assets, clelined as the codilied, tangible, or 
physical descriptions of specific knowledge to which a company can assert ownership 
rights. Intellectual assets can be further subdivided into three categories: 
" Commercializable assets (products, services and processes) 
" Customer-related assets (relationships, agreements and history) 
" Structure-related assets (plans, procedures and processes) 
Intellectual assets become intellectual property when legal protection has been 
obtained. Complementary business assets are structural capital assets used to create 
value in the commercialization process. Such assets might include processing lücilitics. 
distribution networks, prospect lists, supplier networks, service forces, and external 
organization capabilities. Some of these are generic assets that can be bought on the 
open market whereas others are specific assets that are unique and are created in 
conjunction with the commercialization process. Value in the knowledge firm model 
results from two sources: innovations which are generated by the human resources, 
converted into intellectual assets and legally protected, and conversion by the firm's 
structural business assets. 
In discussing the role and importance of'tacit knowledge to intellectual capital 
development and value creation, Saint-Onge (1996) introduces the element of customer 
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capital in addition to human capital and structural capital. For Saint-Onge, customer 
capital is "... the depth (penetration), width (coverage), attachment (loyalty), and 
profitability of customers" (Saint-Onge, 1996; 10). Structural capital consists of four 
elements: systems, structure, strategy and culture. Within the three areas of intellectual 
capital, there are two types of knowledge: explicit or articulated knowledge and tacit 
knowledge, which includes individuals' intuition, perspectives, belief's and values 
Corned from their experiences. The article by Saint-Onge is essentially a description of 
the approach that the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (C113C) has developed to 
manage intellectual capital and tacit knowledge within their own organization. 
In describing various approaches to measuring intellectual capital, Stewart 
(1997) groups measures into lour categories: measures of the overall value of 
intangibles, human capital measurements, structural capital measurements, and 
customer capital measurements. While much of Stewart's approach appears more 
useful to valuing intellectual capital in existing firms rather than start-ups, the structural 
capital measures provide a useful framework Im categorizing intangible assets as 
follows: technical (trade secrets, formulas, proprietary test results, etc. ); marketing 
(copyrights, corporate name and logo, warranties, advertising, package design, 
trademark registrations, etc. ); and skills and knowledge (databases, manuals, quality 
control standards, asset management processes, security systems, business licenses, 
noncomplcte clauses, and proprietary management information systems). 
In describing intellectual capital, Bontis (1996) refers to both Edvisson's and 
Saint-Onge's models as including relational capital, a much broader concept than 
customer capital. For Bontis, relational capital refers to the organization's relationships 
or network of associates and their satisfaction with and loyalty to the company. 
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Brooking and Motta (1996) propose a taxonomy of intellectual capital that 
consists of four categories of intangible assets: human-centred assets, intellectual 
property assets, infrastructure assets and market assets. The authors define l luman- 
Centred Assets as the collective expertise, creative capability, leadership, 
entrepreneurial and management skills held by the employees. Intellectual Property 
Assets include know-how, copyright, patents, etc. Infrastructure assets include the 
technologies, methodologies and processes that allow organizations to function. 
Finally, Market Assets refer to stich market-related intangibles as repeat business, 
goodwill, branding, market dominance, etc. that clearly have value to the firm. 
Building on this taxonomy, the authors propose an approach to auditing, recording and 
valuing intellectual capital. 
There are some obvious similarities in these live models of intellectual capital. 
lach deals specifically with human capital and structural capital. With the exception of 
Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996), the others also include customer capital or as Brooking 
and Motta (1996) stuggest, market assets. The distinction that Bdvinsson and Sullivan 
(1996) draw between structural capital and complementary business assets is somewhat 
unclear, although many of the examples of complementary business assets reflect the 
broader concept of relational capital introduced by I3ontis (1996). Intellectual property 
also is included in all of the models with the exception of Saint-Ouge (1996). Given 
his focus on ways of creating value through intellectual capital at the CIBC, tile 
omission of intellectual property assets is somewhat understandable. In total, these 
models provide a basis on which to examine the approaches used by the financial 
institutions in the present study when valuing intellectual capital and knowledge-based 
assets. 
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2.6 Summary '4 
The literature review suggests that it is not sufficient to rely on single theory 
explanations of small firm financing and commercial lending decisions. Traditional 
Financial theory assumes efficient capital markets where investors and entrepreneurs 
have access to complete information. While this may be the case ['or large public firths, 
small private firms face a different reality, one where access to capital markets is much 
more limited and where ownership is more closely-held (Stanger, 1992). Further, 
according to Van Auken (2001; 241), "... violations of capital market theory may be 
even more significant for owners of technology-based firms due to (high risk, 
apprehension of investors, and limited financial experience of the owners. " Similarly, 
Zingales (2000) argues that existing financial theories have been modeled on the 
traditional business Corporation which he characterizes as asset-intensive, vertically- 
integrated and highly centralized. 1Ic indicates that while existing theories provide 
important insights into capital structure decisions, new theories may be required to 
explain financing decisions in the context of the emerging human capital-intensive 
firm. 
Credit rationing theory also fails to fully explain lending and Iinancing 
decisions as related to small firms. Overall, the literature in this area is highly 
theoretical. As with capital structure theory, the various credit rationing models make 
assumptions that are clearly at odds with the small firm environment, thereby limiting 
their usefulness in explaining finance decisions. 
All indications Crom the literature review point to the potential multi- 
dimensional nature of the lending process in terms of multi-stages, multi-persons and 
multi-criteria and to the need to integrate multiple theoretical perspectives from the 
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capital structure, credit rationing and commercial lending areas in order to understand 
lending and financing decisions in the context of knowledge-based businesses. 
The best potential explanations of supply and demand-side decisions relate to 
theories that underlie each of these areas, particularly information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry appears to be particularly problematic in the case of the new 
small knowledge-based firm where the absence of historical performance is 
compounded by the lack of tangible assets. Many of these firms operate in innovative 
growth sectors where the uncertainties associated with predicting future outcomes also 
may be exacerbated. Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs also have much more positive 
expectations of potential prolitability and success compared to lending institutions. 
Information asymmetry, arising from these differences in expectations and from 
uncertainties associated with predicting future outcomes, likely results in the problem 
cif adverse selection (Akerlol, 1970) for financial institutions. 
There is evidence that banks have responded by implementing structures and 
processes to deal with these issues, especially in the context of knowledge-based 
businesses. Banks may also ration credit in response to adverse selection as posited by 
credit rationing theory (Jaffe and Russell, 1976) or use collateral as an alternative to 
credit rationing as suggested by others (Stiblitz and Weiss, 1981, Bester, 1987; Chan 
and Kanatas, 1985). It is also possible that information asymmetry results in moral 
hazard, incentive effects, and monitoring and bonding costs as posited by agency theory 
(Jensen and Mccklinb, 1976). 
Notwithstanding the potential contribution of individual theories, the literature 
review revealed no overall theoretical framework specifically focused on KBBs that 
can be used to generate testable hypotheses regarding lending to such businesses. 
Traditional financial, credit rationing and commercial lending theories fall short in their 
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ability to individually explain lending and borrowing decisions from a small firm 
perspective and are even less adequate for understanding these issues in the context of 
knowledge-based businesses. Findings from empirical studies provide some demand- 
side evidence of the financing experiences of SMEs, as well as a limited supply-side 
perspective on institutional lending. Ilowever, empirical evidence concerning K13I3s is 
extremely limited. As a result, this dissertation utilizes an exploratory approach to 
examine lending to Kßl3s from both demand-side and supply-side perspectives. The 
proposed research framework and specific research questions arc outlined and 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CIIAPTER 3 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND QUESTIONS 
3.0 Introduction 
Hic primary purpose cif the present study is to increase our understanding of 
institutional lending to knowledge-based firms, especially at the start-up stage. More 
specifically, the study is intended to achieve the following research objectives: 
to investigate the experiences of entrepreneurs in knowledge-based limns 
who have sought financing li-0111 chartered banks and government 
agencies; 
ii. to facilitate understanding of the process of Ichding to knowledge-based 
businesses in Newibundlaud and Labrador; 
iii. to identify and compare the present practices ol'governnment departments 
and agencies with respect to risk assessment ofknowledge-bascd firms; 
iv. to idcntil'y and compare the Present practices of Canadian chartered 
banks with respect to risk assessment or knowledge-based firms; and 
V. to compare the lending processes and criteria utilized when lending to 
high knowledge-intensive firms to those used in lending to less 
knowledge-intensive businesses. 
To achieve the specific objectives of this research it is essential to consider lending 
from both demand and supply sides. The demand-side includes entrepreneurs' financing 
decisions and experiences with access to institutional debt financing, while the supply- 
siele represents the lending decisions of financial institutions. 
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The review of the literature related to the demand-side suggests the thcöretical 
determinants of capital structure are based on assumptions of efficient capital markets 
and do little to explain financing decisions in the context of small firms. Nonetheless, 
the work of Ou (1988) and others (Stanger, 1992; Barton and Matthews, 1989; Pettit 
and Singer. 1985) arguing for the importance of integrating agency theory, information 
asymmetry and owner's objective function may prove useful to understanding the 
Iinancing decisions and experiences of small knowledge-based firsts. 
Similarly, the literature review revealed a myriad of supply-side explanations 
I'm lending decisions based on traditional financial and credit rationing theories. 
Lending models have been developed almost exclusively in the context of large 
established firms with long financial histories (Altman, 1968; Orgler, 1970). Many or 
these models also rely on financial information (Edmister, 1971), especially historical 
data (McNamara and Bromilcy, 1993; Longnecker el al., 1997) to develop financial 
measures and ratios. As such, they are not particularly helpful to explaining lending 
decisions in the context of inew, small knowledge-based firms. Further, no studies were 
identified that addressed lending decisions from the perspective of government funding 
agencies. 
Overall, the results orthe literature review indicate a lack of theoretical and 
empirical research necessary to generate testable hypotheses and the lack or a 
comprehensive model to guide the investigation (Selltiz et al., 1967). Information 
asymmetry and the underlying problems of'agency conflicts, adverse selection and 
moral hazard provide only partial supply and demand-side explanations for institutional 
lending, especially in the context of new, small knowledge-based firms. As a result, the 
present study uses an exploratory research approach based on addressing a number of 
critical research questions to investigate institutional lending. 
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3.1 Areas of Investigation: The Demand-Side 
The literature review on the demand-side included theoretical and empirical 
research on capital structure and empirical studies of the financing experiences of 
knowledge-based SMEs. Information asymmetry appears to offer the best theoretical 
explanation For financing decisions in the context of small knowledge-based firms. Ott 
(1988) provides a demand-side perspective on capital structure determinants that may 
he directly applicable to knowledge-based SMEs. In arguing for the importance of 
information asymmetry in explaining financing decisions, On suggests that access to 
financing and the cost of borrowing are affected by the reluctance of such firms to 
disclose information given the proprietary nature of their products and processes. As a 
result, lenders eitler must collect additional information at increased costs or rely on 
collateral as a substitute. In the absence of collateral, borrowers either bear additional 
costs or they are unable to access financing. Van der Wijst (1989) similarly argues for 
the importance of such information costs to small and young firms operating in 
dynamic industries, as much of their expertise and knowledge is intangible. 
Empirical research on information asymmetry also helps to explain financing 
decisions and experiences ol'entrepreneurs. The results of 13inks el a/. (1992) confirm 
that the types of firms requiring banks to take a more prospects-based approach to 
lending are the very ones that are the most dissatisfied with the quality of the services 
they received. Similar findings are reported for knowledge-based SMCs in Canada, 
indicating they "... are considerably less satisfied overall with their main financial 
institution than are SMLs in general" (Thompson, Lightstone and Company, 1998; 
174). 
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Rinks el u/. (1992) find that knowledge-based businesses perceive the1anks to 
be inadequately informed of their situation and suggest these perceptions lead some 
firms to ignore traditional bank finance. Similarly, Philpott (1995) indicates that banks 
lack an understanding of the nature of technology-based businesses and use collateral 
requirements in lieu of technology assessment. Evidence provided by Philpott (1995) 
suggests this is the case even for banks that have technology managers. I lowever, 
Riding and Swill (1993) provide contradictory evidence, concluding that measures of 
borrowing experience do not differ between teclitiology-based firms and their tion- 
technology counterparts. 
Wynant and I latch (199 1) and Thompson, Lightstone and Company Ltd. (1998) 
provide 8(. Iditic)nal insights OII the differing perceptions cif entrepreneurs and account 
managers regarding the decision criteria employed by the banks and the reasons for 
loan declines. These studies indicate significant ditTerences between the reasons for 
loan declines cited by entrepreneurs and those actually given by account managers. Of 
particular note, is the fact that entrepreneurs felt overly strict bank rules and 
requirements was an issue, while account managers did not mention this lhctor at all. 
While dil'Icrcnccs in level of'knowledge-intensity were not examined, it is an 
empirically testable hypothesis that perceptions ofentrelpreneu rs in knowledge-based 
firms. concerning the importance ul'various lending criteria, differ from those in less 
knowledge-intensive firms. As a result, the present research investigates entrepreneurs' 
perceptions of' the approaches used by the various lending institutions. 
In terms ol'access to debt financing, some empirical evidence confirms 
constraints f'hced by knowledge-based firms both in the United States (Brewer el al., 
1996) and in Canada (Industry Canada, 1994a; Thompson, Lightstone and Company. 
1998). Brewer el a/. (1996) confirm that debt is more likely to be used to finance 
79 
projects that generate tangible assets and that firms whose value depends on 'Zr 
information and research and development are less likely to receive debt financing. 
Ik wcver, the authors also report conflicting results indicating that firms in industries 
with more intangible assets are more likely to receive debt. Although unable to filly 
explain the contradiction in these two Findings, the authors suggest that financing 
decisions may be more closely tied to the asset being funded in a particular financing 
request rather than to the total assets of the firm. 
The Industry Canada (I994a) study and more recent research by Thompson, 
Lightstone and Company (1998) confirm that access to financing is more problematic 
for knowledge-based firms. The latter study provides tangible evidence of institutional 
debt levels experienced by knowledge-based SMEs compared to the general SME 
population. Findings indicate the median reported debt load of KBBs from financial 
institutions is below the SME norm, while the use of equity financing by KBBs is 
greater than for SMEs generally. The'1'hompson, Lightstone and Company (1998) 
study also sheds some light on the types of debt financing requested by SMEs, 
confirming that knowledge-based firms are much more likely to have requested 
operating capital as compared to term financing for other SMEs. Notwithstanding the 
perceived problems with access to debt financing, the Thompson, Lightstone and 
Company Ltd. study (1998) also reports that knowledge-based firms request higher 
amounts of financing on average and are marginally more likely to have their request 
approved. 
In terms of access to government financing, the Thompson, Lightstone and 
Company Ltd. study (1998) was the only study identified in the literature review that 
dealt with knowledge-based firms. Empirical results frone this research indicate that 
knowledge-based firms are more likely to make use of equity financing in the form of 
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government grants. As with the supply-side, the lack of theoretical and empirical 
research concerning government financing is a limitation to developing well-grounded 
research questions. Nonetheless, given the role of government funding agencies as 
outlined previously, one would expect demand-side differences when compared to 
chartered batik financing. 
I-lie following questions are intended to focus the present study on the financing 
experiences ol'knowledge-based firms in an attempt to further our understanding of the 
demand-side of institutional lending decisions. 
QI What roles have the chartered banks and government agencies played in 
tin-mncing knowlcdgc-basal firms and how do they differ from the roles 
(played in financing less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q2 What have been the experiences of 10111s with obtaining debt financing 
from chartered banks and government agencies and how do they compare 
to (he experiences of less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q3 What are the perceptions of K1313s ivith respect to chartered bank and 
government financing : u: d how do they compare with the perceptions of 
less knowledge-intensive firms? 
3.2 Areas of Investigation: The Supply-Sidle 
Notwithstanding the lack of 'a theoretical model to guide the present research, 
the literature review identified the following supply-side aspects of institutional lending 
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that are examined türther in the present study: organizational Jiamework, decision- 
making process, and loan evaluation. Each of these is considered frone the perspective 
oi'chartered banks and government agencies to determine whether or not differences in 
approach exist between the two groups. Overall, the study also explores the existence 
of a "lending culture" within the chartered banks and government agencies and the 
extent to which the culture reflects the needs of knowledge-based firms. The remainder 
ol'this section is devoted to the discussion of the supply-side aspects of institutional 
lending and to the Formulation of related research questions. 
3.2.1 Organizational Framework 
The oganizational framework includes the strategies, structures, systems, 
policies and procedures oIthe lending institutions. The literature review identilied two 
banking studies that provide insights into aspects of the organizational framework that 
influence lending decisions. Wynant and 1latch (1991) foutui support for the role of tlhe 
hank's organizational structure, commitment to small business, and the training and 
experience ol'account managers. Findings from their research confirm significant 
differences between the views of account managers and senior management of the 
attractiveness of small business clients, although it was not clear which had the greater 
impact on lending decisions. They also concluded that the skills and attitudes or 
account managers varied with experience and training und that the workload and tenure 
ol'account managers had an impact on risk assessment. Further, they concluded that 
collateral requirements varied with the account managers' lending experiences, risk- 
taking propensity. and knowledge of clients. These findings suggest potentially 
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important relationships between loan evaluation variables and organizational factors 
that should be examined in the present study. 
McNamara and Bromiley (1997) argue for the influence of organizational 
tlºetors, such as degree of formalization of decision processes, on risk asscssmcnt. 
They concluded that standardization of the loan review process appeared to increase the 
sensitivity of lenders to borrower risk. The authors further concluded that 
organizational effects resulted primarily from informal practices rather than formal 
organizational policies and procedures. 
The impact of these organizational variables on lending to knowledge-based 
firms has not been previously tested empirically. Consequently, it is essential to 
determine whether or not loan evaluation and decision-making are al7cctcd by 
organizational Frameworks, including strategies, structures, systems, policies and 
procedures. Although the chartered banks have established specialized lending units to 
address the needs ofknowledge-based firms, it is not clear to what extent lending 
processes have been modified and how elThctive they have been. Presumably this 
approach is intended to enhance performance through improved skills and knowledge, 
suggesting that account managers in these specialized units should perceive less risk in 
knowledge-basest firms than regular account managers. The present study investigates 
the impact of these organizational variables on loan evaluation and decision-making. 
Q4 Are loan evaluation and decision-making affected by organizational 
variables and are the effects different for knowledge-based firms compared 
to less knowledge-intensive firms? 
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3.2.2 Decision-Making Process 
Theoretical and empirical research in the commercial lending and venture 
capital areas argue for the importance of investigating decision-making processes. In 
the context of venture capital decisions, Boocock and Woods (1997) demonstrate that it 
is not possible to deal independently with the decision-making process and evaluation 
criteria. The interrelationships between the two are likely to be equally important in the 
context ol'comniercial lending decisions. Also in the context of venture investing, 
Schilit and Chandran (1993) stress the importance of looking beyond rational decision- 
making approaches in which investors make decisions based on the risk/return profile, 
to incorporate the human aspects of decision-making. 
A study of the effects of environmental uncertainty on personal lending 
undertaken by Leblebici and Salancik (1981) indicates the importance or the 
relationships between the banks' organizational structures and processes and the 
decision processes employed by account managers. The former is able to take account 
of uncertainty that can be anticipated, while the personal information acquisition 
strategics of loan managers is key to dealing with uncertainty associated with particular 
decisions. Unfortunately, the information acquisition strategies employed by 
commercial account managers have not been the subject of research. As a result, one is 
Iell to speculate as to its role in credit decision-making and its relative importance to 
lending to knowledge-based lirms. Nonetheless, on the basis of the additional 
itnlorination asymmetry problems associated with lending to knowledge-based firms, it 
is reasonable to speculate that account managers may consult more widely and use a 
greater number of inlormation sources when dealing with knowledge-based firms. 
Additional support For this suggestion is provided by research (Reitan and Waago, 
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1998) which demonstrates that bank officers report low levels of ability to evaluate 
criteria related to new technology-based firms. 
Q5 \VIºat are the information acquisition strategics employed by account 
managers to support credit decision-making and are there differences 
between the information acquisition strategics used by account managers 
in making lending decisions to knowledge-based businesses compared to 
less knowledge-intrusive firms? 
3.2.3 Loan Evaluation 
According to I latch and Wynant (1986), loan cvaluation consists of Ibur 
components: borrower risk assessment; estimating borrower's needs; structuring a loan 
package; and loan management. Risk assessment is oipcrationalizcd through the 
application of credit parameters generally referred to as the five "Cs" of credit, namely, 
capacity, capital, collateral, character and conditions. Capacity represents the extent to 
which the organization is able to meet its obligations and is usually reflected in the cash 
(lows of the business. Capital refers to the equity of the business, or the investment of 
the entrepreneur, and provides a measure of the firm's ability to weather setbacks. 
Collateral refers to the assets (business and personal) that are available as security in 
the event ofclelbult. Character relcrs to the intent and commitment of the entrepreneur 
to repay the loan and includes her/his track record. Conditions is a catchall for a 
number of internal and environmental factors that may affect the borrower's ability to 
repay. including, but not limited to, the following: the proprietary nature cif the product, 
competition, size of market, and industry climate and trends. 
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Wynant and 1 latch (1991) suggest chartered banks focus primarily on risk 
assessment when lending to small firms and the Thompson, Lightstone and Company 
Ltd., study (1998) indicates cash flow and collateral are the dominant factors in 
determining the level of risk. In the context of the risk/return trade-off, potential return 
appears to be ol'secondary importance. Collateral is necessary but not sufficient to 
obtain financing. Risk ratings also reflect the credibility or character of the 
entrepreneur and industry structure or competitive conditions. 
While these studies are helpful in identifying and explaining risk assessment 
properties associated with bank lending to small firms, the literature review revealed 
very little research directly related to knowledge-based firms. Studies by Riding and 
Swill (1993) and Philpott (1995) explore banking relationships in the context of one 
segmento r the knowledge-based sector, technology-based ventures, with conflicting 
results. 1'hilpott (1995) argues that high teclulology firms face significant information 
asymmetry problems resulting in the banks placing increased emphasis on collateral. 
Since the assets ol'these firms are largely intangible, the lack of collateral acts as a 
constraint to borrowing. Riding and Swill (1993), on the other hand, conclude 
turndown rates do not differ significantly between high technology firms and those that 
place little emphasis on technology. 
An important question for the present study concerns the extent to which 
financial institutions base lending decisions on the value of intangible assets, in 
p', lrticular human capital. While there appear to be a growing number of chartered 
banks acknowledging that intangible assets can be collateralized in the same way as 
physical assets, it is not clear whether this practice has been widely adopted by the 
banks. It is also not known whether the banks and other financial institutions take a 
similar view of all types of intangibles. As discussed in the literature review, a number 
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of researchers (Brooking and Motta, 1996; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Stewart, 
1997) have proposed intellectual capital taxonomies comprised of human capital, 
structural capital, customer capital, and intellectual property. In light of the lack of 
research on knowledge-based firms and the questions concerning the role of intellectual 
capital in lending decisions, it is reasonable to ask if risk assessment dil'Iers in the 
context of knowledge-based firms and if financial institutions incorporate intellectual 
capital valuation into the risk assessment process? 
The second stage of loan evaluation consists of determining financing needs and 
ol'ussessing the sensitivity of the requirements to uncertainties identified in the risk 
assessment. The literature review did not reveal any research dealing specifically with 
this second stage. Nonetheless, the relationship between determining financing needs 
and uncertainty is open to empirical investigation and will be considered in the present 
study to determine whether or not differences exist between loan evaluation approaches 
used by chartered banks for KBBs and those used for more traditional firms. 
The third stage of loan evaluation involves structuring the terms of the loan, 
including the amount, the interest rate, the repayment terms, the collateral required. and 
the conditions imposed on the business. In sum, the terms of tllc loan allow the lending 
institution to modify the risks in order to achieve the appropriate risk/return profile. 
As with risk assessment, the literature review revealed limited research related to these 
1 ictors in the context of small firms, and even less related to knowledge-based firms. 
Research related to loan structuring deals primarily with interest rates, collateral 
and loan covenants. Apilado and Millington (1992) investigate the role of interest rate 
adjustments and loan covenants in lending to small businesses. Results demonstrate 
that small firms incur substantially higher interest rates, in addition to more covenants. 
Fahowalc. Riding and Swift (199 I) also examine fl actors influencing the terms of hank 
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credit. Results of this research indicate that rates on loans to small businesses irc 
primarily determined by a single dimension X capacity. This finding suggests 
potentially important relationships between risk assessment variables and loan 
structuring variables. 
As indicated previously, research by Riding and Swift (1993), comparing 
banking experiences ol'high technology firms to those that place little emphasis on 
technology, concludes that interest rates do not diller significantly between (lie two 
categories of firms. In the context of knowledge-based firms, it is likely that, as argued 
by credit rationing thcoty, banks limit credit or use collateral rather than increase rates. 
Since the assets cif knowledge-based firms are primarily intangible, banks may resort to 
using personal guarantees. Similarly, since covenants are used by banks to address 
agency problems and to mitigate risks (Apilado and Millington, 1992), knowlcdge- 
based firms may be subject to increased use of loan covenants. Based on the research 
findings discussed here, it is reasonable to assume that there may be differences 
between the loan terms and conditions placed on knowledge-based firms and those 
placed on less knowledge-intensive businesses. As a result, it is necessary to determine 
ifdifferences exist and why? 
The fourth stage of loan evaluation is loan management, which consists of the 
monitoring processes that the banks employ to manage their risk exposure. Such 
monitoring focuses on the key risks and uncertainties, identified in the risk assessment 
stage, and goes hand-in-hand with the loan covenants and conditions. As with 
determining borrowers' needs, the literature review did not reveal any research dealing 
specifically with loan monitoring. It appeared, at least in some cases, that loan 
.: s management may 
have been subsumed under covenants nncl conditions. In any event, 
= ä: 
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3, 
it is necessary to examine monitoring processes to determine if loan management 
differs Im knowledge-based firms. 
Based on the previous discussion of loan evaluation and related issues, the 
following research questions are proposed: 
Q6 Does risk assessment of knowledge-basal firms differ from risk assessment 
of less knowledge-intensive firms and, if so, how? 
Q7 1)u chartered banks attach different terms and conditions to loans made to 
Iuoolvlcclge-based businesses l11: 111 to those made to less knowledge-intensive 
firms anti are there differences between the loan monitoring processes 
employed for knowledge-based firms and those used for less knowledge- 
intensive businesses? 
3.2.4 Government Financing 
As indicated previously, the literature review did not reveal any relevant 
research dealing with lending From the perspective of government agencies. This lack 
of theoretical and empirical research is a significant limitation to developing research 
questions with respect to loan evaluation, institutional structures and decision-making 
processes. For instance, unlike the chartered banks, it is not clear whether or not 
various government agencies have developed and implemented structures and 
approaches specifically designed to address the needs of knowledge-based firms. 
Nonetheless, given that the role of most government funding agencies is to fill 
Iinancing gaps, to leverage funds From other sources, and on occasion to act as a lender 
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OF last resort, one would expect differences in lending approaches and lending decisions 
compared to chartered banks. As a result, it is important to determine if differences 
exist, in what areas, and why. The following question is intended to focus the present 
research on the comparison between chartered bank lending and government financing: 
Q8 Are there differences bchvccn Ichding decisions of chartered banks and 
lending decisions of government agencies? If differences exist, to what 
extent can they be explained by differences in institutional structures, loan 
evaluation and decision-making processes? 
3.2.5 Leiitling Culture 
The previous discussion of tlhe supply-side dealt with the primary theoretical 
components of institutional lending. At a broader level, it is reasonable to consider 
whether or not a "lending culture" exists among the members of the community of 
commercial lenders and account managers and whether or not that culture supports 
access to debt financing by the emerging knowledge-based sector. It is also important 
to explore the extent to which various groups of account managers share a common 
lending culture. Measuring the pervasiveness ofshared culture among various groups 
of account managers also should support investigation into other dimensions of 
institutional lending. To that end, the present study addresses the following additional 
research questions: 
(19 l)ocs a common or shared lending culture exist among account managers in 
chartered banks and government agencies? 
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Q10 To what extent does the lending culture within chartered banks . Ind 
government agencies reflect the needs of Kills? 
3.3 Proposed Research Framework 
Based on the previous discussion, it appears that institutional lending, much the 
same as venture capital investing (llall and Iloier, 1993; Mason and Harrison, 1996b), 
is a multi-dimensional process, involving multi-stages, multi-criteria und multi-persons. 
Further, the literature review highlighted the importance of the interrelationships within 
and among the various components of the lending process. As a result, in order to 
comprehend institutional lending decisions fully, the research approach must capture 
the integrative nature of the lending process. To that end, the present study uses a 
liamework that integrates loan evaluation processes, organizational frameworks, and 
decision-making processes of lending institutions, and the debt linancing experiences 
of entrepreneurs (Figure 3.1). 
The lending model developed by Hatch and Wynant (1986) and the decision 
criteria based on the "5Cs" combine to form the basis for loan evaluation in the present 
study. The proposed framework recognizes that loan evaluation does not occur in 
isolation. Account managers operate within an institutional framework comprised of 
Formal and informal structures, systems, policies and procedures (McNamara and 
Bromiley, 1997). As indicated by Fletcher (1995a and 1995b), decision-making likely 
involves a process of interaction between the account managers' experiences and the 
banks' rules and guidelines. Further, credit decision-making also comprises the 
information acquisition strategies of account managers, including contacts and 
information sources used. Finally, this approach also includes a demand-side 
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perspective on lending decisions, formulated from the debt financing experiences of 
knowledge-based SMEs. 
In summary, institutional debt financing to knowledge-based firms emerges 
from the interaction of the process of loan evaluation, credit decision-making and 
institutional structures on (lie supply-side, and financing decisions of entrepreneurs on 
the denmand-side. The exploratory framework and research questions proposed here 
should Facilitate investigation ol'lending to knowledge-based firms and of the extent to 
which a lending culture is emerging among chartered banks and government agencies 
that rellects the needs of KB13s. 
Figure 3.1 
Institutional Lending Framework 
Financing 
Uccision 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Research Objective 
The primary goal of basic scientific inquiry is to provide an understanding of 
the phenomena under consideration. Theories are the basis of such 
understanding in that they are explanations for how and why particular 
phenomena occur and for how they are related to other phenomena (Greenberg 
ei (il., 1988; 566). 
The present research is exploratory and was undertaken to increase our 
understanding of chartered bank lending and government Iinancing in the knowledge- 
based economy. The study examines lending to knowledge-based firms from both a 
demand-side and a supply-side perspective. On the demand-side, the research 
examines the financing experiences of entrepreneurs in SMEs to address the following 
questions: 
Ql What roles have the chartered banks and government agencies played in 
financing knowledge-based firms and how do they differ from the roles played 
in financing less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q2 What have been the experiences of KBBs with obtaining debt financing from 
chartered banks and government agencies and how do they compare to the 
experiences of less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q3 What are the perceptions of Kl3L3s with respect to chartered bank and 
government (inaucing and how do they compare with the perceptions olless 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
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From the supply-side, the study examines the lending processes and lending decisions 
ol'chartered banks and government agencies to address the following research 
questions: 
Q4 Are loan evaluation and decision-making affected by organizational variables 
and are the effects different for knowledge-based lirms compared to Tess 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q5 What are the information acquisition strategies employed by account 
managers to support credit decision-making and arc there differences 
between the information acquisition strategics used by account managers in 
making lending decisions to knowledge-based businesses compared to less 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q6 Does risk assessment of knowledge-based firms differ frone risk assessment 
of less knowledge-intensive firms and, if so, how? 
Q7 Do chartered banks attach different terns and conditions to loans made to 
knowledge-based businesses than to those made to less knowledge-intensive 
firms and are there dificrcnccs between the loan monitoring processes employed 
for knowledge-based firms and those used for less knowledge-intensive 
businesses? 
Q8 Are there differences between lending decisions of chartered batiks and lending 
decisions of government agencies? If differences exist, to what extent can they 
be explained by differences in institutional structures, loan evaluation and 
decision-making processes? 
Q9 Does a common or shared lending culture exist among account managers in 
chartered banks and government agencies? 
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QI0 To what extent does the lending culture within chartered banks and government 
agencies reflect the needs of KBBs? 
The demand and supply-side components arc closely related and the study of 
both is critical to enhancing our overall understanding of lending to knowledge-based 
firms. 
4.1 Research Design and Methods 
There is no way to convert research questions into useful methods decisions; 
your methods are the means to answering your research questions, not a logical 
transformation of the latter. Their selection depends not only on your research 
questions, but on the actual research situation and what will work most 
effectively in that situation to give you the data you need (Maxwell, 1998; 88). 
Research design "is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of 
data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy 
in procedure" (Selltiz el a!., 1976; 90). According to the authors, the major emphases 
of exploratory studies are on discovering ideas and on gaining insights. As a result, the 
design must be suflicicntly flexible to permit consideration of various aspects or a 
phcnoaucnon. At the same time, the study requires a design that minimizes potential l'or 
bias in the collection of data and maximizes the reliability of the data collected. This 
exploratory study employs a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
provide an understanding of the phenomena under consideration and of the context 
within which participants act and the processes by which actions take place (Maxwell, 
998). 
To achieve the research objectives of the present study and to address the 
research questions, it was necessary to collect information from three key sources, 
namely entrepreneurs, senior officials in the chartered banks and government agencies, 
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and account managers in lending institutions. Input from entrepreneurs was required to 
determine financing experiences and to compare those of high knowledge firms to 
those in less knowledge-intensive businesses. Senior banking and government oflicials 
provided the context for overall institutional policy and commitment to the SM(? sector, 
including knowledge-based firms. Finally, account managers served as the primary 
data source for examining credit decision-making processes and for determining criteria 
used to evaluate lending applications. The methodology that follows is based on this 
triangulation of data sources (Denzin, 1978). 
Given the cxploratory nature of this research and given resource constraints, it 
was decided to limit the study to knowledge-based firms and lending agencies located 
in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The following discussion of research 
methods used in this study is presented according to the two primary study 
components: the demand-siele Perspectives of entrepreneurs, and the supply-side 
perspectives of lending institutions. 
4.2 Methods Used in the Demand-Side Study of Entrepreneurs 
As indicated previously, one of the objectives of the present research study is to 
investigate the experiences of entrepreneurs in knowledge-based firms who have sought 
financing From chärtcrcd banks and government agencies. To Fully achieve this 
objective it is necessary to obtain data From entrepreneurs in high knowledge firms and 
from those in Icss knowledge-intensive businesses. This will enable a comparison 
between the two groups, as well as a comparison between entrepreneurs' experiences 
with bank financing and their experiences with access to government Iinancing. 
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4.2.1 Data Collection 
A mail survey offers the advantage of surveying large numbers of 
geographically diverse respondents (Mangione, 1998). As Mangione suggests, a mail 
survey is relatively inexpensive and allows respondents the time necessary to look up 
more detailed information. Further, respondents arc afforded privacy and convenience 
in responding, and arc able to see the context or a series of questions. Mail surveys are 
ideally suited to situations where human resources to conduct research arc limited, 
where respondents have a stake in the topic, where the number of research objectives is 
limited, and where the vast majority of questions can be framed in a closcd-endcd style 
(Mangionc, 1998). On this basis, a mail survey was the most appropriate means of 
collecting data from entrepreneurs. 
The Survey Sample. The mailing list for the survey consists ofa database 
obtained from the provincial Department of Industry, Trade and Technology (DITI'), 
supplemented with additional contacts provided by the Department of Development 
and Rural Renewal (DIJRR), the Canadian Centre for Marine Communications 
(CCMC) and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA). The Dill' database 
is comprised of firms in the following sectors: manufacturing, biotechnology, 
acluaculture, environmental, petroleum, mining, engineering consulting, and 
information technology. Sectors underrepresented in this database include retail, 
personal services, publishing, crafts, tourism, education, health care, and other 
professional services. While the database is not representative of all firms in the 
Province, it was chosen to ensure a mix of knowledge-based firms. Supplementary 
contacts included firms in the tourism, education, publishing, and professional services 
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sectors. The modified database, considered a purposeful sample (Patton, 1990), 
consists of 1715 private sector firms located in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
I'urposel'ul sampling may be used to ensure heterogeneity in the population, to include 
cases that are critical for developing theory, and to examine differences between 
individuals or settings (Maxwell, 1998). As such, purposeful sampling is well suited to 
the survey of entrepreneurs. 
Design and Administration of the Survey. The first part of the survey 
(Appendix 4.1) was designed to collect basic demographic data on the firms (for 
example, type of business, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, age, 
ownership structure, location, number of employees, gross sales or revenues, research 
and development expenditures, and educational level of employees) and on the 
owners/managers (for example, gender, age, education, and years of experience). To 
determine the degree of knowledge-intensity ofeach firm, two additional questions 
were included in the background section. The first asked respondents to rate the 
importance of a number of li. ctors to success in their industry, while the second asked 
respondents to indicate the extent to which these factors apply to their firm. The Beturs 
included in these two questions were adapted primarily from the work of Lee and I las 
(1996). This area is discussed further in the next section on data analysis. 
The second part of the survey was designed to explore issues related to 
experiences accessing bank and government financing. Two previous studies (Wynant 
and I latch, 1991; Thompson Lightstone and Company Ltd., 1998) provided the basis 
for the issues to be addressed in part two of the survey related to experiences with 
obtaining financing from chartered banks. More specifically, the issues concern the 
timing, nature and outcome of their first attempt to access bank financing and 
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entrepreneurs' perceptions of the importance of various factors to the banks in making a 
decision on the application for financing. Respondents were asked the same qucstions 
regarding their first attempts to obtain financing from government departments and 
agencies. This facilitated comparison between access to chartered bank financing and 
access to government financing. 
The survey was pre-tcsted on a sample of seven firms chosen in consultation 
with members of the Provincial Government Sectoral Team on Knowledge-Based 
Services Exporting. Appendix 4.2 is a copy of the protocol used to elicit Ileedbac: k 
during the pre-test. 
The surveys with personalized cover letters on Memorial University or 
Newfoundland letterhead (Appendix 4.3) and postage paid return envelopes were sent 
by first class mail during February of 1999. Respondents were offered summary results 
as an enticement to complete the survey. Surveys were coded to permit tracking. 
Follow-up letters (Appendix 4.4) were sent after three and six weeks. 
Survey responses were compared to Statistics Canada data on the population of 
firms in the Province to determine representativeness of respondents. 
4.2.2 Da(a Analysis and Interpretation 
"While not all social science research entails the use of formal measurement 
instruments, it is always necessary to specify how the central concepts are being 
applied to concrete social phenomena" (Clark and Causer, 1991; 169). 
In the present research project, this implies specifying measures of knowlcdgc- 
intensity to determine whether or not a firm is considered to be knowledge-based. K13ß 
categorization is necessary to facilitate analysis of survey data. Unfortunately, as 
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indicated in Chapter 1, there is no generally accepted definition or a. knowledge-based 
industry (KUI) or knowledge-based firmn and there are no generally accepted empirical 
measures ol'associated theoretical concepts (Ilowitt, 1996). The lack ofcmpirical 
measures necessitates multiple approaches to operationalizing the knowledge-intensity 
construct (Webb el al., 1981). The present study uses standard industry classification 
data and a number of additional measures compiled from data collected from SMEs in 
order to classify firms by level of knowledge-intensity. In cases where SIC codes were 
not available from the survey, descriptive information on the primary type of business, 
provided by respondents, was used to identify SICs. 
The SIC information used in the present study to categorize firms by level of 
knowledge-intensity is based primarily on work by Lee and I las (1996). The objective 
of their research was to identify knowledge-producing industries. Utilizing research 
and development and human capital indicators to measure knowledge-intensity and to 
define knowledge-intensive industries, Lee and Has categorized 55 SICs as high, 
medium or low knowledge-intensity. The present study also utilizes input from 
entrepreneurs. Two survey questions (Appendix 4.1, questions 16 and 17) elicited input 
from respondents on the importance of a number of factors to success in their industry 
and on the extent to which these factors apply to their firm. These factors were also 
drawn primarily from the work of Lee and I las (1996). 
Initially, factor analysis was employed with the items included in these two 
questions. "Factor analysis is used to discover patterns among the variations in values 
of several variables" (Babbie, 1992; 444). On the basis of the results of the factor 
analysis, new variäbles were created. Subsequently, discriminant analysis was 
employed to test the effectiveness of these new predictor variables at classifying firms 
by level of knowledge-intensity. A process of random selection was used to select 
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approximately hall'ol'tlie cases For the analysis phase with the remainder being used For 
the classification phase. Further, analysis of variance was used to determine whether or 
not significant difTercnces existed among; the three categories ol'knowledgc-based firms 
lbr each of the variables. Post hoc tests were used to check for significant. differences 
between the three groups. 
Given the primary purpose of the survey was to comparc financing cxpcrienccs 
of 'knowledge-based firms to more traditional businesses, descriptive statistics, 
crosstabulations and comparison of means were the main methods used to analyze the 
remainder of the survey data. Responses to open-ended questions wcrc analyzed using 
a more qualitative approach to data analysis (Miles and I luberman, 1994). 
4.3 Methods Used in the Supply-Side Study of Lending Institutions 
The study is also designed to examine the supply-side of institutional lending 
decisions, including organizational frameworks, loan evaluation, and decision-making 
processes. The supply-side perspectives are important to understanding the (ending and 
risk assessment processes of chartered banks and government agencies and to 
examining approaches used when lending to KBBs compared to more traditional 
businesses. The study employs the lending framework, outlined previously in Figure 
3.1, to examine the three primary components of institutional lending decisions: 
organizational framework, loan evaluation and decision-making process. The supply- 
side components of*this framework, including the specific dimensions to be examined 
in this study are reproduced in Figure 4.1. Before discussing each of these components, 
a bricf ovcrvicw ol'thc methodology employed for the supply-side is provided. 
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Figure 4.1 
Supply-Side Components of Institutional Lending 
E. U1111 Evaluation 
" Risk Asscssmcnt 
" Loan terms and conditions 
" Loan monitoring 
Lending Decision 
Organizational Framework 
" Organizational strategics 
" Organizational structures 
" Organizational processes 
Decision-making Process 
" Information acquisition 
strategics 
At the first stage, interviews were conducted with senior managers in each of 
the 10 participating organizations (four government agencies and six chartered banks). 
These interviews focused primarily on organizational frameworks in relation to 
knowledge-based businesses. A copy of the interview protocol is included in Appendix 
4.5. At the second stage, account managers were presented with business proposals for 
review (Appendix 4.6). Simultaneous verbal protocols were employed to document 
initial perceptions, questions and reactions to the proposals. Following cot»plctiou of 
this initial review, account managers were interviewed to obtain feedback on specific 
aspects of the proposals. A copy of the protocol used for the business plan experiments 
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and interviews is included in Appendix 4.7. At the next stage, as part of their due 
diligence process, account managers were asked to identify additional information 
requirements. Uitnally, following completion of the full duc diligciice process, account 
managers were interviewed to determine lending decisions, to identify concerns with 
the proposals, to examine decision-making processes, and to obtain post hoc ratings of 
the proposals. A copy of the interview protocol used at the post review stage is 
included in Appendix 4.8. Lach of these stages is described in more detail in the 
following sections on establishing organizational frameworks and examining loan 
evaluation and decision-making processes. 
4.3.1 Establishing Organizational Frameworks 
As indicated previously, it is necessary to obtain input from senior banking and 
government officials to provide the context for overall institutional policy and 
commitment to the SME sector, including knowledge-based firms. While previous 
research in this area is limited, there is evidence that organizational factors, such as 
structures and processes, influence lending decisions (McNamara and Broi»iley, 1997; 
Leblebici and Salancik, 1981). In order to examine the extent to which account 
managers are affected by organizational variables, it is necessary to establish the 
existing f amcwork, policies and procedures of each lending institution. In addition, 
contact with senior officials is necessary to secure co-operation and to obtain formal 
permission to interview account managers for the final stage of data collection required 
to examine lending processes and to determine lending criteria. 
Wynant and Ilatch (1991) provided insight into the organizational structures 
and broad lending policies employed by Canadian chartered banks in servicing the 
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SME sector. More specifically, their research investigated bank objectives and 
organizational strategies and structures for the small business market, decision-making 
irocesscs for small business loans, and the training and experience of small business 
bankers. No similar studies have been undertaken on the banks' or governments' 
approaches to servicing the knowledge-based sector. More recently, Thompson 
Lightstone and Company (1998) focused almost exclusively on the perspectives of 
account managers and SMEs, while incorporating limited demand-side perspectives 
from special interest groups, such as knowledge-based firms. As a result, there is a 
need to establish the organizational context within which lending decisions to 
knowledge-based lirms are made. 
The present study 1'ocuscs on Icnding institutions (chartcred banks and 
government agencies) in Ncwlbundland and Labrador. Six Canadian banks and lour 
government agencies represent the primary sources of debt financing to SMEs in the 
Province. All the banks, with the exception of I-ISBC, have established specialized 
lending centres to deal specifically with kinowledge-basccl SMI: s. I lowevcr, iionc of 
these centres are located in the Province. 
4.3.1.1 Data Collection 
Interviews with senior managers and with account managers (those who 
reviewed the knowledge-based business proposal), as well as secondary sources, 
including promotional literature and websites provide the data necessary to establish 
organizational frameworks. 
Previous contact with senior individuals in chartered banks and government 
agencies confirmed their reluctance and, in some cases, outright refusal to provide 
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access to policies and procedures manuals, to lending data, and to client files. As a 
result, qualitative interviews were used to obtain information on institutional structures, 
decision processes, and policies and procedures. According to Weiss (1994), there are 
a number of general research objectives for which qualitative interviews are 
appropriate, including developing descriptions, integrating perspectives, describing 
processes and understanding interpretations. As such, the qualitative interview was 
well suited to obtaining the inl'orination needed to determine overall institutional policy 
and commitment to the SMI: sector and to knowledge-based firms. 
In the case of the chartered banks (Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commnmcrcc, I ISI3C Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotiabank and Toronto Dominion 
flank), interviews wcrc conducted with the senior manager responsible for each bank in 
the Province. In the case o('the government agencies, interviews were conducted with 
the assistant deputy ministers of the two provincial government departments (DI'1"1' and 
DORR) and with the appropriate senior officials in the two federal agencies (ACOA 
and I3DC). The me-test ofthe protocol consisted of the initial interviews with senior 
officials in the chartered banks and government agencies and resulted in only minor 
modifications to the protocol. Seven of the interviews were conducted in-person, one 
was conducted by telephone and two individuals submitted written responses to the 
survey questions and subsequently were followed up by telephone. Three of tlhc 
respondents from the chartered banks were located outside the Province. All in-person 
interviews were audiotaped and verbatim transcripts generated For subsequent review 
and interpretation. Except as noted above, no background information was collected on 
senior management interviewees. 
Flic interview protocol explored the lbllowing areas and related issues: bank 
and government agency ohjcctivcs in relation to SMrs, cspccially knowledge-based 
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small firms; organizational strategies and structures designed to serve the SME market, 
especially knowledge-based firms; policies and procedures, and decision-making 
processes for small business lending, particularly lending to knowledge-based SMEs; 
and specialized training, expertise and support provided to account managers dealing 
with SMEs, especially those in knowledge-based sectors. 
Further, 12 account managers in the participating organizations were 
interviewed about the structure, processes and systems employed by their organizations 
to deal with KBBs. The questions addressing KBB structure and support were 
essentially the same as those explored with the senior management group. A copy of 
the interview protocol is included in Appendix 4.8. These interviews are discussed 
Further in section 4.3.2.1 since they also address loan evaluation and decision-making 
processes. Background information, comprised of years of lending experience, 
educational background, and industry sector specialization, was collected from all 
account managers. 
Supplementary materials, including brochures, websites and in offne case, a CD 
ROM, related to each organization's approach to the KBI3 sector also were reviewed 
where available. 
4.3.1.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
As indicated previously, interviews with senior managers in the banks and 
government agencies were audiotaped. Verbatim transcripts of these interviews, as 
well as the interviewer's notes, were content analyzed to determine organizational 
strategies and organizational structures associated with the KBB sector. This analysis 
was supplemented by content analysis of interview data obtained from the account 
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managers and of published secondary data, comprised primarily of information 
obtained from institutional brochures and websites. Overall, analyses focused on 
developing descriptions of organizational approaches to serving the KIM) market and 
on comparing the approaches taken by chartered banks to those employed by 
government agencies. 
Additional data obtained from account managers, consisting of years of lending 
experience, educational background, and industry sector specialization, were also 
subjected to crosstabulations and comparison ol'incans to identify differences between 
account managers in banks and government agencies, and between KULI lending 
specialists and account managers serving more traditional sectors. 
4.3.2 Examining Loan Evaluation and Decision-Making 11rOccsscs 
Account managers in chartered banks and government agencies served as the 
primary data source for examining lending decisions. A total of 23 account managers, 
13 in banks and 10 in government agencies, participated in the study. Elements of the 
lending decision that were investigated included both process and content. In terms of 
the credit decision-making process, the research project encompassed all stages of 
credit evaluation. Although the focus of the study was on loan evaluation and risk 
assessment. including the inflormalion acquisition and decision strategies oIaccount 
managers, interrelationships among the various stages were considered. In terns of 
content, the study examined risk assessment criteria used to evaluate lending 
applications. 
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4.3.2.1 Data Collection 
Loan evaluation data were dcrivcd primarily from verbal protocols and 
interviews with account managers, supported by data obtained from interviews with 
senior management. Decision-making processes are based primarily on data obtained 
from interviews with account managers, also supported by data obtained From 
interviews with senior officials. 
The literature review raised a number of issues that were addressed when 
selecting methodologies for data collection in this area. First, in the venture capital 
context, evaluation is a multi-dimensional process, involving multi-states, multi- 
criteria and multi-persons (I lall and I lofcr, 1993). The lending process and credit 
decision-making areas appear to be similar to venture investing in this regard (Reitan 
and Waage, 1998). As a result, it was necessary to examine processes not just 
decisions (Sandberg, Schweiger and I lofer, 1988) and to utilize a process model or 
decision-making Framework to investigate factors at different stages ol'the lending 
process (Bruno and "1'yebjec, 1984; Boocock and Woods, 1997; Reitaa and Waagp, 
1998). Second, to understand the lending process and lending criteria, it was necessary 
to examine both within an appropriate context (Leblebici and Salancik, 1981; 1, letcher, 
1995a and 1995b; McNamara and I3romiley, 1997). Actual lending situations and 
actual lending decisions would be ideal but unrealistic given concerns For 
confidentiality. Third, the decision-making process and evaluative criteria are likely 
interrelated and need to be examined simultaneously rather than independently 
(I3oocock and Woods, 1997). Fourth, there are significant limitations associated with 
self-report data on the importance of lending criteria, such that self-report data should 
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not be used exclusively (Shepherd, 1997 and Zacharakis and Myer, 1998). Fifth, there 
are a large number of interrelated variables that appear to influence lending decisions. 
It is evident from the previous discussion that, to fully understand the lending 
process and lending criteria, it was highly desirable to observe decision-making under 
actual conditions. Examining lending decisions in a realistic context increases 
reliability and provides details of the processes and criteria that could not be obtained 
otherwise. Such an approach also addresses the concern that the clccision-making 
proccss and evaluation criteria should not be dealt with independently and the concerns 
associated with post hoc sell report data, whether obtained through interview or survey. 
I lowever, since neither the banks nor government agencies would hermit observation of 
actual cases, an alternate approach had to be developed. To that end, two business 
plans were developed specifically for the purpose of this research, one for a knowledge- 
based business (TeleCarc Incorporated)i and one fier a more traditional venture (Glacier 
Ice Incorporated) 2. Copies ol'the two proposals are included in Appendix 4.6. 
I'o control Cor issues related to historical data and previous dealings with 
financial institutions, the business proposals focused on start-up situations involving 
hypothetical entrepreneurs. The plans were designed to reflect contrast in a number of 
key dimensions of knowledge-intensity, especially in the area ofhunian capital. 
Funding requirements Vor the two ventures consisted of term financing at start-up of 
$200,000 with additional tern financing of $100,000 in each of the second and 
third years of operation, and operating credit requirements of $1,000,000-$1,250,000. 
The plans were reviewed by four faculty members at Mcniorial University of 
'TeicCare Incorporated is a telemedicine-bused medical service venture that proposes to offer medical 
diagnosis, consultation and monitoring of patients with cardiovascular disease at a distance. 
2 Glacier Ice Incorporated is a resource-based harvesting and manufacturing venture that proposes to 
harvest and process glacier ice to produce specialty products, such as ice blocks, cubes and crushed ice 
1'or ultimate sate to industrial, institutional and retail consumers. 
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Newfoundland teaching in the area of entrepreneurship and new venture creation. 
Three of these individuals had previous experience in the commercial lending area with 
chartered banks and one is a chartered accountant with considerable small business 
consulting expcricncc. In addition, the two proposals and associated protocols were 
piloted in thrcc organizations, one bank and two government agencies. 
In discussing the lack of understanding of the processes involved in Human 
problem solving and decision making, l'ayinc, Braunstein and Carroll (1978) concluded 
the Following: 
Part of the reason for this lack of understanding is that most decision 
researchers have used empirical procedures which are not suited to the 
identification of the processes which lead a decision maker to a particular 
. 
judgement. Typically, research has been focused on data which reflect only the 
cud product of the decision processes, for example, choice proportions, rankings 
or ratings (p. 17). 
To provide insight into the decision-making process and to ensure the situation 
was as near as possible to actual lending conditions, observational methods were 
employed in the present study (Selltiz el at, 1976). Cook and Diamond (1976) have 
provided evidence of the external validity of results obtained from Field research. The 
present methodology utilized simultaneous verbal protocols (Newell, Shaw and Simon, 
1958) and qualitative interviews in a two-stage approach to examine loan evaluation 
and decision-making by -account managers. 
Verbal protocols involve participants "thinking aloud" while they perform a 
task, in this case the review of a business proposal. Ericsson and Simon (1994) outline 
eight conditions under which verbal protocols are useful and provide accurate data: 
1. the information reported is the focus of study; 
2. the task is not of a highly routine nature; 
3. a short time exists between the task and recording; 
4. excessive encoding of information is not required; 
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ý: 
5. the reports are oral; 
6. subjects are free of distraction; 
7. clear instructions are provided on how to verbalize; and 
8. the reports are as complete as possible. 
'T'hese conditions are well satisfied in the present study and provide support (or using 
verbal protocols. 
Building on the seminal work of Newell, Shaw and Sinion (1958), numerous 
researchers have utilized the simultaneous verbal protocol to examine decision-making 
processes and problem solving in diverse areas (Schweiger, 1983) and to overcome the 
problems outlined by Payne et al. (1978). Schweiger (1983) and others (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1980) have also addressed the issue of the obtrusive nature of the simultaneous 
verbal protocol and concluded that "... it appears improbable that there were any 
effects in performance due to the use of simultaneous verbal protocols" (Schweiget, 
1983; 189). 
At the first static ol'the data collection proccss, bound copies of the Proposals 
were submittal to account managers liar review. The account managers were selected 
by the senior commercial credit person in the case or the chartered banks and by the 
departmental director or manager in the case of the government agencies. Each account 
manager reviewed one proposal. The account managers were provided with only 
limited advance information on the proposals, including the nature of the venture and 
the magnitude ol'the funding requirements. 
At the initial review stage, verbal protocols were used to capture the 
perceptions, opinions, comments, questions and concerns expressed by account 
managers. Warm-up procedures, adapted from Ericsson and Simon (1993), were used 
to I iiniliarize the subjects with the think aloud technique and to stress the distinction 
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between concurrent verbalization of thoughts and retrospective reporting. The 
verbalized thoughts were recorded by audiotape for later transcription and analysis. The 
researcher was ipresciit' during the rcvicw and made notes of coninicints and reactions 
but did not intervene in the process. 
Prior to reviewing the proposal, each participant was asked to outline (lie review 
process normally followed. Immediately following the initial review each account 
manager was asked to indicate to what extent the review process paralleled his/her 
usual review and to rate the proposal in 13 areas. These factors were adapted From 
previous studies on bank lending and venture capital investing in Canada (Wynant and 
I latch, 1991; Knight, 1986 and 1994; Thompson Lightstone, 1998). A copy of the 
protocol used for the business plan experiment is included in Appendix 4.7. 
At the second stage in the process, which involved conducting their due 
diligence, account managers were asked to identify additional information 
requirements. This information was transmitted to the researcher by mail, fax, phone, 
c-mail and in some cascs, in-ipcrson. 
Finally, at the third stage (post review), which followed the completion of the 
risk assessnicnt process, account managers were interviewed to determine the nature 
and extent of recommended support, to identify concerns with the proposals, and to 
investigate the decision-making processes employed. At this stage, account managers 
were again asked to rate the business proposal on the same 13 dimensions outlined 
previously. A copy ol"the interview protocol used at the post review stage is included 
in Appendix 4.8. 
This intcrvicw was semi-structured, thereby permitting more intensive study of 
perceptions, attitudes and motivations than a standardized interview (Selltiz ef al., 
Pour of the rcvicws vcrc conductcd by tclcphonc. 
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1976). Comparing the qualitative interview to participant observation, Jones 1996) 
suggests that the goal of the interview "... is to develop an understanding of the social 
and psychological processes that have occurred in a particular setting, or among people 
who have had particular sets of experiences - but not by immersing yourself in the 
setting and observing. Rather, the goal is achieved by interviewing people who have 
been in the setting of interest, or who have had the experiences you want to focus on" 
(p. 140). 
4.3.2.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Interpretation of the interview data and analysis of the business plan reviews 
necessitate using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
analysis. As Strauss aºul Corbin (1998) argue, the interplay between the two is 
important to work aimed at theory building. As the authors point out, in qualitative 
research studies such as this, "... data collection and analysis occur in alternating 
sequences. Analysis begins with the first interview and observation, followed by more 
analysis, more interviews or lieldwork, and so on. It is the analysis that drives the data 
collection" (Strauss and Corbin. 1998; 42). 
The observational nature of the simultaneous verbal protocol approach 
combined with the qualitative nature of the interviews with both senior management 
and account managers require using a highly qualitative and in some cases, primarily 
descriptive or narrative approach to analysis and interpretation (Caulkins, 1988). 
Some of the qualitative data from the business plan reviews was interpreted in a similar 
Cashion. 1lowcvcr, other data obtained from the business plan reviews, especially the 
two-stage ratings of the venture proposals, were analyzed using more quantitative 
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approaches including consensus analysis (CA), multidimensional scaling (MUS) and 
hierarchical clustering (I IC), in addition to standard multivariate techniques. Data 
analysis includes comparisons of results between the following a priori groups of 
account managers: account manager type (government and bank), typt cif plan 
reviewed (traditional and KUH), and account manager löcus (generalist and KULI). 
Given its prominence in the analysis of the results of the business plan reviews, 
an overview ofconscnsus analysis follows. CA has its roots in cognitive anthropology 
where it was originally developed as a technique for determining which respondents are 
most knowledgeable and reliable in a particular cultural context (Caulkins and I lyatt, 
I999). The theory was motivated by the fact that when exploring new cultures and 
asking questions of individuals, neither the correctness of answers to the questions nor 
the cultural competence of the respondents is known (Romney el a!., 1987). As a 
theory, CA is based on the assumption that there is one culture that is the same for all 
members of a group and that members of the group possess varying degrees of 
knowledge with respect to a particular subject (Romney, Wcllcr and Batchcider, 1986). 
CA also specifics the conditions under which more agreement among individuals on 
correct answers to questions indicates more knowledge on their part (Borgatti, 199Gb). 
"There are three assumptions underlying the methodology of consensus analysis. 
"Translated into the anthropological context, they are as follows: 
1. One Culture. It is assumed that, whatever cultural reality might be, it is the same 
('or everyone. There are no subcultures that have systematically different views 
on a given topic. All variability is due to variations in amount of knowledge. 
2. Independence. The only force drawing people to a given answer is the culturally 
correct answer. When informants do not know an answer, they choose or make 
up one independently of each other...... 
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3. One Domain. All questions are drawn from the same underlying domain°.... " 
(13orgatti, I996b; 45). 
The consensus model makes no presumptions as to what constitutes a correct 
answer. 'Flic theory uses consensus among respondents to ascertain the "culturally 
correct"` responses and subsequently infers the level of knowledge of each informant 
on the basis ol'the relationship to the shared culture. As a method, CA is useful in 
determining patterns of agreement among respondents concerning a particular domain, 
what information is culturally correct within the group, and how well iººllorined each 
individual is with respect to the domain of knowledge (Caulkins and l lyatt, 1999). 
According to Romney, Wcllcr and Batchelder (1986), one of the main advantages of 
CA is the ability to produce reliable results with as few as four respondents. 
According to Caulkins and I Iyatt (1999), conscnsus analysis should not be 
limited to the study of high-agreement domains. The authors propose a typology for 
conceptualizing and examining diversity in non-coherent or IOW-consensus domains 
consisting of the following: weak agreement domains, turbulent domains and 
multicentric domains. The latter is comprised of two subcategories: subcultural 
domains where there are two or more groups expressing different but not opposite 
views, and contested domains where groups take opposing perspectives. A weak 
agreement domain is characterized by an elbow-bend scree plot of eigenvalues and no 
negative knowledge scores. Turbulent domains are characterized by a straight-line 
descending scree plot of eibenvalues and, also, no negative knowledge scores. 
Subcultural groups arc distinguished by the appearance of two or more "answer keys", 
Domain in this context rcl'crs to a body of knowledge on a particular topic or subject. In consensus 
analysis, all questions must be drawn from a single domain. 
According to l3orgatti (1996b), the right answer to a question in this context is a culturally defined 
concept and does not imply truth in the scientific sense of empirical reality. 
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while the opposing views of contested groups are represented by negative knowledge 
scores. 
In so far as a "culture of lending" may exist among account managers in lending 
institutions, consensus analysis is utilized in this study as a means ofcxhloring the 
existence. nature and pervasiveness of this culture. 
C'onscnsus analysis performed on initial and post review data is also supported 
by (actor analysis and correlation analysis. Factor analysis is employed to gain 
additional insight into key lending variables and the extent to which there is 
convergence among the variables over time. Correlations are computed between initial 
and post review ratings to investigate the impact of the due diligence process on 
account managers' perceptions and, therefore on overall risk assessment and loan 
evaluation. 
Finally, information requirements identified by account managers and data 
concerning internal and external resources utilized by account managers arc analyzed to 
provide Further insight into loan evaluation and decision-making. Descriptive statistics 
and comparison of means are employed to determine if differences exist among the 
three a priori groups of account managers. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The methodology as outlined is well suited to the needs of this study For n 
number of reasons. In terms of the demand-side, the mail survey provides the 
opportunity to obtain input from a geographically diverse group of entrepreneurs. This 
is important for budgetary reasons. More importantly, the mail survey also affords 
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privacy and convenience for respondents, as well as the time and flexibility needed to 
reflect on previous experiences and to retrieve data where necessary. 
In terms of the supply-side, the proposed methodology addresses a number of 
issues OutliI, cd previously. The use ofmultiple data sources enhances reliability as 
does the integration of qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques. The 
business plan experiments, supported by the use of simultaneous verbal protocols 
ensures that lending decisions are examined in a realistic context, providing details of' 
the loan evaluation process and risk assessment criteria that, otherwise, would be 
difficult to obtain: Collecting and comparing data at various stages in the evaluation 
process also permits greater insight into the due diligence process. Finally, use of 
consensus analysis enables quantitative assessment of very small subgroups of account 
managers, overcoming one of the main limitations associated with standard 
multivariate statistical analysis. 
4.4.1 Limitations 
[here are a number of potential limitations with the methodological approach 
used in this research that are summarized briefly here and discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7. In terms of the demand-side, the database used for the mail survey of 
entrepreneurs is not representative of all firms in the Province. This raises a concern 
with generalizability. Nonetheless, as a purposeful sample, the database ensures the 
heterogeneity necessary to examine firms of different levels of knowledge-intensity. 
There are also a number of potential limitations associated with the 
methodology used to investigate the supply-side of institutional lending. The sheer 
volume of qualitative data obtained from the interviews and from the verbal protocols 
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presents a challenge to analysis and interpretation. Careful attention to systematic 
description and to linking data from multiple sources not only should address this issue 
but also should ensure results are well grounded and reliable. The experimental nature 
of the loan review process also poses some limitations. For example, using 
hypothetical entrepreneurs does not permit account managers to engage in the full due 
diligence process or to focus on an important variable in the lending decision - the 
individual entrepreneur and his/her experience, commitment and previous dealings with 
the financial institution. 
Small sample size also presents a limitation to (lie use oF'sta ndard multivariate 
analyses and to gcncralizability of results. Similarly, there arc limitations arising from 
tue geographic setting. As an exploratory study, findings from this thesis must be 
interpreted in the context of institutional lending in Newfoundland and Labrador. A 
final concern deals with the elements of the cultural domain, in this case, the key 
lending variables or criteria. Ideally the participants should feline the cultural domain 
to ensure the dimensions reflect the experience and reality of account managers. In this 
study. the elements of the lending domain are drawn from the literature. To address 
this constraint, account managers are given the opportunity to add to the list of lending 
variables. 
4.4.2 Summary 
In summary, the methodology employed in this study utilizes triangulation of 
data sources and data collection methods. The mail survey of entrepreneurs provides 
data necessary to compare the financing experiences of entrepreneurs in ktiowledge- 
based firms to those in more traditional, less knowledge-inntenlsive sectors. The 
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interviews with senior banking and government officials provide the institutional 
context necessary for viewing lending decisions. Finally, the two-stage data collection 
Process used with account managers provides insight into the lending process and 
ensures that lending decisions arc examined within the context in which they normally 
occur. Table 4.1 includes a summary cif the methodologies employed to address each 
rescarch qucstion. 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Research Questions and Methodologies 
ýý 
t 
I_ 
t 
11 
Ii 
Research questions methodologics 
(j I: What roles have the chartered hanks and government ngcncics played in " Mail survey of lirms in 
financing K1313s compared to less knowledge-intensive firms? Newfoundland & Labrador 
Q2: What have been the experiences of Kills with obtaining debt financing from " Mail survey of firms In 
chartered banks and govcrnmcnt agencies compared to less knowledge-Intensive Newfoundland & Labrador 
irnts? 
Q3: What are the perceptions of K1313s concerning chartered bank and government " Mail survey of firms in 
financing compared with perceptions of less knowledge-intensive firms? Newfoundland & Labrador 
Q4: Are loan evaluation and decision making nllectcd by organizational variables Interviews with senior 
and are the cll'ccts different For Kilts compared to less knowledge-intensive officials and account 
firms? managers 
" Promotional literature 
" Vetbal protocols 
" Account manager requests 
for additional information 
Q5: What are the information acquisition strategies employed by account " Interviews with senior 
managers to support credit decision-making and are there dill'crcnccs between the officials and account 
strategies used by account managers in making lending decisions to K1313s? managers 
Q(: Does risk assessment of K13L3s dilTcr from risk assessment of less knowledge- " Interviews with account 
intensive firms, and if so, how? managers 
" Verbal protocols 
(17: Do chartered banks attach diflcrcnt terms and conditions to loans made to " Interviews with account 
Kilns than to those made to less knowledge-intensive firms and tire there managers 
differences in the loan monitoring processes employed for the two types of firms? 
Q8: Are there diflcrences between lending decisions orchartcred banks and " Interviews with senior 
government agencies? Ifdifferenccs exist, to what extent can they be explaitied by oliicials and account 
ditlcrenccs in institutional structures, loan evaluation and decision-making managers 
processes? Verbal protocols 
Q9: Does a common or shared lending culture exist among account managers in " Interviews with account 
chartered banks and government agencies? managers 
" Consensus analysis 
Q 10: To what extent does the lending culture within chartered batiks and " Interviews with account 
government agencies reflect the needs of KI313s? managers 
" consensus analysis 
Data analysis in this study integrates qualitative approaches necessary to 
interpret field observations of, and interviews with, account managers with the more 
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quantitative approaches appropriate to summarizing and interpreting findings from the 
survey of entrepreneurs and from the business plan reviews. Consensus analysis is 
used as the primary means of exploring the existence and extent of a lending culture 
among groups of account managers. In addition, multidimensional scaling and 
hierarchical clustering provide the descriptive and analytical tools necessary to depict 
and examine patterns of cultural agreement and consensus among respondents. Finally, 
standard univariate and multivariate statistical analyses are employed as appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEMAND-SIDE FINDINGS 
5.9 Introduction to Demand-Side Findings 
One of the primary objectives of the current study is to investigate the 
experiences of entrepreneurs in knowledge-based firms who have sought financing 
from chartered banks and/or government agencies. Previous research (Groupe Secor 
Inc., 1998) identified the need to obtain a first-hand view from knowledge-based Firms 
about their financing experiences, especially at the nascent stages of their development. 
'1'o that end, a mail survey (Appendix 4.1) was undertaken in the spring of 1999. 
Survey data were analyzed to address the following research questions previously 
outlined in Chapter 3: 
Ql: What roles have the chartered banks and government agencies played in 
financing knowledge-based firms and how do they differ from the roles played 
in financing less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q2: What have been the experiences of KI3I3s with obtaining debt financing from 
chartered banks and government agencies and how do they compare to the 
experiences of less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q3: What are the perceptions of KURs with respect to chartered bank and 
government financing and how do they compare with the perceptions of less 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
Phis chapter presents results and discusses findings based on the demand-side 
perspective of entrepreneurs obtained from this survey. A brief overview of (lie survey 
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sample is provided initially before proceeding to the presentation and discussion of 
results. 
5.1 Profile of Survey RcspOndcnls 
Of the total of 1715 mailings, 185 surveys were returned by Canada Post as 
undeliverable and another 58 were returned by firms for a variety of reasons, such as 
the firm has ceased operations. the business is not locally owned and the survey is not 
considered applicable. A total of 235 usable surveys were received for a response rate 
of 16 permit. 
5.1.1 Profile of Owtrcr/Man: rgcrs 
Approximately 75 percent of respondents arc the principal owners of the 
business with the remainder indicating either a minority ownership or senior 
managerial position. More than 83 percent started the firms while 12 percent indicated 
a purchase situation and slightly less than five percent inherited the business. Almost 
86 percent of the respondents arc male. The mean age of respondents is 45 years with 
years experience in the firm, nine years previous business experience and eight years 
previous industry experience prior to involvement in the present business. The 
educational background at the time ol*becoming involved in the prescht business is 
presented in Table 5.1 which indicates 73.3 percent have completed a college diploma 
or university degree program. In addition, it is noteworthy that approximately a quarter 
of respondents holds a professional designation with professional engineer (('. Eng. ) 
bring cited most frcc ucntly. 
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Table 5.1 
Educational Level of Owners/Managers 
Highest Level of Education nI 'yo 
Did not complete high school 21 9.2 
l li gh school graduate 40 17.5 
Trade school or college graduate 61 26.8 
University under graduate degree 54 23.7 
University graduate degree 52 22.8 
Total 228 100.0 
5.1.2 Profile of Firms 
Very few respondents were able to provide Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes as requested in the survey. As a result, descriptions or tim primary type of 
business provided by respondents were used to identify SIC codes. Firms were 
subsequently categorized as high, medium or low knowledge-intensive using the SIC 
categories employed by Lee and I las (1996). 'fable 5.2 provides a breakdown of 
respondent firms by level of knowledge-intensity. 
'fable 5.2 
Firms by Level of Knowledge-Intensity 
KnowIed *c-Intcnsit y it % 
High 85 36.2 
Medium 91 38.7 
Low 59 25.1 
Total 235 100. 
Seven respondents did not indicate educational background. 
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To enable a comparison of respondent firms to industry sector data for 
the entire 
population of lirms in the Province, SIC codes were transformed into the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS)2 codes, currently used by Statistics 
Canada. Table 5.3 provides a summary distribution of industry sectors 1'or respondent 
firms, as well as for all firms in the Province. 
Table 5.3 
Industry Sector I)islributiou 
Industry Sector' 
Sample 
'Yo 
l'011ulati0113- 
'Y, ) 
Aýriculturc, Forestry, Fishing and I Iuntin º 3.0 3.9 
Mim and Oil dud (; as Extraction 3.4 0.4 
Utilities 0.0 0.1 
Construction 5.1 10.2 
Manufacturing 38.5 4.9 
Wholesale Trade 5.6 5.1 
Retail Trade 3.0 16.6 
Transportation and Warehousing 1.7 5.1 
Information and Cultural Industries 0.0 0.9 
Finance and Insurance 0.9 2.4 
Real Estate and Rental Leasing 0.9 3.0 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services, 
Management of Companies and Enterprises, and 
Administrative and Support, Waste Mgt. & Rented Scrv. 
29.9 9.2 
Educational Services 1.3 1.4 
1 Iealth Care and Social Assistance 1.7 13.1 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 2.1 2.2 
Accommodation and Food Services 2.6 8.0 
Other Services (Except Public Admin. ) .4 11.0 I'ublic Administration 0.0 2.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
The mean age of respondent firms is 11.6 years with 28.9 percent established in 
the last live years. Incorporated firms represent 83.3 percent of the total. Postal coole 
NMMCS was introduced in Canada in 1997. 
' All (irin population data were obtained from the Business Register, Statistics Canada, December 1999. 
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information was used to categorize firms geographically. Table 5.4 provides a summary 
of the geographic location of respondent firms, as well as comparable data for all firms 
in the Province. 
'1'ublc 5.4 
Geographic Distribution of Firms 
Region 
Sample 
(%) 
I'ol)ula(ioin 
('%o) 
Avalmi 46 ,0 Eastern 9.8 . - 1 LL 
Central 8.9 R 
Wesicni 7.3 12.2 
Northern 8.0 5.0 
Labrador 4.7 5.7 
Tot, I 100.0 
In terms of number of employees, the mean for full-tine employment in the last 
ii 
Iiscal year was 14.5 while the mean for part-time was 11.5. This compares to 3.3 and 
2.9 employees respectively in the start-up year. The distribution of respondent firths by 
employment size category, as well as the comparative data for all firms in the Province 
is presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 
Distribution of Firms by Employment size category 
1 
Em )lo) ment Size Category 
Sample 
CYO) 
Population 
Cy") 
I to 4 50.6 62.0 
5 to 9 19.0 18.0 
l0 to 19 13.0 10.3 
20 to 49 10.9 6.3 
50 to 99 3.3 1.9 
100 to 199 2.7 0.8 
200 to 499 0.0 0.4 
500+ 0.5 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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A number of observations can be made on the basis ofcomparing the prolilc of 
respondent firms to the firm population data for the Province. First, there are a number 
of significant differences in industry sector representation, most notably manufacturing, 
retail, health care and social assistance, professional, scientific and technical services et 
al., and other services. The manufacturing and professional sectors are clearly 
overreprescntcd in the respondent group while several other sectors are 
underrepresented. Second. in terms of geographic distribution. the Avalon region is 
overrepresented in the respondent group at the expense of aall other regions, except 
Northern, which are underrepresented. Third, the smallest lirin size category (I to 4 
employees) is underrepresented in responses while lirin size categories beyond 10 
employees are overrepresented, except lbr firms employing 200 to 499 employees. 
In total, these differences confirm that survey respondents are not representative 
ol'thc cntirc population of firms in this Province. This finding is not surprising given 
the composition of the database used for the mail survey. As indicated in Chapter 4, 
the database was chosen as a purposelül sample to ensure heterogeneity in the 
population, to include cases critical for developing theory, and to examine differences 
between individuals or settings (Maxwell, 1998). 1 Icterogcneity in terms of level of 
knowledge-intensity has been achieved as indicated by the results presented in Table 
5.2. This heterogeneity ensures critical cases are included to enable investigation of 
differences between KBBs and less knowledge-intensive firms in terms of their 
dealings with financial institutions. 
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5.2 Level of Knowledge-Intensity 
In the absence of a generally accepted definition of a knowledge-based business 
or a knowledge-based industry, the present study uses SIC information and input from 
entrepreneurs to classify firms by level of knowledge-intensity. The previous section 
described the process of establishing the SIC code for each firm. In addition to 
providing descriptive information on the primary type of business, survey respondents 
were asked to rate the importance of a number of Factors to success in their industry and 
to indicate the extent to which these factors apply to their firm (Appendix 4.1, survey 
questions 16 and I7). 
Initially, factor analysis was CI11ploycd with the 12 items included in these two 
ý: ¬, 
ý. 
questions. Results (Table 5.6) indicate the items load onto two primary factors at both 
the industry level and the firm level: innovation and growth (component 1) and human 
capital (conmponent 2). At the industry Ievel, the following four factors relate primarily 
to innovation and growth: the importance of research and development activity, the 
importance of patents, the importance of innovative products and processes, and the 
ability to compete internationally. Also at the industry level, two items, the importance 
of intangible assets and the importance ol'a highly educated workforce, group together 
under human capital. Similarly, at the firm level, three items, invests heavily in 
research and development (It & U), exhibits a high level of innovation, and has the 
potential to grow rapidly, relate primarily to innovation and growth. Also at the firm 
level, three items, depends heavily on human capital, has a high proportion of 
intangible assets, and success is based primarily on knowledge, group together under 
human capital. 
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Table 5.6 
Rotated Component Matrix of Knowledge-intensity Factors 
Item component 
1 2 
Importance of research and development activity . 843 . 177 
Importance of patents obtained . 747 -. 115 Importance of innovative products and proccsscs . 571 . 368 Importance of intangible assets . 421 . 624 
Inn portance of Iii ghI educated work tierce . 142 . 643 
Importance of ability to compete internationally . 619 . 322 Invests heavily in R and D . 787 . 127 
Exhibits a high level of innovation . 5451 . 472 Depends heavily on I)))man capital . 204 . 726 
Has the potential to grow rapidly . 581 . 318 
1las a high proportion of intan Bible assets . 229 . 762 
Success is based primarily on knowledge -3.1431; -02 . 712 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
On the basis of the results of tlhc factor analysis, four new variables were 
created by computing a simple average of the underlying factors: industry innovation, 
industry human capital, firm innovation, and firm human capital. Subsequently, 
discriminant analysis was employed to test time effectiveness of these ibur new predictor 
variables at classifying firms by level of knowledge-intensity. A process of random 
selection was used to select approximately half of the cases for the analysis phase with 
the remainder being used for the classification phase. Results (Table 5.7) indicate the 
predictor variables arc effective at classifying firms correctly, particularly in the case of 
the high knowledge-intensity group. 
Further, analysis oi'variance was used to determine whether or not significant 
differences exist among the three categories of knowledge-based firms for each of the 
Tour variables. Results indicate significant differences exist between groups for only 
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Table 5.7 
Discriminant Analysis Classification Results 
Level of Knowledge-Intensity 
Predicted Croon Mc mbershin 
Level of lligh Medium Low Total 
knowledge knowledge knowledge knowledge 
# (%) (%) 'Yº #% 
Cases high 29 (74.4) 4 (10.3) 6 (15.4) 39 (100.0) 
Selected knowledge 
Medium 9 (30.0) 13 (43.3) 8 (26.7) 30 (100.0) 
knowledge 
Low 6 (31.6) 8 (42.1) 5 (26.3) 19 (100.0) 
knowled e 
Cases Not I Iigh 24 (64.9) 7 (18.9) 6 (16.2) 37 (100.0) 
Selected knowledge 
Medium 16 (36.4) 13 (29.5) 15 (34.1) 44 (100.0) 
knowledge 
Low 8 (29.6) 10 (37.0) 9 (33.3) 27 (100.0) 
knowledge 
53.4 percent of selected original grouped cases correctly classified. 
42.6 percent of unsclccted original grouped cases correctly classilied. 
two of the variables, industry human capital and firm human capital. Post hoc tests 
confirm significant differences exist between the high knowledge group and each ol'the 
medium and low knowledge categories but not between the medium and low 
knowledge groups. As a result, the medium and low knowledge categories have been 
combined for the remainder of the analysis. 
t 
i 
i 
5.3 The Role of Banks sind Government in Financing Kills at Start-up 
To address the question of the roles played by chartered banks and government 
agencies in financing KI3Bs at the start-up stage compared to less knowledge-intensive 
lirms, survey respondents were asked to indicate the amount or percent of total start-up 
capital obtained from all sources. The comparison of the total amount and sources of 
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start-up capital used by high knowledge firms to the combined medium and low 
knowledge category reveals significant differences in three areas: percent contribution 
fron personal sources, percent contribution from banks, and percent contribution in the 
Form of government loans (Table 5.8). High knowledge firms rely on personal sources 
fora significantly greater percentage oflinancing than do less knowledge-intensive 
firms (70.6 % vs. 50.2%: p<. 001). Firms in the medium and low knowledge category 
use a signi f icantly greater percentage of bank loans (21.0% vs. 10.7%: 1'<. 05) and 
government loans (9.7% vs. 2.3%: p<. O1) than high knowledge firms. 
7'aI)Ic 5.8 
Results of T -Tests: Start-up Capital4 
Iligli Versus medium and Low Knowledge Firms 
I ligli vs. Medium & 
Low Knowledge 
ii Mean Std. ucv. Me: iui 
Difference 
1'ersonal sources '%. high I knowled e 83 70.6 38.4 20.4*** 
Medium & low 
knowledge 
139 50.2 41. U 
Bank loans '%. high knowledge 84 10.7 25.2 -10.3* 
Medium & low 
knowledge 
140 21.0 33.5 
Government lonns '% Ui li knowled ºe 84 2.3 12.2 -7.4** 
Medium & low 
knowledge 
140 9.7 21.4 
sib. "p>. OI <. 05; .. r>. oOI <. 01; .. +p<. oo) 
_, ° These results arc consistent with previous research (Thompson, Lighstonc and 
Company, 1998) indicating the use ol*ccluity financing by K13[3s is greater than t'or 
I- SMI: s overall and, indicating the median reported debt load by KlJBs from financial 
institutions is bclow the SME Worin. One intcrprctation ofthc findings in the present 
2 -, - 4 It is noteworthy that only 5.5% of respondents obtained start-up capital from formal venture capital 
e__ sources and only 6.8% obtained start-up capital from private investors. 
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study is that KBBs rely more heavily on equity sources at start-up because they 
experience greater difficulty accessing debt financing from both chartered banks and 
government agencies. Another possibility is K1313s do not attempt to access these 
sources either because they assume they will encounter difficulty obtaining financing or 
because they wish to avoid using debt. Regardless of the underlying reasons, it is 
apparent banks and government agencies do not play as significant a role in financing 
K1313s at start-up as they do in financing less knowledge-intensive firms. 
5.4 Financing from Chartered flanks 
To determine the experiences and the perceptions of KBBs with respect to 
chartered bank Financing, respondents were asked a number of questions concerning the 
timing, nature and outcome of their first attempt to access bank financing. In addition, 
the survey elicited respondents' opinions concerning the perceived importance of 
factors to the banks in making decisions on applications for financing. More than 70 
percent of respondents indicated they had attempted to access bank financing on at least 
one occasion. Those that had not attempted to access bank financing indicated a 
variety of reasons, such as not needed, used personal Funds, trying to avoid debt, and 
figured there was little or no probability of obtaining bank financing. 
The average age of Grins at the time of seeking their first bank financing was 
3.2 years, although approximately 50 percent had sought financing when the firn was 
one year old or Tess. Approximately 30 percent had no revenues at the time they first 
attempted to access bank financing and approximately 40 percent were at the 
idca/startup stage of development. Firms contacted an average of 1.8 banks in the 
attempt to access financing with a relatively low percentage (7.7%) of banks contacted 
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located outside the Province. The mean number of banks willing to provide financing 
was . 87 with approximately 
25 percent of firms unable to obtain financing From any 
bank. 'T'here were no significant differences between high knowledge firms and Finns 
in the medium and low knowledge category for any of these variables, although n lower 
I ercentage of high knowledge firms (24.2% vs. 33.3%) sought bank financing before 
generating any revenues. 
In terns of the types of financing requested, the majority of requests were for an 
operating line of credit (53.0%) followed by requests for term financing (21.2%) and 
commercial mortgages (I I. 9%). 'fable 5.9 summarizes requests For all types of 
Iüiancing. Similarly, the vast majority (78.1 %) of lirms requested an operating line of 
credit followed by firms requesting term financing (31.3%) and commercial mortgages 
(17.5%). 
i'ablc 5.9 
Types of Financing Requested from Chartered Banks 
i` 
Type of Financin 
Frequency of 
Requests 
Percent of Total 
Requests 
Percent of Total 
Firms 
Operating line of credit 125 53.0 78.1 
Term financing 50 21.2 31.3 
Commercial mortgage 28 11.9 17.5 
SBLA financing 12 5.1 7.5 
Export ftnatncin 5 2.1 3.0 
Contract financing 5 2.1 3. o 
It &D financin g2 .8 1.3 
Other 9 3.8 5.6 
Total number of requests 236 100.0 
Total number of firms 160 
On average, firms requested 1.5 types of financing from banks with 
approximately 38 percent requesting financing of two types and 9.4 percent requesting 
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three types of financing. 't'here were no significant differences in the types of financing 
requcstcd between firms in the high knowledge category and other tines (Pearson chi- 
square = 10.348 (7th) p =. 170). 1lowever, it is worth noting the percentage of high 
knowledge firms seeking operating credit lines was 88.1 percent compared to 71.6 
percent olthc medium and low knowledge category. Further, the percent cif high 
knowledge firms seeking term financing was only 5.1 hcrccnt compared to 11.8 percent 
of the other firms. 
Respondents also provided inibrmation on the amount of each type of financing 
I; 
requested ('fable 5.10). With tlhe exception ufcoiitract financing and lt &D finainciing. 
the mean amount requested by high knowledge firms is lower than that requested by 
firms in the medium and low knowledge category (Table 5.11). The difference is 
significant only for the amount of operating credit requested (mean difference = 73663, 
p=. 033). I lowever, tlic amount ol'term financing requested is also notably lower 
(mean difference = 161995, p= . 142). These findings are consistent with those 
reported previously, indicating high knowledge firms rely more on personal sources of 
financing and less on bank loans. 
Table 5.10 
Amount of Chartered Bank Financing Requested by Type 
Type of Financing n Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Operating line of credit 10 250 1200000 89615 25000 172265 
Term financing 33 500 1000000 168318 50000 269695 
Contract financing 3 . 00 50000 21667 150000 25658 
Commercial mortgage 17 1200 200000 298659 12500 504311 
Export financing 5 . 00 1200000 353000 250000 492362 
It &D financing 3 . 00 50000 20000 10000 26458 
Si3LA financing 11 . 00 250000 72182 2500 80749 
Other types of linancin g 7 .0 25000000 3672714 25000 9406942 
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Table 5.115 
Types and Amounts of Chartered Bank Financing Requested 
Iligh versus Medium and Low Knowledge-Base 
I Iigh vs meditnn 1111(1 low Std. Sid. litºor 
knowledge base n Mean I)evialion Mean 
ninount of operating line high knowledge 44 48363.64 83734.37 12623.43 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 50 122026.78` 213313.99 28505.28 
amount ol'term linancing high knowledge 8 45625.0( 66785.23 23612.14 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 25 207580. (1( 298422.51 59684.50 
amount of contract Iinancing high knowledge 2 32500.0( 24748.73 17500.00 
requested low and medium 
knowledge I . 00 
amount of'mortgage financing high knowledge (1 111500.0( 168527.44 68801.04 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 11 400745.45 600204.49 18((968.46 
amount of export financing high knowledge 2 1325UU. O( 166170.09 1 17500.00 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 3 500000.00 624499.79 360555.12 
amount of R& I) financing high knowledge I 50000.00 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 2 5000.00 7071.0( 5000.00 
amount ol'SW. Afinancing high knowledge 3 125000.0( 114564.39 66143.78 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 8 52375.0( 62616.60 22138.31 
amount of'other linancing high knowledge 3 222000.00 328917.92 189900.85 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 4 6260750.0( 12492837.77 6246418.88 
*p<. 05 
In addition to details of requests for bank financing, survey participants were 
asked about the outcome cif their first attempt to access bank financing. In terms of the 
level of success at obtaining bank financing, a higher percentage (26.7% vs. 16.2%) of 
high knowledge firms were unable to obtain any financing (Table 5.12), although the 
difference is not significant (Pearson chi-square =4.430 (2do p=. 109). Similarly, a 
Tower percent of high knowledge firms (10.0% vs. 20.0%) were able to obtain only 
partial financing (less than requested). Ilowever, the percent of partial financing 
' Rcadcrs arc cautioned to note the limited number of responses in some categories and the high standard 
deviations. 
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obtained by high knowledge firms was higher (59% vs. 45%), although the difference 
was not significant6. 
Table 5.12 
L 
9_-, 
Cross tabulation: Results of First Attempt to Access Chartered Bank Financing 
Iligh versus Medium and Low Knowledge Firms 
Result of First Attempt to Obtain Bank 
high vs. Medium 
and Low 
Knowledge Total 
lligll Low and 
medium 
Eventually Count 38 67 105 
obtained the full Expected Count 38.2 66.8 105.0 
amount requested 'Yo within describes first 
'ittcm t to access financing 
36.2%, 63.81/(, 100.00/0 
'Yo within high vs. medium and 
low knowledge base 
63.3% 63.8% 63.6° 
(yo of'1'otal 23.0% 40.6% 63.6% 
Eventually Count 6 21 27 
Obtained some Expected Count 9.8 17.2 27.0 
Financing but less 
than requested 
/o within describes first 
attempt to access financing 
22.2%, 77.80/(, 100.0% 
/o within high vs. medium and 
low knowledge base 
10.0% 20.0°/ 16.41/o 
% of Tnlal 160/n 17 7% 16 40/, 
Was not Count 16 17 33 
Successful at Expected Count 12.0 21.0 33.0 
Obtaining any 
Bank financing 
% within describes first 
attempt to access financing 
48.5% 51.5% 100.0% 
% within high vs. medium and 
low knowledge base 
26.7% 16.2Yo 20.0%% 
/o of Total 9.7% 10.3% 20.0% 
Total Count 60 105 165 
Expected Count 60.0 105.0 165.0 
/o within describes first 
ttcm t to access linancin t 
36.4% 63.6% 100.0% 
/o within high vs. medium and 
low knowledge base 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 36.4% 63.6% 100.0% 
ý' t= . 914 (18df) mean difference = 13.85 sig. (2-tailed) p= . 373 
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Respondents who were turned down for financing or received less than 
requested provided details on the reasons given by the banks, as well as their own 
perceptions of the real reasons for the turndowns. Table 5.13 provides a summary of 
combined responses for both categories. 
Table 5.13 
Reasons for'i'urrrclowrr of Ucriucs(s for Chartered Bank Financing 
Bank Reasons Perceived Reasons 
Reason It '%, it '%o 
Insutlicicnt collateral/security 33 18.6 18 1 1.2 
Business too risky 26 14.7 16 9.9 
Insufficient income or revenue 23 13.0 9 5.6 
Bank rules/requirements ovcrly strict 21 11.9 31 19.3 
Insufficient cash flow 18 10.2 12 7.5 
Not willing to lend to this type of business 18 10.2 24 14.9 
No guarantor 13 7.3 12 7.5 
Account manager didn't understand business r 5. I 28 17.4 
I'oor credit history 5 2.8 2 1.2 
Other 4 2.3 4 2.5 
Limited management expertise 3 1.7 3 1.8 
Don't know/can't recall 2 1.1 2 1.2 
No reason given 2 1.1 
Total 177 100.0 161 1 00.0 
A review of the results presented in Table 5.13 reveals some notable differences 
between the reasons given by the banks and respondents' perceptions of the real 
reasons. According to respondents, insufficient collateral/security, business is too risky 
and insufficient income or revenue were the three top reasons given by the banks. 
These three accounted for 46.3 percent of the total mentions. I lowevcr, when asked to 
indicate what they perceived were the real reasons For being turned down by the banks, 
the same three reasons were mentioned only 26.7 percent of the time. The top three 
mentions cited as the real reasons were bank rules/requirements overly strict, account 
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manager did not understand my business and the banks are not willing to lend to this 
type ol'business. These three accounted for 51.6 percent ofthc total mentions. 
There were no significant differences' between bank reasons mentioned by high 
knowledge firms and those identified by less knowledge-intensive Iirnns. I however, a 
greater percentage ol'high knowledge firms (56.0% vs. 40.4%) cited insufficient 
collateral/security as a reason given by the banks. In terms of perceptions of the real 
reasons for turndowns by banks, there were no significant differences" between high 
knowledge firms and firms in the medium and low knowledge category. 
In addition to the perceptions ol'tliosc who experienced turndowns by banks, all 
respondents who sought hank linancing were asked to indicate the degree of 
importance they felt the bank attached to a number of factors in making a decision on 
the application for financing. Responses are presented in Table 5.14. With the 
exception of other factors introduced by respondents (4.73), collateral/security 
available (4.40), track record of the entrepreneur (3.80) and potential cash llow (3.72) 
were accorded the highest ratings. All factors received ratings of 3.0 or higher out or a 
possible 5.0 with the exception of uniqueness of product/service (2.90) and other 
funding available (2.94). 
F> 
_. 
7 Pearson chi-square - 15.393 (I Id() pe . 165 " I'carson chi-square - 12.868 (9d() p- . 169 
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Table 5.14 
Summary Statistics: Perceived Importance of Factors to Chartered Banks 
Factor n Min. Max. Mean Std. llev. 
Past relationship with bank 164 1.00 5.00 3.63 1.53 
Market potential 163 1.00 5.00 3.45 1.31 
Completed business plan 162 1.00 5.00 3.60 1.40 
Type of industry 162 1.00 5.0 3.52 1.20 
Collateral/security available 164 1.00 5.00 4.40 1.04 
Proven/ roduct service 162 1.00 5.00 3.55 1.33 
Otlºcr lünding available 160 1.00 5.00 2.94 1.41 
Stage of develo pment of business 163 1.00 5.00 3.50 1.22 
Track record of entrepreneur 163 1.00 5.00 3.80 1.39 
Unic uencss of roducUscrvicc 162 1.00 5.0 2.90 1.38 
Potential cash flow 162 1.00 5.00 3.72 1.25 
Management team 163 1.00 5.00 3.45 1.30 
Demonstrated market acceptance 163 1.00 5.00 3.23 1.35 
General economic conditions 161 1.00 5.00 3.21 1.20 
Other factors 11 3.00 5.00 4.73 . 65 
A follow-up question asked respondents to indicate the two most important of 
these Factors. Table 5.15 presents the Frequencies of the combined mentions ranked 1 
fi om highest to lowest. Collateral/security available and the track record of the 
entrepreneur remain at or near the top based on these combined ratings. I lowcvcr, it is 
noteworthy that past relationships with the bank received the second highest total 
mentions while potential cash flow appears to be far less important at seventh on the 
list. 
ý_ ý, 
i 
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Table 5.15 
Combined Total of First and Second 
Most Important Factors to Chartered Banks 
Factor 11 % 
Collateral/security available 83 25.6 
Past relationship with bank 60 18.5 
'T'rack record of entre prencur 34 10.5 
Completed business plan 26 8.0 
Market potential 25 7.7 
Type of industry 21 6.5 
Potential cash flow 15 4.6 
Stage ul'develo pment of business 11 3.4 
Proven/ product service 11 3.4 
Other factors 9 2.8 
Other funding available 8 2.5 
Management team 7 2.2 
Demonstrated market acceptance 7 2.2 
General economic conditions 5 1.5 
Uniqueness of product/scrvicc 2 .6 Total 3 24 100.0 
A comparison between high knowledge Greis and medium and low knowledge 
firms of the perceived importancc of thcsc factors to the banks indicatcs high 
knowledge firms rate all factors lower than less knowledge-intensive firms. The 
differences between the mean ratings are significant on 10 of the 14 factors (Table 
S. 1 G). 
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Table 5.16 
Perceived Importance of Factors to Chartered Banks 
High versus Medium and Low Knowledge Firms 
Factor High vs. Medium and Low 
Knowledge-Base 
n Mean Mean 
Diff. 
Past relationship with bank High 62 3.45 -. 30 
Low and medium 102 3.75 
Market potential Ili h G 2.97 -. 76* ** 
Low and medium 103 3.73 
Completed business plan High 59 3.19 -. 65** 
Low and medium 103 3.84 
Type of industry [ [i gh G 3.23 -. 45* 
Low and medium 102 3.69 
Collateral/security available I ligh 61 4.38 -. 03 
Low and medium 103 4.41 
Proven/ product service I li gh 61 3.22 -. 53* 
1 Low and medium 102 3.75 
Other funding available [ li ll 5 2.85 -. 15 
Low and medium 101 3.00 
Stage of development of business I li h 61 3.21 -. 45* 
Low and medium 102 3.67 
Track record ofentre preneur High 61 3.3 -. 80*** 
Low and medium 102 4.10 
Uniqueness o[ roduct/scrvice [li gh G 2.48 -. 67** 
Low and medium 102 3.15 
Potential cash flow I [i ºh G 3.58 -. 21 
Low and medium 102 3.79 
Management team I [i gh 61 3.16 -. 45* 
Low and medium 102 3.62 
Demonstrated market acceptance I high 61 2.77 -. 73** 
Low and medium 102 3.50 
General economic conditions high 61 2.75 -. 74*** 
Low and medium 10 3.49 
Other factors Ili h 3 4.33 -. 54 
Low and medium 8 4.88 
sib. * p>"01 <. 05; ** r>"0o1 <. 01; *** p<. 00I 
/\ comparison between the two groups of the combined responses for the two 
most important f ictors, rcvcals strong similarities in the rank order of importance 
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(Table 5.17) with one exception, high knowledge fins perceive market potential to be 
far less important to banks than firms in the medium and low knowledge category. 
Table 5.17 
Combined Total of First and Second 
I\lost Important Factors to Chartered Banks 
Factor 
All Firms High 
t owt ae 
Medium and 
of Ki nwic(i 
Collateral/security available 83 25.6 35 29.4 48 23.4 
Pncf eInlinnchin with hink (, (1 1R i 74 909 16 176 
Track record of entre reneur 34 10.5 14 11.8 20 9.8 
Completed business plan 26 8.0 10 8.4 16 7.8 
Market potential 25 7.7 2 1.7 23 11.2 
Type of industr 21 6.5 7 5.9 14 6.8 
Potential cash flow 15 4.6 6 5.0 9 4.4 
Stage o1'develo mcut ol'tirnn 11 3.4 7 5.9 4 2.0 
Proven/ product service 11 3.4 2 1.7 9 4.4 
Other lüctors 9 2.8 4 3.4 5 2.4 
Other funding available 8 2.5 3 2.5 5 2.4 
Management team 7 2.2 2 1.7 5 2.4 
Market acceptance 7 2.2 1 .8 6 2.9 
General economic conditions 5 1.5 2 1.7 3 1.5 
Uni uciiess of roduct/service 2 .6 0 0.0 2 1.0 
Total 324 100.0 119 100.0 205 100.0 
5.4.1 Summary Findings of Financing from Chartered Banks 
In summary, there were three notable differcnccs between the experiences of 
KBUs and those of less knowledge-intensive firms in terms of obtaining debt financing 
from chartered banks. First, although not statistically significant, KI3I3s were more 
likely to seek operating credit and less likely to seek terns financing. This is consistent 
with the fact that high knowledge firms have fewer tangible assets and may have 
greater needs to finance working capital requirements and soft costs, such as research 
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and development. Second, the mean amount of operating credit requested by 
kBI3s is 
significantly lower than less knowledge-intensive firms and the amount of term 
Financing requested is also notably lower, although the latter difference is not 
significant. This could suggest K1313 requirements for financing are not as great or that 
K1313s reduce their requests for assistance because they lack tangible collateral and 
security to support requests for higher amounts. 'T'hird, the percentage of high 
knowledge firms unable to obtain any financing was 26.7 percent compared to 16.2 
percent for more traditional firms. Although this difference was not statistically 
significant, it does suggest high knowledge firms may experience more difficulty 
obtaining bank financing at start-up than firms in the medium and low knowledge 
category. 
There were two notable differences between the perceptions of K13I3s and less 
knowledge-intensive firms in terms of access to bank financing. First, a greater 
percentage of' high knowledge firms (56.0% vs. 40.4%) cite insufficient 
collateral/security as the reason given by the banks for turndowns or reduced funding. 
Again, this is consistent with the lack of tangible assets held by KB Bs. If these 
perceptions are accurate, the chartered banks may not be valuing and collatcrizing 
intangible assets when assessing applications for financing from KI3ßs. Second, high 
knowledge firms perceive banks to attach less importance to all lending criteria than do 
less knowledge-intensive firms. Differences were significant on 10 of 14 variables. 
Iowcvcr, there were strong similarities between the two groups in terms or rank order 
of importance of the variables. 
I_ 
t 
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5.5 Financing from Government Departments and Agencies 
To determine the experiences and the perceptions of KBBs with respect to 
government Financing, respondents were asked the same questions as for bank 
financing, only this time concerning the timing, nature and outcome of'their first 
attempt to access government financing. Similarly, the survey elicited respondents' 
opinions concerning the perceived importance of factors to government agencies in 
making decisions on applications Irr financing. 
Over two thirds of respondents (67.7%) had requested funding from at least one 
government department or agency. Those that had not attempted to access government 
financing indicated a variety of reasons, such as, it has not been necessary, too much 
red tape involved in government financing, was not aware of the programs and criteria. 
was not eligible, and relied on my batik instead. Table 5.18 provides a summary of 
Funding requests from six specific government departments or agencies, as well as an 
indication of requests made to other government organizations. Funding requests to 
ACOA, 13DC and DDRR comprise 72.1 percent of the total number of requests. It is 
1; 
_ noteworthy that 7.6 percent of funding requests were made to otlhcr organizations. The 
most frequently cited of these organizations was I luman Resources Development 
t 
t I 
Canada (IIRDC), which provides salary subsidies to support job creation. 
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Table 5.18 
Summary of Requests for Government Financing 
Government Organization N '%º 
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) 125 32.5 
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) 66 17.2 
Department of Development and Rural Renewal (DDRR) 86 22.4 
Department of Industry Trade and Technology (DITT) 29 7.6 
Industry Canada (IC) 14 3.6 
National Research Council (NRC) 35 9.1 
Other goveºnmcnt organizations 29 7.6 
Total 384 100.0 
The average age of firms at the time of seeking their first government financing 
- 
was 4.4 years, somewhat older than those seeking bank financing (3.2 years) for the 
first time. Approximately 45 percent had sought government Iinancing when the firm 
was one year old or less compared to 50 percent of those seeking bank financing for the 
first time. Approximately 34 percent had no revenues at the Linie they first attempted to 
access government financing and approximately 37 percent were at the idea/startup 
stage ofdevelopment. This compares to 30 percent and 40 percent respectively for 
those socking bank financing. 
The comparison between high knowledge firms and firms in the medium and 
I 
Io%v knowlcdgc category indicates no significant diffcrciucc in the nican age of firms at 
the time of requestitng financing. however, crosstabultation results reveal significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of stage of development and annual gross 
sales or revenues at the time of seeking first government financing. A significantly 
lower percentage of firms in the high knowledge category sought financing at the 
i 
idea/startup stage (22.0% vs. 43.8%), while a significantly higher percentage sought 
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linancing at the product/market development stage (60.0% vs. 40.0%)9. Similarly, a 
significantly lower percentage of high knowledge firms sought financing bel'ore 
generating sales or revenues (24.0% vs. 39.3%)I0 
In terms of the types of financing requested from government sources (Table 
5.19), the majority of requests were for term financing (26.3%) followed by requests 
for an operating line of credit (17.4%) and commercial mortgages (13.1%). Similarly, 
the highest percentage (35.2%) of firms requested term financing followed by firms 
requesting an operating line of credit (23.2%) and commercial mortgages (17.6%). 
This is a considerably different picture frone that of requests for bank financing which 
were heavily dominated by applications for operating credit lines (sec Table 5.9). 
Other notable dil7ercnccs compared to chartered bank financing are the increased 
reliance on government as a source of It &D financing and contract financing. 
Further, more than a quarter of firms seeking government financing cited additional 
types of assistance not normally available from private sector sources, such as the wage 
subsidy programs of I IRDC mentioned previously. 
On average, firms requested 1.3 types of financing from government sources 
with approximately 30 percent requesting 1in, 1incing of two types -nd 10.7 percent 
requesting three types of financing. Only two firms had attempted to acccss four types 
of Financing. The comparison of high knowledge firms to firms in the medium and low 
knowledge group indicates a lower percent (17.0% vs. 28.3%) of the high knowledge 
group sought term financing, while a much higher percent (21.3% vs. 7.1%) sought It & 
I) financing, although the differences were not signilicant" 
' Pearson chi-square = 16.504 (5d() p= . 
006 
Pearson chi-square - 11.212 (5d1) p= . 047 
Pearson chi-Square =11.155 (6d1) p- . 084 
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Table 5.19 
'I'ypcs of Financing Requested from Government Agencies 
Type of Financing Requested 
Frequency of 
Requests 
Percent of 
Total Requests 
Percent of 
Total Firms 
Operating line of credit 37 17.4 23.2 
Term financing 56 26.3 35.2 
Commercial mortgage 28 13.1 17.6 
SI3LA financing 6 2.8 3.8 
Export finan ing 5 2.4 3.1 
Contract financing 12 5.6 7.5 
It & 1) financing 27 12.7 17.0 
Other 42 19.7 26.4 
Total number of requests 213 100.0 
't'otal number of firms 159 
Respondents also provided information on the amounts of financing requested 
1 
t 
I 
. - 
__ ý= 
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from government agencies (Table 5.20). A comparison of the means of thigh 
knowledge firms to firms in the medium and low knowledge category revealed no 
significant differences (Table 5.21). 1lowever, the additional lt & 1) financing obtained 
by high knowledge firms is noteworthy (mean difference = 74183 p= . 179). 
7'ablc 5.20 
Amount of Government Financing Requested ley '1'yüc 
Type of Financing it Min. Max. Mean Median Stil. Ucv. 
Operating line of credit 17 5000 50000 86882 50000 125043 
Terns financing 33 7000 75000 155727 50000 205698 
Contract financing 7 5000 16500 46714 15000 57436 
Commercial mortgage 17 600 50000 146623 50000 176191 
Export financing 5 5900 12500 278180 25000 544596 
It &D financing 18 5000 50000 61970 17732 114510 
Sl3LA financing 5 5000 25000 111000 25000 127151 
Other types of financing 14 1000 60000 113500 27500 167422 
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Table 5.2112 4 
Types and Amounts of Government Financing Requested 
Iligh versus Medium and Low Knowledge-Base13 
Group Statistics 
High vs medium and low Std. Std. Error 
knowledge base N Mean Deviation Mean 
amount of operating line high knowledge 4 51250.00 37052.8901 18526.4451 
of credit requested low and medium 
knowledge 13 97846.15 141248.51 39175.2876 
amount of term financing high knowledge 9 100555.6 120867.81 40289.2704 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 24 176416.7 228362.59 46614.3178 
amount of contract high knowledge 4 36250.00 28394.5417 14197.2709 
financing requested low and medium 
knowledge 3 60666.67 90423.0796 52205.7894 
amount of mortgage high knowledge 5 169800.0 174671.69 78115.5554 
financing requested low and medium 
knowledge 12 136966.7 183612.47 53004.3555 
amount of export high knowledge 1 100000.0 
financing requested low and medium 
knowledge 4 322725.0 618237.85 309118.92 
amount of R&D financing high knowledge 8 103182.9 165837.90 58632.5511 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 
10 29000.00 25690.4652 8124.0384 
amount of SBLA financng high knowledge 2 127500.0 173241.16 122500.00 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 3 100000.0 129903.81 75000.0000 
amount of other financing high knowledge 4 159000.0 294166.62 147083.31 
requested low and medium 
knowledge 10 95300.00 101760.12 32179.3757 
Firms that attempted to access government financing were asked to indicate the 
outcome of their application for each agency contacted. Summary results are presented 
in 'fahle 5.22. Applications made to the ACOA and the NRC received the highest 
percentage of full Funding approval at 48.7 percent and 50.0 percent respectively. 
I lowever, combined success rates Irr lull and partial Funding were similar across all 
organizations in the range of 67.9 to 75.0 percent with the exception of the 13UC at 52.2 
pcrcct. 
headers are cautioned to note the limited number of responses in some categories and the high 
standard deviations. IVI 1" No significant differences were found. 
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Table 5.22 
Summary Results ofAttempts to Access Government Financing 
Organization 
Received Full 
rundirr 
Received 
Partial 
Funding 
Did Not 
Receive 
Funding Total 
11 % Il % 11 %% 11 'Yr 
ACOA 57 48.7 26 22.2 34 29.1 117 100.0 
I3DC 21 33.3 12 19.0 30 47.6 63 100.0 
DDRR 33 40.2 27 32.9 22 26.8 82 100.0 
DITT 7 25.0 12 42.9 9 32.1 28 100.0 
IC 8 42.1 6 31.6 5 26.3 19 100.0 
N RC 17 50.0 7 20.6 10 29.4 34 100.0 
Othcr 16 57.1 5 17.9 7 25.0 28 100.0 
A comparison of high knowledge firms to lirms in the medium and low 
knowledge category for each agency revealed no significant differences, although 
applications by high knowledge Zinns to DDRR, D11-r, IC, NRC and other 
organizations received higher percentages of full funding (Table 5.23). Caution should 
be exercised in interpreting these results given the small number of cases involved in 
some organizations. 
Table 5.23 
R. ; 
iL 
,. ý" 
ý"'. 
3 
Percent of Applications Receiving Full Funding 
Iligh versus Medium and Low Knowledge Base 
Percent of Applications 
Rccciving Full Funding 
Government Org: uºizatiou High 
Knowledge 
Medium and 
Low Knowledge 
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 50.0 48.3 
Business Development Bank of Canada 31.3 34.0 
Department of Development and Rural Renewal 52.4 36.1 
Department of Industry Trade and Technology 36.4 16.7 
Industry Canada 71.4 25.0 
National Research Council 58.8 41.2 
Other government organizations 66.7 52.2 
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Respondents who were turned down for financing or received Icss thait 
requested were asked to indicate the reasons given by the funding agencies, as well as 
their own perceptions of the real reasons. Table 5.24 provides a summary of combined 
responses for both categories. 
Table 5.24 
Reasons for Turndown of Requests for Government Financing 
Uri;. Reasons Perceived Reasons 
Reason u % n '%o 
Gov't. rules/requirements overly strict 19 17.6 18 17.1 
Not willing to lend to this type of business 18 16.6 22 20.9 
Business too risky 15 13.9 8 7.6 
Insullicicnt income or revenue 12 11.1 7 6.7 
Insufficient collateral/security 12 11.1 7 6.7 
Insufficient cash flow 9 8.3 4 3.8 
Account manager didn't understand business 6 5.6 17 16.2 
Limited management expertise 5 4.6 7 6.7 
Other 4 3.7 8 7.6 
Don't know/can't recall 3 2.8 3 2.9 
No guarantor 2 1.9 4 3.8 
No reason given 2 1.9 0 0.0 
Poor credit history 1 .9 0 0.0 
Total 108 100.0 1 05 100.0 
Comparing the reasons attributed to government agencies to respondents' 
perceptions of the real reasons indicates considerable similarity with two exceptions, 
business too risky and account manager didn't understand my business. The Former is 
more likely to be cited as a reason for turndown by government organizations, while 
the latter is more likely to be perceived by respondents as the real reason for turndown. 
Overly strict government rules/requirements and not willing to lend to this type of 
business are cited as the top two reasons attributed to the funding agencies and the top 
two real reasons in the view of respondents. Comparing reasons Ior turndowns by 
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banks to govcrnmcnt turndowns highlights one very notable difference, the importance 
ol'collateral/security to the banks. This factor is cited far less frequently in relation to 
government funding. 
A comparison of reasons for turndowns attributed to government agencies by 
high knowledge firms to reasons mentioned by firms in the medium and low 
knowledge category, indicates no significant differences". Similarly, in terms ofthe 
perceptions of the real reasons I'or turndowns by government agencies, there were no 
significant differences between high knowledge firms and firms in the medium and low 
knowledge category's. 
As was the case for financing from chartered banks, all respondents were asked 
to indicate the degree of importance they felt government organizations attached to a 
number of factors in making decisions on their application for financing. The list of 
factors presented to respondents was a duplicate of the one provided in the banking 
scgmcnt of the survey. Responses are summarized in Table 5.25. 
With the exception of other factors introduced by respondents (4.50), a 
completed business plan (4.22), market potential (4.15) and type of industry (3.99) 
were accorded the three highest ratings. None of these three appeared at the top of the 
list of Iactors felt to be important to the banks. Similarly, uniqueness of product/service 
was rated more highly in the case or government financing (3.54) than For bank 
financing (2.90). Other notable differences include past relationships and 
collateral/security available which were considered to be far less important to 
government (2.61 and 3.11 respectively) than to banks (3.63 and 4.40). 
ý'º Pearson chi-square = 5.919 (9d1) p- . 748 ý` Pearson chi-square = 12.514 (10d 1) h= . 252 
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Table 5.25 
Summary Statistics: Perceived Importance of Factors to Government Agencies 
Factor n Min. Max. Mean Std. Dcv. 
Past relationship with organization 140 1.00 5.00 2.61 1.53 
Market potential 148 1.00 5.00 4.15 1.05 
Completed business plan 146 1.00 5.00 4.22 1.09 
Type of industry 147 1.00 5.00 3.99 . 99 Collateral/security available 141 1.00 5.00 3.11 1.35 
Proven/ product service 140 1.00 5.00 3.53 1.25 
Other Funding available 134 1.00 5.00 3.17 1.33 
Stage of cicvclopnicnt of business 142 1.00 5.00 3.57 1.14 
Track record ol'entre preneur 143 1.00 5.00 3.67 1.28 
Uni( ueness of product/scrvice 142 1.00 5.00 3.54 1.30 
Potential cash flow 144 1.00 5.00 3.61 1.15 
Management team 142 1.00 5.00 3.77 1.14 
Demonstrated market acceptance 140 1.00 5.00 3.71 1.17 
General economic conditions 138 1.00 5.00 3.25 1.07 
Other factors 14 2.00 5.00 4.50 . 94 
The follow-up question asked respondents to indicate the two most important of 
II 
r 
F 
f. 
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these Iictors. Table 5.26 presents the Frequencies of the combined mentions ranked 
lrom highest to lowest. (Based on these combined ratings, track record of the 
entrepreneur emerges as one of the top lhctors in addition to market potential, 
completed business plan and type of industry. Track record of the entrepreneur is the 
only common factor among the top three factors of importance to the banks and 
government funding agcncics. I lowcvcr, there is considerable consistency among the 
top live factors of perceived importance to the two groups. 
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Table 5.26 
Combined Total of First and Second 
Most Iml)ortant Factors to Government Organizations 
Factor It % 
Market potential 53 18.3 
Completed business plan 49 16.9 
Track record of entre reneur 26 9.0 
Type of industry 25 8.7 
Collateral/security available 21 7.3 
Uniqueness of prod tict/servicc 16 5.5 
l'rovcn/ roduct service 16 5.5 
Stage of development of business 15 5.2 
Management team 15 5.2 
Other factors 12 4,2 
Other funding available 11 3.8 
Potential cash llow 10 3.5 
Past relationship with organization 9 3.1 
Demonstrated market acceptance 7 2.4 
General economic conditions 4 1.4 
Total 289 100.0 
The comparison between high knowledge firms and firms in the medium and 
low knowledge category of the perceived importance of these factors to government 
agencies indicates high knowledge firms rate all factors, except past relationships and 
uniqueness of products/services, lower than firms in the medium and low knowledge 
category. The mean differences are significant on four of the 14 factors (Table 5.27), 
indicating Icss variation than was true for the banks. 
X 
F_ , 
t 
I' 
The comparison between the two groups of the combined responses tier the two 
most important factors reveals (Table 5.28) only minor differences in the rank order of 
importance. 
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Table 5.27 
Perceived Importance of Factors to Government Agencies 
High versus Medium and Low Knowledge Firms 
Factor high vs. Medium and Low 
Knowledge Base 
it Menn Mean 
Uiff. 
Past relationship with organization High 46 2.76 . 23 Low and medium 94 2.53 
Market potential High 47 4.02 -. 19 
Low and medium 101 4.21 
Completed business plan Ugh 47 3.96 -. 38* 
Low and medium 9q 4.34 
Type of industry tligh 47 3.77 -. 32 
Low and medium 100 4.09 
Collateral/security available Ili ºh 47 2.68 -. 65** 
Low and medium 94 3.33 
Proven/ product service I li gh 47 3.17 -. 54* 
Low and medium 93 3.71 
Other funding available [ 1i h 45 2.87 -. 46 
Low and medium 89 3.33 
Stage of develo 7nment of business I li h 46 3.41 -. 23 
Low and medium 96 3.65 
Track record ofentre reneur [li gh 4 3.40 -. 31 
Low and medium 97 3.77 
Uniqueness of prodUcVscrvice High 46 3.59 . 08 Low and medium 9 3.51 
Potential cash flow High 47 3.47 -. 21 
Low and medium 97 3.68 
Management team Ili ºh 4 3.63 -. 21 
Low and medium 96 3.84 
Demonstrated market acceptance I Ii gh 4 3.50 -. 32 
. ow nnd me 
inn 941 '1.9'2 
General economic conditions high 45 2.96 -. 44* 
Low and medium 93 3.40 
Other factors [ Ii gh 5 4.40 -. 16 
Low and medium 9 4.56 
Sig. * p>. O1 <. 05; ** p<. Oi 
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Table 5.28 
Combined Total of First and Second 
Most Important Factors to Government Agencies 
Factor 
All Firms Iligh 
Knowledge 
Medium and 
Low 
n "/º ii '%º n '% 
Market potential 53 18.3 14 15.2 39 19.8 
('omnlc't' I h, icinrcc ninn 49 1 r) 9 11 I'S 7 
Track record of entrepreneur 26 9.0 6 6.5 20 10.2 
Type of industr 25 8.7 8 8.7 17 8.6 
Collateral/security available 21 7.3 10 10.9 11 5.6 
Uniqueness of product/service 16 5.5 5 5.4 11 5.6 
Proven/ product service 16 5.5 3 3.3 13 6.6 
Stage of development of business 15 5.2 6 6.5 9 4.6 
Management team 15 5.2 6 6.5 9 4.6 
Other factors 12 4.2 5 5.4 7 3.6 
Other Funding available 11 3.8 2 2.2 9 4.6 
Potential cash flow 10 3.5 5 5.4 5 2.5 
Past relationship with agency 9 3.1 3 3.3 6 3.0 
Demonstrated market acceptance 7 2.4 I 1.1 6 3.0 
General economic conditions 4 1.4 0 0.0 4 2.0 
Total 289 100.0 92 100.0 197 100.0 
5.5.1 Sttmmar)y Findings of Financing from Government Agencies 
In summary, analysis of survey data concerning government financing revealed 
e 
a number of noteworthy dillerenccs between high knowledge firms and firms in the 
medium and low knowledge category. First, there were differences in terms of the 
stage of development at which the two groups of f irnis Iirst sought financing. A 
I significantly lower percentage of firms in the high knowledge category sought 
financing at the idea/startup stage (22.0% vs. 43.8%), while a significantly higher 
pcrccntagc sought Iinancing at the product/market development stage (60.0% vs. 
40.0%). Similarly, a significantly lower percentage of high knowledge firms (24.0%) 
sought financing before generating sales or revenues compared to medium and low 
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knowledge firms (39.3%). It is not clear to what extent these findings may be 
explained by diflcrences in the financial needs of KBBs, by diilercnces in financial 
programs available to KBBs, and/or by reluctance on the part of KBBs to approach 
government agencies earlier in their development. 
Second, as was the case with access to bank finance, there were some 
differences between high knowledge and less knowledge-intensive firms in terns of the 
types and amounts of finance requested fro in government agencies. A lower percent 
(17.0% vs. 28.3%) of high knowledge firms sought term financing while a much higher 
percent (21.3% vs. 7.1%) sought It &D financing. These findings arc consistent with 
the needs of K1313s to finance greater soll costs, such as research and development and 
to finance fewer tangible assets, thus a reduced requirement for term loans. 
Third. there was one notable difTerence between the two groups of firms in 
terms of their success obtaining government financing. Although the difference was 
not significant, the percent ofapplications by high knowledge firms that received Füll 
Funding from government was higher than firms in the less knowledge-intensive 
category for all government agencies, except the Business Development Bank of 
Canada. It may be that some government agencies look more tiwourably on KI313s 
because such firms mesh better with institutional maclates, programs and services. 
Finally, there were a number of differences between high knowledge firms and 
Iirms in the medium and low knowledge group in terms of the factors considered to be 
important to government agencies when making decisions on applications for Funding. 
I Iigh knowledge firms rated all factors lower than oilier firms except for past 
relationships and uniqueness of products/services. However, the differences were 
significant on only lour of the 14 factors, suggesting less variation between the two 
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groups than was evident for perceptions of importance of the factors to the chartered 
batiks. 
5.6 Comparison of Bank Financing to Government Financing 
At a broader level, it is also useful to compare access to chartered bank 
linaiucing to access to government financing. Results indicate similar percentages of 
respondents had attempted access to bank financing (71.5%) and government financing 
(67.7%). There were also similarities in the timing of access to both types of 
assistance. The average age of firms at the time of seeking their first government 
financing was 4.4 years, slightly older than firnis seeking bank financing (3.2 years) for 
the first time. Approximately 45 percent of firms sought government financing when 
the firm was one year old or less compared to 50 percent of firms sceking bank 
financing for the first time. Further, 34 percent of firms had no revenues at the time 
they first attempted to access government financing and approximately 37 percent were, 
at the idea/startup's(age of development. This compares to 30 percent and 40 percent 
respectively For those seeking bank financing. 
Him were a number of notable ditTcrenccs between the types of linancc 
V 
requested From the two Funding sources. The majority of requests for government 
assistance were for term financing (26.3%) l'ollowed by requests for an operating line 
of credit (17.4%) and commercial mortgages (13.1%). Requests for bank financing, oti 
the other hand, were heavily dominated by applications for operating credit lines 
(53.0%). Further, the percentages of lines that requested It & I) and contract financing 
From government were 17.0 percent and 7.5 percent respectively compared to 1.3 
percent and 3.0 percent requesting the same types of financing from batiks. 
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Respondents also perceived differences in the relative importance of Ieiuling 
criteria employed by the two funding sources when making decisions on financing 
applications. While there appears to be agreement that the track record of tlhe 
entrepreneur is of considerable importance to both groups, collateral/security available 
is seen to be of significantly greater importance to the banks. Conversely, respondents 
perceive government agencies place greater reliance on a completed business plan and 
market potential. 
Finally, the comparison between raisons for turndowns attributed to banks and 
reasons for turndowns by government agencies highlighted one very notable difference, 
the importance of collateral/security. This litctor is cited Ihr less frequently in relation 
to government assistance than bank financing. I lowever, there was considerable 
agreement on the critical role that organizational rules and requirements and type of 
business play in the financing decisions of chartered banks and government agencies. 
5.7 Summary of Demand-Sidc Findings 
The primary purpose of the survey was to investigate the experiences or 
entrepreneurs in knowledge-based firms who have sought financing from chartered 
banks ad/or government agencies. Survey data provide insight into the experiences 
and perceptions of entrepreneurs in high knowledge firms compared to those in less 
knowledge-intensive businesses concerning financing from both sources. 
As a first step in this investigation, the analysis focused on the sources and 
amounts of start-up capital utilized by entrepreneurs. The comparison between high 
knowledge firms and less knowledge-intensive firms in terms of sources of start-up 
capital indicated significant differences in three areas. High knowledge firms relied 
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more heavily on personal sources of capital (70.6% vs. 50.2%), whereas less 
knowledge-intensive businesses made greater use of chartered bank financing (21.0% 
vs. 10.7%) and government loans (9.7% vs. 2.3%). Thus, in response to research 
question Q 116, it appears as though chartered banks and government agencies do not 
play as significant a role in financing high knowledge firms at start-up as they du ill 
financing less knowledge-intensive firms. This finding confirms results of prior 
research indicating K1313s rely more heavily on equity and use Tess debt from financial 
institutions (Thompson, Lightstone and Company, 1998). 
'fo address research question Q2'7, the survey elicited input from entrepreneurs 
in terms of their dealings with chartered banks and government agencies. More 
specifically, respondents provided information on the timing, nature and outcome of 
their first attempt to access financing from a chartered bank and their first attempt to 
access financing from a government agency. Findings indicate considerable 
similarities in timing of access to both sources of f inancing. Although there were no 
significant differences between high knowledge firms and less knowledge-intensive 
businesses in terms oHiming cif aiccess to chartered bank linauciing, a significantly 
lower percentage of KD13s sought financing from government agencies at the earliest 
stages of development and prior to generating any sales or revenues. There are a 
number of potential explanations for these timing differences, some reflecting demand- 
side requirements and others reflecting supply-side constraints. It may be the needs of 
KL3l3s arc not as great at the earlier stages of development. It is also possible there is 
limited financing available to serve their needs at this point. Similarly, it may be that 
'' QI: What roles have the chartered banks and government agencies played in linancing knowledge. 
based firms and how do they differ from the roles played In financing less knowledge-intensive firms? 
1' Q2: What have been the experiences of K13ßs with obtaining debt financing from chartered banks and 
government agencies and how do they compare with the experiences of less knowledge-intensive firms? 
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KURS are more reluctant to approach government agencies at start-up bccausc they 
perceive difficulty in obtaining financing at this early stage. 
In terms of types of financing requested, there were a number of notable 
differences between high knowledge businesses and less knowledge-intensive firms. 
A Ith ough not statistically signilicaint. KI 13s were more likely to seek operating credit 
and less likely to request tern financing from chartered banks than less kniowlcdge- 
intensive firms. K1313s also requested significantly lower amounts of operating; credit 
and notably, albeit not significantly, lower amounts of term financing from banks than 
did less knowledge-intensive businesses. Requests for government assistance by 
Kl313s were more likely to be for R&D financing and less likely to be for terns 
financing than was the case flor firms in the medium and low knowledge category. 
There were no significant differences in the amounts of finance requested from 
government agencies by K1313s compared to firms in the medium and low knowledge 
category. Findings concerning the types and amounts of financing requested by K1313s 
confirm the need for operating credit to support working capital and soil costs, such as 
research acid development, rather than term loans to acquire fixed assets. 
In terms of outcome, and more specifically, success obtaining financing, high 
knowledge firms were less likely to obtain chartered bank financing than less 
knowledge-intensive firms, although the difference was not significant. On the other 
hand, the level of success in obtaining the füll amount requested from all government 
agencies, except the L3DC, was higher for KI3l3s. Again, the differences were not 
significant. These findings suggest efforts by the chartered banks to scrvc the needs of 
K[3[3s have been less than successful, at least in the view urpotential clients. 
Government agencies, on the other hand, appear to look more favourably on K1313s, as 
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evidenced by the level of success achieved by high knowledge firms in obtaining 
government support. 
Finally, to address research question Q31R, the study analyzed respondents' 
perceptions of the rationale provided by financial institutions for (Icclining applications 
For financing (or reducing the amount rcqucsted) and responclcnts' opinions on the 
importance of icncling criteria to financial institutions. The most notable dillcrcncc 
between the high knowledge group and lirms in the medium and low knowledge 
category is the perception by K1313s that chartered banks place greater weight on 
collateral and security. This finding is consistent with those ori, iiilpott (1995) 
indicating entrepreneurs in Kf313s perceive that banks use collateral in lieu of 
technology assessment. KBBs also perceive both groups of lending institutions attach 
less importance to most lending criteria, although there is a high level of agreement 
between KBBs and less knowledge-intensive firms on the rank order of importance of 
identified critcria. 
If tlhe opinions and perceptions of entrepreneurs in KI3Bs represent an accurate 
rellcction of Iending practices, the implication is clear - chartered banks take a 
tiaditional approach to risk assessment, emphasizing collateral in the form of physical, 
tangible security to the potential detriment of knowledge-based businesses. This has 
significant implications For K13I3s in search of chartered bank financing and could 
iotcntially lead Kl3ßs to ignore traditional bank linance as indicated in the study by 
Uinks el a!. (1992). 
1" Q3: What are the perceptions of K[3Bs with respect to chartered bank and government financing and 
how do they compare with the perceptions of less knowledge-intensive firms? 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUPPLY-SIDE FINDING 
6.11 Introduction to Supply-Side I+iudiugs 
The present study explores the supply-side of lending to knowledge-based 
businesses in Newfoundland and Labrador by analyzing data obtained from two key 
groups, senior officials responsible for commercial lending activities by banks and 
government agencies in the Province, and account managers responsible For reviewing 
and assessing applications For financial assistance from entrepreneurs. This chapter 
presents and discusses findings based on that input. 
The profile of participants is presented first followed by the discussion of results 
in the three primary supply-side areas of tlhe study, organizational framework, decision- 
making process and loan evaluation. Findings, concerning the existence and 
pervasiveness of a shared lending culture, arc presented and discussed in the context of 
loan evaluation and, more specifically, risk assessment. Comparisons of findings in 
each of the areas under study are made on the basis of the following a priori groups: 
account manager type (government and bank), type of plan reviewed (traditional and 
KBJ3), and account manager focus (generalist and KJ313). 
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6.1 Profile of Participants 
As outlined in Chapter 4 on methodology, interviews were conducted with 
senior managers in six chartered banks' and four government agencies= during March 
and April, 2000. In one government department (Dlii'), two individuals participated 
in the interview. Given the nature and purpose of these interviews, no background 
inlbrniation was collected on the interviewees, except their position in the organization, 
as previously noted in the methodology chapter. 
A total ol'23 account managers, 13 in banks and 10 in government agencies, 
participated in the business plan reviews and semi-structured interviews over the period 
November 1,2000 through May 7,2001. A review of the data obtained from the 
participants revealed (lie following profile in terms of years of experience, educational 
background and related training, and industry sector specialization. 
Ehe nmean' for years of experience in commercial lending and related fields for 
the overall group was 10, although the range was from one to 27. Although not 
significant, bank account managers had slightly more years of experience (mean=10.6) 
than government account managers (mean=9.1). Similarly, those who reviewed the 
KBß proposal had more years of experience (mean=11.0) than those who reviewed the 
traditional proposal (mean=8.9) and account managers with a K1313 focus had more 
years of experience (mean=12.9) than the more generalist account managers 
(mean=9.1). Again, these differences were not significant. 
' Participating banks: Bank of Montreal (t3MO), Canadian Imperial Bank or Commerce (CI[3C), I ISUC 
Bank Canada (I ISRC), Royal Bank of Canada (RISC), Scotinbnnk (SB) and Toronto Dominion I3niýk 
("I"D) 'Participating government agencies: Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC), Department or Development and Rural Renewal (DDRR) and 
I)cpartment of Industry, Trade and Technology (DI'I"I') 
' The median for years of experience with the current employer was 5.5 and for years of previous related 
experience was 0.0. 
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Eighteen account managers had completed a bachelor's degree and six' of these 
had also completed a graduate degree. While cross tabulations between educational 
level and various types ofaccount managers revealed no signilicant dillcrcnccs, it is 
noteworthy lour of the live account managers, with no post-secondary education, were 
bankers. These live account managers had significantly more experience (mean-17.5 
years) but were no more likely to have any additional training. Two of the live were 
K13B specialists, raising the question of how specialized expertise, required Im 
technology and scientific assessment, is acquired. 
A significant percentage (82.6%) of participants had undertaken additional 
related training, comprised mainly ot'in-house seminars and short courses. Account 
managers in banks were more likely (100.0% vs. 60.0%: p<. 05)4 to have completed 
such training than were account managers in government agencies. Only three 
participants, two in government and one banker, had undertaken training specifically 
related to the knowledge-based sector. In terms of industry sector specialization, 10 
account managers focused on specific sectors, eight of which included at least one 
knowledge-based sector. I lowever, only five account managers, three in government 
and two in banks, focused primarily on knowledge-based businesses. Table 6.1 
provides a summary of account manager participation in the study. 
Eleven participants reviewed the more traditional business proposal (Glacier 
Ice) while the other 12 reviewed the knowledge-based business proposal (TelcCare). 
One of the modifications made to the data collection process following the pilot was the 
addition of the question asking account managers to rate the proposal following the 
initial review`. As a result, only 20 account managers, eight in government agencies 
and 12 in banks, provided ratings at the initial review stage. Initial ratings are based on 
' Pearson chi-square = 6.295 (I do p= .0 
12 
'The initial review process is outlined in section 4.2.2.2 of Chapter 4 on methodology. 
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nine reviews of the traditional business proposal and 11 of the KBB proposal. Ratings 
were obtained at both stages from the five account managers with a KI313 focus. 
The remainder of this chapter presents and discusses findings from the 
interviews with senior management and account managers and from the business plan 
reviews by account managers. 
Table 6.1 
Summary of Account Manager Participation 
11: u" ticih: 1110' Affiliiitioii flan Reviewed 
01.1 C; ovcrnment Glacier lee 
B'l'2 Bank Glacier Ice 
1313 Bank Glacier Ice 
G'I'4 Government Glacier Ice 
G'I'5 Government. Glacier ice 
BK6 Bank 'I'clcCare 
G K7 ** Government. '1'cleCarc 
GK8* Government. 'I'clcCare 
BK9 Bank 'I'clcCarc 
GK 10* Government. 'I'eleCare 
13K I 1** Bank '1'eleCarc 
BK12* Bank 'I'cleCare 
13113 Bank Glacier 
13114 Bank Glacier 
13'1' 15 Bank Glacier 
BT16 Bank Glacier 
G'I'l7 Government Glacier 
13K 18 Bank TelcCare 
GK 19* Government TeleCarc 
BK20 Bank '1'eleCare 
BK21 * Bank TeleCare 
G'1'22 Government Glacier 
GK23 Government TeleCare 
* denotes account manager with a Kßß focus 
"' denotes account manager participating in the pilot test 
F 
-\ 
rI 
G= government account manager, 13 = bank account manager, T- traditional business plan, and K= 
`. ý knowledge-based business plan. 
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6.2 Organizational Framework of Lending Institutions 
Results of the interviews with senior bank and government ollicials and with 
account managers revealed some notable dif ercnecs between the approaches taken by 
chartered banks and government agencies to organizational strategies and structures 
associated with the KIM sector. The following discussion is organized and presented 
in these two areas: organizational strategies, which includes defining and targeting 
knowledge-based businesses, and organizational structures, which includes specialized 
lending units, and recruitment and training of staff. 
6.2.1 Organizational Strategics 
The definitions of knowledge-based businesses by the institutions studied were 
diverse. Not all banks had a corporate definition of'knowledge-based businesses or 
knowledge-based industries. Only one bank (134)' subscribed to the definition based on 
SICs utilized by the Canadian Bankers Association for reporting data on lending to 
knowledge-based firms. The others provided more qualitative observations on key 
aspects oI'KBBs, such as research and development-intensive, export-oriented, and 
possessing a high percentage or intangible assets. The perspectives also varied from 
those who viewed Kßl3s as technology-oriented to those who emphasized dimensions 
such as innovation and growth. In fact, the terminology associated with KUiis and 
KBIs ranged from a very broad-based reference to "new economy firms" to terms such 
as "innovative growth firn" and "emerging market sectors. " Only one government 
organization (G4) provided a prccisc definition ofa K1313 as "... a business that 
' Codes are used in places where participants expressed concern for confidentiality. 
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generates the majority of its revenue from non-fixed assets or soft assets, such as 
patents and the like. " 
Interview results indicate there was little agreement on a definition of 
knowleclge-basccl business or knowledge-based industry. however, there was some 
agreement on the characteristics exhibited by K1313s. Most agreed that K1313s possess 
sonic, if not all, of the following attributes: highly ski I led/highly educated workforce, 
high level of research and development, strong export orientation, high percentage of 
intangible assets, and products/services with short life expectancies and high gross 
margins. In addition, K1313s were considered more likely to use and/or develop 
advanced technologies and to be innovative in their products, services or processes. 
None of the banks and only one government agency, the BDC, indicated having 
a specific statement in their mission or mandate directed to knowledge-based 
businesses. however, all banks, except I IS[3C", referred to K1313s on their websites and 
in promotional literature and offered products/services that were specifically designed 
to meet the needs of K1313s. One bank (133) also reported that they communicated their 
KBI strategy via papers, presentations, bank Intranet, training forums and other 
communication pieces. Specialized product oficrings included tax credit financing, 
contract financing, and research and development financing. Specialized services 
offered by the banks appeared to vary by industry sector, frequently involved public 
and private partnerships, and, in many cases, were designed to improve access to export 
services and advice'. 
'I ISI3C offers Practice and Capital Loans targeted to (lie needs of professionals, such as doctors, 
lawyers, dentists and accountants. 
"One example is an alliance between the Royal Bank of Canada and the DUC targeted to knowledge- 
based and innovative manufacturers. Under this program. firms have access to financing of tip to $1 
million for developing new products or technologies. for market development and for establishing new 
production and services capacity. I'rolfessional advice is also available under this program. 
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There was also a reference in the mandate of one government agency, the l3DC, 
to supporting the growth of knowledge-based businesses. In addition, all Four 
government agencies made reference to aspects of KI313s on their websites and in their 
promotional literature. Such references included the following: strategic growth 
industries, particularly those offering export potential, emerging non-resource based 
sectors, technology-based firms, innovative technical prcijcets, and innovative, growth- 
oriented mannlacturing and exporting businesses. 
The I3l)C was the only government agency to offer products targeted 
spccilically to KUDs. Interestingly, a number of their programs were delivered in 
collaboration with the chartered banks"'. The ACOA also offered a limited range of' 
programs designed k)r leclufology-based ventures anal made sonUe program adjusti>>ents 
to suit the needs of Kl3l3s. Otherwise, government programs were not targeted 
specifically to K13Bs. 
Just as there was considerable variation in the terms used to refer to KI3Bs, 
there was also variation ill the industry or sectoral focus that each of the banks and 
government agencies had chosen to pursue. Three banks (DMO, I ISI3C and TU), and 
all four government organizations take a more general or nor -scctoral approach; 
although, two of the banks (IMO and TD) appear to place greater emphasis on high 
technology companies, particularly those operating in areas such as 
telecommunications and information technology. The other three banks (CII3C, RISC 
and SB) appeared to be pursuing similar foci in three main areas, namely, information 
technology, life sciences and health care, arul media and entertainment. I lowever, the 
For example. the 13DC has an agreement with Toronto Dominion Bank to offer joint loan packages to 
innovalivc manufacturing, knowledge-bused and export oriented businesses. t31)C also have partnered 
with Bank of Montreal through the Eastern Technology Seed Investment rund to provide venture capitni 
financing and management support for early-stage technology projects in Eastern Canada. 
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emphasis given to each of these areas and their subsectors varied among the three 
hanks. 
None of the banks reported having specific goals or objectives for knowleclgc- 
based sectors, at least not ones that differed from traditional sectors. I lowcvcr, in two 
cases (I3I and 133) banks employed sector limits designed to ensure that a balance or 
appropriate mix of industry sectors was maintained. Finally, three banks (132,133 and 
135) reported that their strategies I it dealing with K1313s were evolving and they were 
presently engaged in restructuring areas of their business that may affect their approach 
to the KBI3 market. Only one government organization (G4) indicated having a 
specific target or goal for KUDs, expressed as a percentage of their total portfolio. 
6.2.2 Organizational Structures 
All chartered banks, with the exception of I ISIC, had established specialized 
lending units or centres to service Kl3Us, although none o('these centres were located in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. The locations of these specialized centres tended to 
mirror the development ol'clusters of K13[3s in areas such as Ottawa, Markham and 
Kitchener-Waterloo in Ontario, Calgary in Alberta, Saskatoon in Saskatchewan, and 
Vancouver in British Columbia. Three banks (DM0, Royal and CIBC) had KBI3 
centres in I Ialilax, Nova Scotia that provided support to commercial account managers 
in Newfoundland and Labrador. One bank (132) also reported having specially trained 
staff in seven branch locations to support their efforts at servicing innovative growth 
firms. Again, none ol'these branches were situated in Newl'oundlaiid and Labrador. 
Only one government organization, the I3DC, had centres catering specifically 
to tlhc needs ofthc knowledge-based sector. At tlhc time of the interviews, the 131)C 
168 
was piloting a program of entrepreneurship centres in 12 areas of the country. The 
centres, which included St. John's and Halifax, focused on lending to small technology 
and export-oriented firms. Two other government agencies, T)1T1 and ACOA, 
employed individuals who devoted their primary attention to technology-based 
ventures, especially those in the information technology area. Otherwise, government 
organizations did not maintain structures with a specialized K1313 Ibcus. 
Account managers with specific Kß13 responsibility in the chartered batiks had 
been drawn principally From the ranks of experienced commercial Lenders and provided 
with training to enable them to undertake the appropriate risk and technology 
assessments of KI313s. Training consisted mainly or a combination of in-house sessions 
supplemented, in some cases, with the use of outside consultants and attendance at 
various conferences. One bank (133) reported that their KBI specialists undergo a threc- 
month training program with cxtcnsivc involvement of an outside consultant and 
bccomc accrcdited on successful complction of the program. Two banks indicated a 
recent trend to hiring individuals with more industry experience and providing thcm 
with training in account nmanagcnmcnt. I Iowcvcr, they noted this approach was true 
across the bank and not specific to the K[3[3 area. One bank indicated that they used a 
mentoring approach to training but again this was true for their training program in 
general. Similarly, a few brinks stressed the use cif a team approach to K1313 lending 
with groups meeting frequently to share experiences. 
There was wide variation in the recruitment strategies of the various 
government agencies reflecting the dihTcring mandates of these organizations. 
lowever, with the exception of the BDC, they appeared to take a generalist approach 
emphasizing signilicant industry experience. They also placed much greater emphasis 
on the counselling role ol'stallthan did the banks, reflecting their economic 
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development mandates. The I3DC operated more like the chartered banks hiriIg 
individuals with lending or venture capital experience. They were also the only 
government organization engaged in formalized training of account managers. The 
training was o(icred twice a year at the BDC head office and involved the use of' 
outside industry experts providing an overview o1' industry and market trends. 't'he 
objective was to sensitize account managers to the risk assessment process that needed 
to be undertaken in (lie KUl3 context. The training also appeared to reflect the 
spccializcd nature of products and scrviccs that the BDC offers to K1I3s. Training in 
the other government agencies, similar to the banks, consisted mainly of in-house 
sessions supplemented with the use of outside consultants and attendance at various 
conferences. Except as noted above, training in banks and government agencies diel not 
have a specific Kßß focus. 
Overall, chartered bank commercial lending in the Province appeared to be a 
highly centralized and generalist activity. Interviewees indicated that loan evaluation 
was primarily the responsibility of commercial account managers operating From 
provincial offices located in St. John's. Branch managers at other locations engage in 
some small scale commercial lending, largely as part of their broader responsibilities 
and usually linked to the personal lending side of the business. Only one bank (133) 
reported having someone in the Province with designated responsibility for Kil 
lending, although there was also some evidence of responsibilities being organized 
along sectoral lines. Kßl3 lending activities of government organizations in the 
Province varied widely and, except for the I3DC, tended to follow more traditional 
approaches. 
170 
6.2.3 Organizational Variables and Lending 
In order to determine the impact ol'organizational variables, such as strategies 
and structures, on lending decisions, it is necessary to examine the loan evaluation and 
decision-making processes of account managers. Information from all stages ol'tiic 
review process, in particular the verbal protocols at the initial review stage and follow- 
up requests by account managers for additional information, are useful to gaining 
insight into organizational effects. 
A review of the transcripts of the verbal protocols provides initial insight into 
1 -1 
the potential impact of organizational variables on lending decisions at the earliest stage 
in the review process. A wide variety of factors were mentioned by all account 
managers during the initial review of the proposals; however, only a few related to 
organizational framework are noteworthy. The most frequent mentions by bank 
account managers included minimum equity requirements, required security, especially 
accounts receivable to support operating loans, and industry sectors and associated 
standards, most notably debt to equity ratios and gross margins. It was apparent 
bankers were operating from a fairly structured approach to assessment in each of these 
areas. In a number of cascs, account managers calculated ratios and margins and 
re erred specifically to limits or minimums, such as "... the operating loan can't exceed 
10 percent of sales" and "... we will need to see that lower" (referring to the debt to 
equity ratio). 
In other cases, account managers appeared sensitive to the industry sector, 
noting its importance with respect to policies. To quote one account manager, "I have 
to check what industry sector this is. I need to know for corporate policy guidance. " 
Overall, the comments by the bank account managers did not differ depending on the 
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proposal under review (traditional or KBB) and there was little evidence of the 
influence of either institutional strategy or structure with respect to knowledge-based 
businesses. 
Interestingly, government account managers also referred most frequently to 
equity requirements during the initial review, in a number of cases noting the 
requirement For a minimum percentage of total capital costs in order to meet program 
eligibility criteria. References to industry standards and security were also noted by the 
government group, although not as frequently as by bankers. In many cases these 
references reflected concern for the ability ol'the proponents to access operating credit 
from the bank. The most notable differences on the part of the government account 
managers were references to factors such as, competitive impact assessment, 
employment and export potential. These observations clearly reflected specific 
organizational strategies and mandates, as well as overall government support for 
economic development in the Atlantic Region and in the Province. Again, there was no 
evidence at the initial review stage by government account managers of differences 
between the KBB proposal and the traditional proposal with respect to organizational 
variables. 
Relatively few account managers noted requirements for additional information 
during the initial review. Those that did were interested primarily in statements of 
personal net worth for the owners. One account manager actually made a list of 
missing information during the review process, and provided the list to the researcher 
immediately following the review. The list included the following: personal statements 
ol'n et worth for the owners, financial pro Formas covering two additional years, copies 
cf sale and purchase agreements for equipment, copies of the lease and insurance policy 
liar the premises, copies ol'sales agreements/contracts, and copies of any binding 
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agreements with unions, if applicable. In all other cases, participants were asked to 
identity additional ini'ormation requirements during the due diligence process. Account 
managers conveyed those requirements to the researcher by mail, Iax, e-mail, phone 
and in-iperson. Account managers identified a total of 25 items; however, only 12 
received live or more mentions and only nine items were mentioned 10 or more times. 
A review of the results presented in Table 6.2 provides additional insight into the 
influence of organizational variables, especially policies and procedures, on loan 
evaluation and decision-making. 
Table (. 2 
Information Requirements I(Icntircd by Account Managers 
n=23 
Nature of Information it % 
Confirmation of other sources of financing 21 91.3 
Statements of personal net worth 16 69.6 
Details of market research and marketing strategy 14 60.8 
Details of capital costs including supplier quotations 14 60.8 
copies of confirmed orders or sales contracts 13 56.5 
Lists of shareholders, officers and directors 12 52.2 
More detailed f inancial statements with sensitivity analysis 12 52.2 
Resumes of the principals 10 43.5 
Environmental/re gulator /le ºal clarification 10 43.5 
Availability of security, including personal guarantees 7 30.4 
Information on key employees 6 26.1 
Copy of the lease 5 21.7 
Confirmation of distribution agreements 4 17.4 
Copy of insurance policy 3 13.0 
Copy of union a greenments 2 8.7 
Identification of economic benefits 2 8.7 
Previous bank and contact 1 4.3 
Detailed sales breakdown 1 4.3 
Competitive assessment 1 4.3 
Copies of charter agreements for vessels 1 4.3 
Schedule of critical timelines 1 4.3 
Identify supplier 1 4.3 
Details of technology 1 4.3 
Tax returns for owners 1 4.3 
Clarification of trans portation issue 1 4.3 
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These results demonstrate a high degree of consistency among account 
managers regarding critical inlormation requirements. Comparing the government 
group to (lie hank group revealed only one key difference: bank account iimiiagcrs were 
more likely to identify issues and information related to the financial aspects of the 
proposal, while the government account managers were more likely to identify 
information requirements related to the technology/production, marketing, and human 
resource areas. The vast majority of items mentioned less frequently appeared to be 
specific to the proposal under review and involved points of clarification and requests 
for elaboration. The consistency reflected in the items identified suggests the due 
diligence process is highly standardized, with account managers operating under 
structured guidelines. The difference in emphasis on the part of the government group 
compared to the bankers likely reflects the difference in mandates between the two 
groups discussed previously. No significant differences were found in information 
requested by those who reviewed the Kßl3 proposal compared to those who reviewed 
the traditional proposal, indicating the presence of standardized policies and procedures 
regardless of the nature of the vulture. 
Overall, findings From the initial review of the proposals and subsequent due 
diligence indicate organizational variables help to explain differences in approach 
between account managers in banks and those in government but there is no evidence 
to indicate differential effects on loan evaluation and decision-making in the context of 
knowledge-based firms. As a result, in response to research question Q4", it is possible 
to conclude that loan evaluation and decision-making are affected by organizational 
variables but the effects do not appear to be different for knowledge-based firms 
compared to less knowledge-intensive firms. 
" Q4: Are loan evaluation and decision-making affected by organizational variables and are the effects 
different for knowledge-based firms compared to less knowledge-intensive firms? 
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6.3 Decision-Making Process 
In addition to strategic and structural approaches taken to serve the KUR 
market, the study also examined the decision-making processes of account managers 
and, in particular, their information acquisition strategies and use of internal and 
external support. 
To explore the nature, extent and utilization of support for decision-making, 
account managers were asked to indicate both internal and external sources or 
information and assistance available and used, or referenced, as part of their business 
plan reviews. Results presented in Table 6.3 indicate account managers used or 
consulted an average of 3.00 internal sources of support and 2.13 external sources. 
While there were no significant differences between the various a priori groups based 
on t-tests for equality of means, three findings arc noteworthy: goverilillellt account 
managers consulted more external sources than bankers; account managers who 
reviewed the KBI3 proposal consulted fewer internal sources than those who reviewed 
'1'abIc 6.3 
Internal and External Sources of Information and Support 
Used/Consulted by Account Managers 
E .. t 
F 
Interna l Sources External Sources 
Account Manager Group n Mean n Mean 
All 23 3.00 23 2.13 
Banks 13 3.00 13 1.77 
Government 10 3.00 10 2.60 
Traditional plan 11 3.27 11 2.36 
K13B plan 12 2.41 12 2.33 
KUR focus 5 1.80 5 2.60 
Generalist 18 3.33 18 2.00 
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the traditional plan; and account managers with a KBB focus consulted fewer internal 
sources and more external sources than the more generalist account managers. 
"Types of internal support used were grouped into four primary categories as 
lollows: colleagues in the same branch, office or department, including superiors; stall' 
in other departments, branches or offices; internal databases. tiles. libraries and 
Intranuts; and policies and procedures manuals. As indicated in 'f'able 6.4, the vast 
majority of account managers (90.1 %) turned to their colleagues for advice and 
support. In fact, there was evidence ofa team-based approach to risk assessment in 
government agencies and banks. In a Few cases, the level of consultation appeared to 
be dictated by policy. I lowevcr, in the majority ofcases, account managers appeared to 
consult because they needed specific advice, because they lacked confidence in dealing 
with certain aspects of the proposals or because this was a natural part of a team-based 
cllort. 
'1'nbIc 6.4 
Types of Internal Support Used/Consulted by Account Maingers 
(n=22)x: 
F- ý= 
Category of Support Number of Account Manners Percent 
Colleagues 20 90.1 
Staff in other locations 13 59.1 
Databases, files, library and Intranet 13 59.1 
Policies and procedures manuals 4 18.2 
Other 1 4.5 
The majority of account managers also relied on expertise available From stall' 
k, 
in other departments, branches or offices (59.1%), and on a host of internal support 
systems that included customer files and databases, and in a Few cases a resource 
', ° "One account manager did not consult/utilize any internal sources. 
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library (59.1%). One bank (132) indicated using a process in several designated 
branches (none were located in Newfoundland and Labrador) involving a credit 
adjudication partnership between account managers in branches and credit specialists in 
a central credit division. A qualified consultant was also available in these branches to 
assist account managers with analyzing and structuring deals. The main purpose of this 
approach was to ensure good quality applicants were not turned away because of lender 
bias. Bank account managers in specialized lending centres were also provided with 
support, such as head office industry expertise and research, not widely available to 
those in traditional lending areas. Five of the banks also had an lntranct in place to 
facilitate access to information, such as corporate policies and directives. However, 
only tour account managers referred specifically to policies and procedures manuals as 
part of their decision-making processes, indicating either they were very familiar with 
the guidelines or they did not consider them to be a source of information and support. 
Government account managers and bankers were equally likely to consult with 
colleagues. I lowever, bankers, especially those who reviewed the Kßß proposal, were 
more likely to utilize other staff resources in bank departments such as credit, risk 
management, national accounts, and K13ß centres for specialized expertise. 
Government account managers relied primarily on other government departments to 
provide specialized assistance and advice. With the exception of the I3DC, individual 
government departments did not appear to be as well served with internal resources, 
such as databases and Intranets, as the banks. I lowever, this may be the result of the 
consolidation within the Provincial Government of similar information and support 
through the establishment of the Canada Newfoundland and Labrador Business Service 
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Network (CNLBSN)" and the Success Works database14. 
Types of external support and information available to and utilized by account 
managers were considerably more varied than internal sources, although the Internet 
was mentioned most frequently by both bankers and government participants as a 
source cal' industry and market data (Table 6.5). The most notable di (Terence between 
the two groups in terms of'extcrnal sources was the significantly greater use ol'both 
Robert Morris Associates" credit information and credit bureau checks by bank 
account managers. Account managers in both groups were equally likely to turn to 
industry associations Irr ini Innation and also indicated they would normally contact 
potential customers with the client's permission. 
Table 6.5 
Types of External Support Used/Consulted by Account Managers 
(n=22)6 
Category of Support Number of Account Mainagers Percent 
Internet 14 63.6 
Industry associations 6 27.3 
External exerts and consultants 6 27.3 
Robert Morris Associates 5 22.7 
Credit bureau 4 18.2 
Other 4 18.2 
CNL[3SN is a province-wide support network providing a full service lending library and information 
research assistance. 
r'r The Success Works database, developed by the Department of Industry, Trade and Technology, 
includes information specific to business analysis, industry support, trade, and industrial benefits. 
" In June, 2000 Robert Morris Associates changed its name to RMA - The Risk Management 
Association. RMA is a financial services trade association that provides member financial institutions 
with a variety of risk management services, Including credit risk information, research and training. 
K One bank account manager did not undertake any external due diligence indicating they "didn't feel 
there was a deal here to warrant the effort. " 
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It is worth noting three government agencies made provisions to hire outside 
experts to assist with evaluation by conducting market research or even fine tuning the 
business plan for clients. Two banks also reported using external expertise 
extensively to validate the strength of some of the business plans and technologies. 
although this was not done ('or the present experiment. Bank use of external 
consultants was also mentioned in the context of specialized lending and K1313 centres. 
Ehe government organizations also reported working flirty closely together, 
sometimes partnering on deals and sometimes relying on each other For expertise. 
As mentioned previously, partnerships had also been established between a number of 
banks and the Ul)C. Other than the potential use of outside consultants, there were no 
apparent clifIbrcnccs between sources of external support used by those who reviewed 
the KI3I3 proposal and sources used by those who reviewed the more traditional 
proposal. 
Finally, on a more informal level, it appeared as though both groups of account 
managers used their internal and external connections and contacts to access required 
expertise and experience in dealing with the specilic industry sectors. For example, 
one account manager indicated he knew someone at the Tclcmedicinc Centre at 
Memorial University of Newfoundland who he could call upon for background and 
expertise in the tclemedicine area. A second account manager mentioned a current 
client that could be helpful in assessing the technology associated with harvesting 
glacier ice. While a third account manager indicated she consulted with her spouse ('or 
input on the concept. 
In summary, results indicate three notable differences between bankers and 
government account managers in terms or information acquisition to support loan 
evaluation and risk assessment. First, government account managers consulted more 
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external sources of support. Although the difference was not significant, this finding 
may indicate the internal support network available to account managers in government 
is not as strong as that available to bankers, necessitating greater reliance on external 
sources of assistance. Second, support for this finding is also provided by the fact that 
the bankers in this study, especially the ones who reviewed the Kuh proposal, were 
more likely to utilize other staff resources in the bank, including expertise in credit and 
risk management departments and KBI3 centres. Third, batik account managers 
emphasized credit inlbrmation and Credit checks more than the government group, with 
live account mandgers specifically relerring to data From Robert Morris Associates. 
A number of findings are noteworthy in the context of lending to knowledge- 
based businesses. In theory, support available to account managers, both internally and 
externally, should address differences in the skills and knowledge needed to assess 
applications from knowledge-based firms. The banks, in particular, provide access to 
internal information and expertise specifically designed to facilitate loan evaluation and 
risk assessment of KBBs. In addition, the banks and government agencies make 
provision lör the use of external consultants to assess business proposals and associated 
technologies. Nonetheless, in practice, this study found limited evidence of differences 
in approaches used by account managers when assessing the K13B proposal. Findings 
indicate this group consulted fewer internal sources, while the subgroup, comprised of 
account managers with a Kßl3 focus, also consulted fewer internal sources but used 
I more external sources. In both cases, the difiercnccs were not significant. I urther, as 
indicated previously, bankers who reviewed the Kßß proposal were more likely to use 
other staff resources in specialized departments. Finally, other than the potential use of 
outside consultants, there were no apparent differences between the types cif external 
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support used by those reviewing the KBB proposal and the types of external support 
used by those reviewing the more traditional proposal. 
In terms of research question Q51', findings indicate government account 
managers rely more on external sources of support when making lending decisions to 
knowledge-based businesses. Bankers, on the other land, arc more likely to rely on 
their cxtcnsivc internal network cif information and expertise. Roth groups have access 
(0 specialized cxp6-tisc in the Conn of external consultants; however, the present study 
was not able to assess the extent to which that support is used in loan evaluation and 
risk assessment, either generally or specilically related to K1313s. 
6.4 Loan Evaluation 
The third and Iinal supply-side component of the lending decision, examined in 
the present study, is loan evaluation. As indicated previously, loan evaluation is 
comprised of risk assessment, estimating borrower's needs, and loan structuring and 
management. The discussion of exploratory findings concerning loan evaluation 
integrates these components and addresses elements of both process and content. 
6.4.1 The Loan Evaluation Process und the Lending Decision 
In terms of process, all banks reported making some modifications to traditional 
risk assessment when evaluating loan applications from knowledge-based firms. In 
some cases, the approach consisted of little more than placing increased emphasis on 
'7Q5: What are the information acquisition strategies employed by account managers to support credit 
decision-making and are there differences between the information acquisition strategies used by account 
managers in making lending decisions to knowledge-based businesses compared to less knowledge- 
intensive firms? 
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cash flow, management and market potential in lieu of tangible security. I Io4ever, 
three banks (B 1,132, and 133) indicated having developed proprietary risk assessment 
models for use in K1313 loan evaluation and decision making. The models were 
developed aller extensive research and consultation with universities, technology 
centres and private companies. The approaches varied but generally consisted of 
relining conventional risk assessment models to evaluate firms with few tangible assets 
and of collaterizing loans on the basis of traditional intellectual property, such as 
patents. Overall, the due diligence process was purported to be much more extensive in 
the case of lending to K1313s. 
The risk assessment processes employed by the government agencies were also 
purported to be more stringent and complex for K[313s than for traditional firms, 
reflecting the increased risk associated with the lack of tangible security. I lowevcr, 
interviewees indicated the same basic due diligence process was followed in all cases. 
As well, only one of the government participants indicated using risk assessment tools 
developed specifically for K1313s. 
There were marked differences between government account managers and 
hankers in terms of their decisions and recommendations concerning financial support. 
Six government account managers were prepared to recommend financial assistance 
consisting of a variety of packages, including term loans, working capital loans, cost- 
shared marketing assistance, third party consulting and counselling assistance, and 
direct equity contributions. The latter took the form of matching support. In addition, 
two government account managers were prepared to recommend indirect financial 
assistance, consisting or a tax holiday from provincial corporate income tax, health and 
post-secondary education tax and retail sales tax. One of the government group 
required more information before making a recommendation and another recommended 
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against providing financial assistance. Interestingly, the latter two account managers 
were with the sank organization (G4). 
Notwithstanding the willingness on the part of some individuals to provide 
variOUS types and, amOuiits of financial support, all government account managers were 
quick to point out that obtaining operating credit facilities from a bank was essential 
and could pose a major obstacle to start-up. In the vast majority of cases, government 
assistance was predicated on other linancing being in place with disbursements being 
made accordingly. In almost all cases, the government account managers indicated a 
willingness to provide counselling assistance, either themselves or From other 
departmental staff. This assistance was intended to improve aspects cif the proposal and 
in sonne cases, to address specific information gaps, most notably, market research. 
The bank account managers were less enthusiastic about providing financing 
than their counterparts in government with only two of 13 willing to provide a term 
loan to support the purchase of equipment and only one prepared to recommend an 
operating line of credit to cover working capital requirements. In both cases, the term 
loans would be provided under the Canada Small Business Financing Act, which 
carries a federal government guarantee of 85 percent. Meanwhile, the operating line 
would Inc limited to $450,000, liar short ol'time required amount. Two hankers also 
made a point of mentioning that the best they could provide at this point in time was 
value-added advice. The offers of advice by the bank account managers were intended 
to cultivate a longer-term relationship with the client that could lead to potential future 
business, compared to the offers of advice by government account managers that were 
designed to enhance the likelihhod of obtaining financing in the short term. 
For the bankers, willingness to provide financial support appeared to be 
unrelated to the type of proposal revicwed, traditional or knowledge-based. The 
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government account managers, on the other hand, appeared to be more suppoi live of 
the KßB proposal. For both groups of account managers, the type of firm did not 
appear to influence recommendations as to the nature and amount of financing and 
associated terms and conditions. Given the few cases where bank account managers 
were prepared to recommend a loan, it was not possible to address research question 
Q7T' concerning diflcrcnces in the terms, conditions and monitoring of loans made to 
KU13s compared to traditional firms. 
The data did permit analysis concerning Q819and differences between lending 
decisions of banks and government agencies. Findings support the conclusion that the 
government agencies are more supportive of providing assistance to both types of firms 
than are the banks. I lowcver. preliminary analysis indicates these differences appear to 
explained by differences in overall mandates and types of support available and not by 
dillcrcnces in institutional structures and processes, even though such diIThrences exist. 
Further, the type of lirm, K13[3 or traditional, did not appear to be a factor in explaining 
differences between the two groups in terms of lending decisions and 
recommendations. The preference by government account managers to support the 
knowledge-based firm compared to the more traditional venture also appears to be 
related to mandate, since the K1313 proposal fits well with the emphasis being placed by 
government on innovative growth sectors with significant export potential. 
1" Q7: Do chartered banks attach different terms and conditions to loans made to knowledge-based 
businesses than to those made to Icss knowledge-intensive firms and are there diflercnccs between the 
loan monitoring processes employed for knowledge-based firms and those used for less knowledge- 
intensive businesses? 
I') Q8: Arc there differences between lending decisions of chartered banks and lending decisions of 
government agencies? If differences exist, to what extent can they be explained by differences in 
institutional structures, loan evaluation and decision-making processes? 
184 
6.4.2 Ilisk Assessment and Lending Culture 
The findings reported previously in section 6.2 of this chapter, as well as the 
literature on commercial lending, indicate the commercial lending process is highly 
standardized with account managers following structured guidelines, policies and 
procedures. This appears to be the case regardless of the nature of the proposal under 
review. Although there were differences in emphasis noted between account managers 
in government agencies and chartered banks, the loan evaluation process appears to be 
highly structured in both types oforganizations. As a result, it is reasonable to expect a 
high level of agreement among bank account managers and among government account 
managers in terms of risk assessment. 
To explore the nature and extent ol'agreement among various groups okiccount 
managers, the present study utilizes consensus analysis. 'Flic approach taken is to 
examine content, as well as process, to determine the relative importance of the Victors 
underlying loan evaluation and risk assessment and to explore the existence or a shared 
lending culture. Risk assessment and lending culture are examined at two stages in the 
loan evaluation process: at the initial review stage based on account managers' ratings 
of the business proposals, and at the post review stage based on account managers' 
proposal ratings, risk ratings and related concerns. 
Account managers conducted their initial review and Provided assessments 
without using formal evaluation instruments and without the benefit of the full due 
diligence process. Risk assessment, us reflected in their proposal ratings at this stage, is 
ý; 
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more likely to indicate initial reactions and perceptions, presumably based on previous 
experience and preconceptions. On that basis, it is unlikely that a high level of 
agreement or consensus will emerge at this stage in the process. At the post review 
stage, account managers provided feedback based on a much more complete 
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assessment of the proposals, following the full due diligence process. As a result, there 
is more likely to he a higher level of agreement and potentially consensus at the post 
review Stage. 
Given the considerable volume of data and analyses concerning risk assessment 
and lending culture, results are presented for each stage (initial and post review) 
followed by discussion of the findings as they relate to the specified research questions. 
Comparisons to a priori groupings arc made where appropriate. In addition, the 
analyses include comparisons between the two stages. 
6.4.2.1 Ilisk Assessment and Lending Culture at the Initial Review Stage 
As a first step in assessing the existence of a shared lending culture, data from 
the initial ratings of the proposals were analyzed using consensus analysis software 
available in ANTI IROPAC2°(I3orgatti, I996a). Results of the consensus analysis for 
all respondents at the initial review stage are presented in 't'able G. G. According to 
l3orgatti (1996b). the presence of two large eigenvalues is strong evidence of more than 
one culturally correct pattern ofresponscs. A ratio of less than 3 to I between the 
cigcnvalucs Ihr the first two factors indicatcs the assumption of one culturc dots not 
IK)Icl. 
An examination orl'able 6.6 indicates the data resemble the pattern of weak 
k ;- 
f- 
agreement identified by Caulkins and Myatt (1999). The ratio between the first and 
second eigenvalues is less than three-tines, indicating no clear common culture of 
lending. The first factor explains a majority of the variance and "a plot ol'the 
cigcnvalucs shows an `elbow' between the first and second Factors, flattening out 
20 In performinbg consensus analysis, the ANTI IROPOACrrosram crcatcs and factor analY zes a matrix 
of agreement among respondents. 
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between the second and third factors" (Caulkins and llyatt, 1999; 15), results 6nsistcnt 
with a pattern of weak agreement. 
Table 6.6 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
All Account Managers 
(u=2U) 
Factor Eigcnvaluc l'crccnt Ctnu. '% Ratio 
7.120 56.9 56.9 2.199 
2 3.327 25.9 82.8 1.502 
3 2.156 17.2 100.0 
Total 12.513 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score - . 547 
Respondent Reliability21- 
. 
896 
A review of the knowledge scores22 generated by ANTI IROPAC for 
'e 
F 
I 
F[ 
" I: 
i 
I 
respondents (Table 6.7) reveals one account manager had a negative cultural 
knowledge score. According to Caulkins and l lyatt (1999), the existence of a negative 
cultural knowledge score indicates an individual holds a very dissimilar view of the 
domain in question, likely the result or a very different set of experiences. Further 
examination of the data revealed this account manager was significantly more positive 
than the group on most aspects of the proposal but more negative on others. Analysis 
provided no explanation for the negative knowledge score. Following Caulkins and 
I Iyatt's (1999) treatment of such an outlier, data For this account manager were omitted 
21 Respondent reliability is n measure of the average amount of agreement among respondents computed 
by calculating Cronbach's alpha on the person-by-person agreement matrix. 
' Knowledge scores indicate the percentage of culturally correct responses For each respondent. They 
are computed by comparing each respondent's answers to the culturally correct answer as determined by 
the group consensus. 
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from subsequent analysis at the initial review stage, thereby permitting a closer and 
more focused examination of the remaining account managers. 
TaI) Ic 6.7 
Knowledge Scores of Account Managers - Initial Review Static 
Participant Knowledge Score 
1312 . 20 
B7'3 . 71 G14 . 29 G15 . 60 13K6 . 46 
GK8 -. 09 
13K9 . 61 GK10 . 57 
13K 12 . 79 13' 1' 13 . 72 
13'1' 14 . 62 
BT 15 . 64 13'1' 16 . 65 
GTI 7 . 45 L3K18 . 61 
GK19 . 75 
13K20 . 9U 
13K21 . 15 
G'1'22 . 58 
G K23 . 72 
At the second static ol'analysis, the initial review data were analyzed using non- 
metric multi-dimensional scaling. MUS provides a visual representation of the pattern 
of similarities or distances among a set of objects that can be scanned at a glance 
r 
(ßorgatti, 1996b). According to Borgatti (1996b) euclidean distances23 are typically 
computed instead of correlations when comparing profiles of respondents across 
21 Euclidean distance is the square root of the sum of the squared dilTerences between corresponding 
elements of two vectors, where a vector is a row consisting of n numbers or vnriables. 
188 
variables. As the interest here is in comparing patterns of responses among account 
managers, euclidean distance was selected as input to MDS. Results of the MUS for 
the initial review are presented in Figure 6.1. 
Given the high stress level" noted in the MUS diagram, hierarchical clustering 
was employed to examine the grouping patterns in greater detail. The cluster diagram 
(Figure 6.2) rcinlbrccs the results of the MUS, revealing two small but dominant 
clusters of account managers. 25 Taken together these groupings arc consistent with the 
results of the CA that pointed to a single factor explaining the majority (56.9%) of (lie 
Figure 6.1 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
All Account Muuagcrs 
BT2 
BK21 
BK9 GT4 
GT5 BT16 BT15 
GT22 
BK10 GKI9 
BT3 GK1OOK4T13 GT17 
GK23 
BK20 ßKß 
BT14 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.165 
21'I'he stress level is nn indication ul'how well the MUS map reproduces and represents the input data. 
The smaller the stress level. the better the representation. According to I3orgntti (1996b), n stress level 
under 0. I is excellent and over 0.15 is unacceptable. 
"One group consists of ßK 12,13K20,13T13, GT22, ßK18, GTI7, and GK 19, while the second is 
comprised of BT3, GK 10, and GK23. 
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variance, even though not representing consensus. The makeup of these groups is also 
noteworthy in that they are comprised of a mix of account managers from banks and 
From government agencies and a mix of those who reviewed the traditional plan and 
those who reviewed the KBB plan, although the latter group is slightly more dominant. 
The lack of agrccmcnt among the overall group at this stage is not surprising given the 
diversity of organizations and the fact that not all account managers reviewed the same 
proposal. 
Figure 6.2 
Hierarchical Cluslcring26 - Initial Review 
All Account Managers 
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2" Based on Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering Average Linkage Method. 
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At a third stage of analysis, the initial review data were segmented into a priori 
groups of account managers as indicated previously: account manager type 
(government and bank), type ol'plan reviewed (traditional and KBB), and account 
manager focus (generalist and KBB). Each of these groups was subjected to consensus 
analysis to determine whether new patterns of agreement or disagreement emerged. 
Non-metric multidimensional scaling was used to display consensus patterns. An 
examination of the data for the government account managers ('fable 6.8) reveals a lack 
of consensus, most closely resembling a case of weak agreement with some evidence cif 
subcultural grouIpinngs. 
'fabIc 6.8 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Government Account Managers 
(n=7) 
Factor Eigenvaluc Percent Cum. "/º Ratio 
2.315 44.8 44.8 1.536 
2 1.507 29.2 74.0 1.125 
3 1.340 26.0 100.0 
't'otal 5.162 100.0 
Mcan Knowledge Score - . 508 Respondent Reliability - . 706 
The pattern of weak agreement and two small subgroups of account managers 
are evident on examination o('thc MUS diagram presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
Government Account Managers 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.006 
As can be seen in ']'able 6.9 and Figure 6.4, the bank account managers at this 
stage also display a lack of consensus. As with the government group, the bankers show 
signs of weak agreement, but in their case, tending more toward a turbulent domain. 
Table 6 .9 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Bank Account Managers 
(n=12) 
Factor Eigcnvaluc Percent Cum. '%, Ratio 
1 4.579 50.5 50.5 1.678 
E 2 2.728 30.1 80.5 1.543 
3 1.768 19.5 100.0 
Total 9.075 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 579 Respondent Reliability -. 859 
ý; 
`_ 
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Figure 6.4 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
Bank Account Managers 
BT15 
BK21 
DTIG 
ßT2 BKG 
DK9 
ßK1U 
BK12 
ßT3 DT13 
BK20 
BT14 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.147 
The analysis of the data by type of proposal suggests a lack of consensus among 
the group that reviewed the traditional proposal (Table 6.10), as indicated by the 
cigenvaluc ratio of 1.494. Further, the straight-line descending plot of cigenvalues is an 
indication of considerable heterogeneity. The pattern of agreement, or more 
Table 6.10 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Traditional Business Plan 
(n=10) 
Factor Eigcirvalue Percent Cuun. %, Ratio 
3.382 50.0 50.0 1.494 
2 2.264 33.4 83.4 2.016 
3 1.123 16.6 100.0 
Total 6.769 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 553 Respondent Reliability - . 807 
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Figure 6.5 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
Traditional Business Proposal 
BT2 
GT4 
OT15 
STI6 
GT22 GT5 
GT17 ST13 
DT3 
6T14 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.046 
appropriately disagreement, among members of this group is presented in Figure 6.5 
and clearly resembles the turbulent domain described by Caulkins and I lyatt (1999). 
A very different picture emerged from the review of the data for the account 
managers that reviewed the knowledge-based business proposal. There is evidence or a 
high level of agreement among account managers in this group as indicated by the ratio 
of3.687 between the cigenvalues for the first and second factors and by the fact that the 
first factor accounts for 68.1 percent of the variance (Table 6.11). It is also noteworthy 
that the mean knowledge score for this group is noticeably higher, and in some cases 
significantly higher, than For the other groups. 
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Table 6.11 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Knowledge-Based Business Plan 
(n=9) 
Factor EiLCnnvaluc Percent Cum. "/º Ratio 
1 3.829 68.1 68.1 3.687 
2 1.039 18.5 86.6 1.381 
3 0.752 13.4 100.0 
Total 5.620 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 623 Respondent Reliability -. 849 
The clustering among members of this group is quite noticeable in the ML)S 
diagram (Figure 6.6) and supports the finding of consensus. Once again, the primary 
cluster is comprised of a mix of government and bank account managers. 
Figure 6.6 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
Knowledge-Based Business Proposal 
GK23 BK20 
BK12 
GK19 
GK10 
BK21 
BK18 
BK9 
BK6 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0. I01 
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A review cif the CA results for account managers with a K1313 focus ('I'cihle 
6.12) also indicates consensus, as evidenced by the ratio of 4.587 between the 
cigenvalucs oithc Iirst two (actors and by the fact that the first factor accounts for a 
very high percentage of the variance (82.1%). Even though Weller and Romney (1988) 
provide support for using CA with small groups, a note of caution is in order given the 
relatively small size of this particular group. Consequently, the MUS diagram has not 
heal included. 
Table 6.12 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Account Managers with a 1(1313 Focus 
(n=4) 
Factor Eigenvaluc Percent Cw». "/º Ratio 
1.426 82.1 82.1 4.587 
2 0.311 17.9 100.0 
'l'etal 1.737 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 574 Respondent Reliability -. 653 
Analysis of the final group, account managers with a non-KBB locus. indicates 
another non-consensus and weak agreement domain that, much like the bankers, tends ý. s 
more towards a turbulent domain exhibiting considerable diversity (Table 6.13). 
r- _ý 
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Table 6.13 
Consensus Analysis - Initial Review 
Account Managers with a Non-IC1313 Focus 
(n=15) 
Factor Eigcnvuluc Percent Cuuu. % Ratio 
1 5.564 57.4 57.4 2.100 
2 2.649 27.3 84.6 1.788 
3 1.482 15.3 100.0 
't'otal 9.695 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 590 Respondent Reliability -. 888 
The lack of agreement among the members of this group is clearly visible in the 
pattern displayed in the MDS diagram (Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6.7 
Multidimensional Scaling - Initial Review 
Account Managers with a Non-Kill Focus 
BT2 
GT4 
BK9 
GT5 BT15 
BTI 6 
GT22 
BK18 
BT3 BT13 
GT17 
BKG 
GK23 
BK20 
BT14 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.136 
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One additional output (iom consensus analysis that is usclül to the present study 
is the culturally correct response key or answer key generated by ANTI IROPAC. The 
predicted answer keys for the various subgroups, as well as the key for the overall 
group, are presented in Table 6.14. Caulkins and Hyatt (1999) argue for the usefulness 
of (lie answer key as a diagnostic tool, even in cases where the domain is non-coherent 
or where consensus dots not exist. 
Table 6.1 4 
Culturally Correct Response Keys" - Initial Review 
Variable Bank Govt Tad K1313 Spec Gen All 
Market potential 4.75 4.39 4.85 4.53 4.64 4.62 4.62 
Business plan 5.08 3.74 4.46 4.95 4.36 4.69 4.63 
Collateral/security 1.88 2.02 1.92 2.00 2.17 1.91 1.97 
Proven prod uct/scrvice 2.86 3.03 2.66 3.34 3.73 2.75 2.87 
Potential funding available 3.81 4.27 3.87 3.78 5.20* 3.41 3.88 
Stage of'development of firm 3.03 3.32 3.07 2.93 2.78 2.99 2.98 
Track record of entre reneurs 4.51 4.99 4.72 4.59 4.35 4.61 4.59 
Uniqueness of product/service 5.61 6.08 5.38 5.91 4.93 5.72 5.67 
Potential cash now 3.47 2.76 3.27 3.50 3.11 3.37 3.21 
Mina Bement scam 4.56 4.77 4.83 4.63 4.46 4.61 4.58 
Demonstrated market acceptance 3.25 3.76 3.8U 3.25 3.58 3.47 3.44 
Logistics and facilities 3.45 3.35 4.06 3.13 3.66 3.56 3.46 
General economic conditions 5.28 5.22 4.10 6.15** 5.55 5.04 5.20 
Spec = account manager with a K13[3 focus; Gen - account manager with a non-Kill) focus 
sig. * p>. 01 <. 05; "" p<. 00I - basal on t-tests of means, not weighted averages. 
A review of the data in Table 6.14 reveals a number of notable differences 
(highlighted in bold) among the various subgroups of account managers in terms of 
their ratings of the two business proposals. First, account managers in banks were more 
favourably impressed with the overall business plans than their counterparts in 
27 According to Borgatti (I996b), the answer key is the model's best guess as to the culturally correct 
answer to each question, and is based on a weighted average of respondents' answers with weights 
corresponding to level of knowledge. The numbers in this table represent the predicted answers for each 
group of account managers based on weighting respondents' ratings of the variables using the original 7 
point Likct1 scale, where I= well below average, 4= average and 7= well above average. 
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government. Second, those who reviewed the proposal from the knowledge-based 
business fielt general economic conditions were more conducive to start-up than did the 
account managers that reviewed the proposal from the traditional venture. Third, 
; tccutint in n agcrs witli a focus on KI)IZs stew better prospects lbr the kno ledge-hascd 
business to obtain other potential funding than did the more generalist account 
managers that reviewed the traditional plan. Finally, the Kßß specialists rated the 
proven nature of the proposed knowledge-based service more highly than the generalist 
account managers rated the proven nature of tlic proposed traditional product. 
Finally, the ratings at the initial review stage were subjected to discritniiiatit 
analysis in an cilürt to idcntily potential explanatory variables underlying the 
assessments by the various subgroups, namely, account manager type, plan type and 
account manager focus. Results indicated no significant differences. 
In summary, there is limited evidence at the initial review stage of a shared 
lending or risk assessment culture. In combination, results from the CA and the MUS 
suggest account managers are a diverse group of individuals. This is not surprising at 
the overall level, given diflcring mandates, policies and procedures, especially between 
banks and government agencies. The lack of consensus within the subgroups, 
particularly the banks, is more surprising given the structured processes generally 
associated with commercial lending activity. I lowever, lack of agreement may reflect 
the fact that account managers have not used formal evaluation instruments and have 
not engaged in formal due diligence at this stage in the review process. As a result, risk 
assessment, at this stage, may not reflect structured policies and procedures. 
Subgroup consensus, at the initial review stage, emerged only among account 
.i managers that reviewed the 
KUl3 proposal and among the smaller subset of account 
managers with a KI3B focus. Interestingly, in the case of both these groups, consensus 
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is reflected in a very mixed view of the 13 proposal variables with approximately half 
being viewed more positively by these groups and half being viewed more negatively. 
In addition, the review of the culturally correct response keys identified 
relatively few significant differences between the groups for the 13 variables rated. 
Similarly, results of the discriminant analysis provided little insight into potential 
explanatory variables underlying assessments by various subgroups, as no siginilicant 
diflcrcnccs were found. 
In terms ol'research question Q92", a common or shared lending culture does not 
appear to exist among account managers in banks or government agencies at the initial 
review stage. In terms of research question QIO , thcrc is evidence of al shared culture 
among account managers with respect to risk asscssmcnt of knowlcdgc-based 
businesses; however, the culture is not necessarily supportive of the needs of KI3I3s. 
To the contrary, agreement may reflect account managers' negative perceptions or the 
K1313 proposal. 
6.4.2.2 Risk Assessment and Lending Culture at the Post Review Stage 
At the post review stage, account managers were interviewed to obtain a 
decision on the financing application, to obtain risk ratings and second-stage proposal 
ratings, to discuss the loan evaluation, risk assessment and decision-making processes, 
and to identify any additional concerns with the proposals. By this stage, account 
managers had completed their due diligence, had identified requirements for additional 
information and had conducted more in-depth assessment. Consequently, it was 
2" Q9: Does a common or shared lending culture exist among account managers in chartered banks and 
government agencies? 
9Q10: To what cxtent does the lending culture within chartered banks and government agencies reflect 
the needs of Kßßs? ' 
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reasonable to expect changes in proposal ratings from the initial review stage. It was 
also anticipated that a higher level or agreement or consensus might emerge at the post 
review stage from the use of formal evaluation instruments and the application of 
structured policies and procedures. 
As with the initial review, data from the post review ratings were subjected to 
consensus analysis. Results for all account managers arc presented in 't'able 6.15 and 
provide a very similar picture to the initial review stage. The ratio of 2.761 bctwecn the 
first and second factors and the plot of the cigenvalues indicate low consensus and 
demonstrate a situation of weak agreement within the group, even though the first 
Bielur accounts lair 60.1 percent of the variance. The CA results Irr the overall group 
arc remarkably similar to those at the initial review static, demonstrating lack of clear 
CO lSCUSUS. 
Table 6.15 
Coiiscnsus Analysis - Post Review 
All Account Managers 
(n=23)3 
Factor Eigenvaluc Percent C11111. 'Yo Ratiu 
1 7.673 60.1 60.1 2.761 
2 2.779 21.8 81.9 1.203 
3 2.311 18.1 100.0 
Total 12.763 100.0 
Mcnn Knowlcdgc Score -. 533 Respondent Reliability - . 9o 1 
k` 
ý, Y 
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A review of the knowledge scores generated by ANTI IROPAC for respondents 
at the post review stage (Table 6.16) revealed one account manager had a negative 
"' It should be remembered that data for the initial review were based on 20 respondents. 
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cultural knowledge score, as was the case at the initial review stage. Further 
4 
examination of the data indicated this account manager was significantly more positive 
than the group on all aspects of the proposal with the exception of the overall business 
plan. A review of information obtained from the interviews revealed this individual 
had a significantly shorter tenure in the commercial lending and risk assessment areas 
(three years compared to a mean of l0). This may explain, at least in part, the very 
clifl'crcnt pcrspcctive of this account managcr. Again, following Caulkiiis aiul l lyatt's 
(1999) treatment oloutliers, data (or this account manager were omitted from 
subsequent analysis, thereby permitting a closer and more focused examination of the 
remaining account managers. 
Table 6. L6 
Knowledge Scores of Account Managers -1'ost Review Stage 
Participant Knowledge Score 
(: '1' 1 -. 02 
13"1'2 . 17 
[313 . 65 
GT4 . 72 
G'1'5 . 73 
I3KG . 67 GK7 . 18 
GK8 . 30 
ßK9 . 58 
GK10 . 63 13K11 . 79 
BK12 . 76 
131'13 . 77 
13114 . 64 
13"1' 15 . 74 
13T1 G . 43 
GTI 7 . 63 13K18 . 67 
GK19 . 59 13K20 . 60 
13 K21 . 29 
G'1'22 . 25 
GK23 . 50 
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The post review data for all account managers were also analyzed using non- 
metric multidimensional scaling. Figure 6.8 presents the results of the MUS 
confirming the pattern of weak agreement identified in the consensus analysis. 
Figure 6.8 
Multidimensional Scaling - Post Review 
All Account Managers 
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I Iicrarchical clustering was also cmploycd at this static to idcntify groups more 
clearly and to examine grouping patterns in greater detail. The results of the cluster 
analysis are presented in Figure 6.9 and reveal the formation of two almost equal size 
clusters", each of which is comprised or a mix of account managers from banks and 
government agencies and a mix ofaccount managers that reviewed each of the two 
proposals. Further, one cluster is situated entirely in the left portion of the M1)S 
diagram (Figure 6.8), while the second group appears to the right. 
'' One group is comprised of BT2, ßT3. GKIO, ßK12, GK23. GK8, UKI I. GK7, ßT13, and GK19. The 
other is comprised of GT4, I5K20, GT5,13K9, ß115, GT17, ßK6, ßK18, ßT16,13K21, ßT14 and GT22. 
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These results demonstrate a higher level of agreenmeint among the members of 
the overall group compared to the initial review stage, possibly resulting from a more 
formal and structured review process. Again, the lack of consensus at this stage is not 
surprising given the diversity of organizations and the fact that all account managers 
(lid not review the same proposal. 
Figure 6.9 
I licrarchical Clustering - Post Review 
All Account Managers 
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Consensus analysis and non-metric multidimensional scaling were also 
employed at the post review stage to examine patterns of agreement among the same 
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three a priori groupings of account managers as at the initial review stage, namely, 
account manager type, type of plan reviewed, and account manager focus. 
fhc government account manager group again fails to reach consensus as 
evidenced by the ratio of 2.398 between the eigenvalues for the first two factors ('t'able 
6.17). Further, a domain that indicates a highly turbulent perspective among its 
members has replaced the subcultural groupings that were evident at the initial review 
Stage. 
Table 6.17 
Consensus Analysis - Post Review 
All Government Account Managers 
(n=9) 
Factor Eigenvaluc Percent Cum. "/, Raliu 
1 2.407 59.4 59.4 2.398 
2 1.004 24.8 84.1 1.562 
3 0.643 15.9 100.0 
'l'etal 4.054 100.0 
Mcan Knowlcdgc Scorc - . 
482 Respondent Reliability -. 727 
The diversity ofopinion among members ol'thc government account manager 
group is clearly evident in the MUS diagram presented in Figure 6.10. I lowcver, on 
closer examination a rather unique clustering pattern is visible. The account managers 
that reviewed the traditional proposal are all clustered to the right in the diagram, while 
those that reviewed the Kßß proposal are all grouped to the left. Hierarchical 
clustering was used to examine this phenomenon in more detail. The results of the 
cluster analysis, presented in Figure 6.11, confirm the presence of the two primary 
clusters and their unique composition, suggesting higher levels of agreement within 
groups of account managers reviewing the same proposal. 
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Figure 6.10 
Multidimensional Scaling -1'ost Review 
All Government Account Managers 
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Figure 6.11 
hierarchical Clustering - Post Review 
All Government Account Managers 
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One further modification was made to the government category to enable 
additional analysis; the three account managers from the Business Development Bank 
of Canada were extracted from the group. Interviews with BDC staff and the review of 
secondary material confirm the organization's mandate" is more closely aligned with 
the chartered banks than it is with the other three government agencies. As a result, it 
may be unreasonable to consider BDC account managers in the same light as other 
government account managers. Subsequent consensus analysis, hcrlbrmcd on the 
remaining group members, revealed a high agreement domain with 100 percent of the 
variance accounted for by a single factor ("fable 6.18). These results confirm the 
existence of differences between 13DC account managers and the rest of the 
group. CA performed on the sank subset cif governnment account manages at the 
initial review stage produced considerably different results. An cigcnvaluc ratio or 
119 bctwcen the first two factors indicates an extremely low level of agreement, 
providing support For previous findings at the initial review stage. 
Table 6.18 
Consensus Analysis - I'ost Review 
Government Account Managers (not including lil)C) 
(u=6) 
Factor Eigcnvaluc Percent Cum. % Ratio 
1 1.959 100.0 100.0 
Total 1.959 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 552 Respondent Reliability - . 722 
'' In July of 1995, legislation governing the BDC was updated reaffirming its role as a complementary 
lender rather than its previous mandate as a lender of last resort. 
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The diversity of opinion, exhibited by bankers at the initial review stage, is even 
more apparent from the analysis of their post review ratings. Results of the consensus 
analysis, presented in Table 6.19, confirm the lack of consensus among the group 
(eigenvalue ratio of 2.450), while the straight-line plot of the cigenvalucs signals it shill 
to a highly turbulent and diverse domain. It is worth noting that consensus analysis, 
performed on the bank group with the addition of the three BDC account managers, 
resulted in virtually no change in the level of agreement". A reasonable interpretation 
of this result is that the BDC group tit well with the bankers, reinforcing the previous 
conclusion concerning the dif('erences between the IIDC and the other government 
agencies. 
fable 6.19 
Consensus Analysis - I'ost Review 
All Bank Account Managers 
(n=13) 
Factor Eigcnvaluc Percent Cum. %, Ratio 
1 4.945 59.5 59.5 2.450 
2 2.019 24.3 83.8 1.496 
3 1.350 16.2 100.0 
' o(al 8.314 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score - . 589 
Respondent Reliability - . 874 
Results of non-metric multidimensional scaling, presented in Figure 6.12, 
ýý_ 
provide a clear picture or the diversity and turbulence existing among the bankers at the 
post review stage., 
"The eigenvalue ratio between the first two factors is 2.438 with the first factor accounting for 56.3 
percent of the variance and the second factor explaining 23.1 percent of the variance. 
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Figure 6.12 
Multidimensional Scaling - Post Review 
All Bank Account Managers 
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The finding of such diversity ofopinion among the bank account manager 
group at this static is somewhat surprising. Bankers were expected to be more 
structured and consistent in their approach to risk assessment and commercial lending. 
especially following the due diligence process. As a result, one further modification 
was made to the bank group at the post review stage; the two K1313 specialists were 
removed from the group to permit an assessment of the Icvcl of consensus among the 
more traditional lenders. As indicated previously, discussions with bank staff and the 
review of secondary support material confirm live of the chartered banks take a 
dif Trent approach to knowledge-based businesses, utilizing K1313 lending centres and 
employing K13ß specialists. As a result, it is reasonable to expect some intra-cultural 
variability within a group comprised of both Kl3I3 specialists anti traditional 
= commercial lenders. Table 6.20 includes the CA results for the bank account managers 
with the K13ß specialists removed and indicates a very different picture, one of a high 
level of agreement among the more traditional group of lenders. 
., 
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Table 6.20 
Consensus Analysis - Post Review 
Traditional Bank Accoun t Managers 
(n=11) 
Factor Eigenyaluc Percent Cum. 0% Ratio 
1 4.324 64.5 64.5 3.494 
2 1.238 18.5 83.0 1.088 
3 1.138 17.0 100.0 
'total 6.700 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 595 Respondent Reliability -. 857 
Figure 6.13 presents the results of the MUS ('or this subgroup of bank account 
managers, providing a picture of consensus among the traditional commercial lenders, a 
sharp contrast to the results for the overall group of bankers presented in Figure 6.12. 
Figure 6.13 
Multidimensional Scaling - Post Review 
Traditional Hank Account Managers 
BT15 
BTIG 
BK9 
BKG 
BK20 
ßK1ß BT2 
BT14 BTI3 
BT3 
ßK11 
Stress in 2 dimensions is 0.100. 
YF 
210 
It is noteworthy that CA performed on the same subset of traditional bank 
account managers at the initial review stage indicates little change (cigcirvaluc ratio of 
1.028) from the low level of agrccmcnt reported previously for findings , It the initial 
stage. 
Results of the CA at the post review static for the group of account managers 
that reviewed the traditional business plan arc presented in Table 6.21. The cigenvaluc 
ratio o1'3.301 confirms a high level of agreement within the group with the first factor 
explaining 64.9 percent of the variance. This is a significant change From the highly 
turbulent low agreement domain evident lbr this group at the initial review stage. 
Table 6.21 
Consensus Analysis - Post Rcvicw 
Traditional Business Plan 
(1i=1 O) 
Factor Eigcus'aluc l'crccut Cum. "/% Ratio- 
1 3.593 64.9 64.9 3.301 
2 1.089 19.7 84.6 1.278 
3 0.852 15.4 100.0 
Total 5.534 100.0 
Mcan Knowledge Scorc - . 565 Respondent Reliability -. 821 
The high lcvcl of agrccmcnt among members of this group is clearly visible 
From the review of the MDS results presented in Figure 6.14. The mix cif account 
managers from the banks and government agencies is also quite noticeable in the 
primary cluster at the right of the diagram. Two outliers ([3'1'2 and [3"1'3) are also quite 
obvious in the MUS representation. These two bank account managers apparently hold 
considerably different views from the rest of this group. 
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Figure 6.14 
Multidimcusioual Scaling - Post Review 
Traditional Business Plan 
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CA results for those reviewing the Kill) proposal, presented in 'fable 6.22, also 
reveal a dilTcrcnt picture from the initial review. Consensus evident at the previous 
stale has been replaced by a pattern of weak agreement with an indication or two 
Table 6.22 
Cunscnsus Analysis - Post Review 
Kno`vledge-13ased Business Plan 
(n=12) 
Factor Eigenvaltic Percent Cum. % Ratio 
1 3.930 57.8 57.8 2.272 
2 1.730 25.4 83.2 1.517 
3 1.140 16.8 100.0 
Total 6.800 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score - . 
535 Respondent Reliability - . 828 
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subcultural groupings. The two groups are depicted quite clearly in the MDS results 
presented in Figure 6.15. A review of these results also reveals that, with two 
exceptions (I3KI I and ßK12), one group" is comprised entirely of batik account 
managers, while the other is comprised primarily of government account managers. It 
would appear there is a higher level of agreement within each of the two groups than 
exists liar the entire group that reviewed the Kßß proposal. 
Figure 6.15 
Multidimensional Scaling - Post Review 
Knowledge-Based Business Proposal 
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The final a priori grouping contrasts account managers with a Kßß focus with 
the more generalist account managers or those with a non-KBI3 focus. Results of the 
CA liar those with a K1313 focus indicate the presence of high agreement, as was the 
f -- 
-"' The group on the right is comprised of 13K 18,13K20, [3K9, I3K6 and 13K2 I, while the group on the tell 
is comprised of GK23, GK to, GK8, GK7 and GK 19. 
213 
case at the initial review stage. A review of the results, presented in Table 6.22, reveals 
that 100.0 percent of the variance is accounted for by a single factor. 
Table 6.23 
Consensus Analysis- Post Review 
Account Managers with a K1313 Focus 
(n=5) 
factor Eigenvaluc Percent Cwn. % Ratio 
1.950 100.0 100.0 
Total 1.950 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Scorc -. 590 Respondent Reliability -. 712 
Results of CA for the final group of account managers, those with a non-KI3I3 
or more general focus, also indicate consensus. As can be seen in Table 6.24, the 
cigcnvalue ratio between the first two ('actors is 3.221. This is a marked contrast to 
Table 6.24 
Consensus Analysis - Post Review 
Account Managers with a Non-Kill Focus 
(n=17) 
Factor Eigenvaluc Percent Cum. 'Yo Ratio- 
1 6.233 65.3 65.3 3.221 
2 1.935 20.3 85.5 1.399 
3 1.383 14.5 100.0 
Total 9.551 100.0 
Mean Knowledge Score -. 568 Respondent Reliability - . 889 
results at the initial review stage that not only indicated non-agreement, but also 
pointed to a turbulent domain. The pattern of agreement at the post review stage is 
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evident on review of flit MDS results presented in Figure 6.16. Also noteworthy is the 
makeup or the core group depicted in the lower left of the diagram that consists of 
account managers from banks and government agencies and account managers that 
reviewed both types of proposals. 
Figure 6.16 
Multidimensional Scaling - Post Review 
Account Managers wills a Non-Kill) Focus 
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a: 
Results of the consensus analysis at the post review stage provide a very 
different picture from the initial review stage. Post review results not only confirm a 
shill towards a greater level ol'agrecmcnt among account managers in all groups but 
also confirm the existence of consensus among a significantly greater number of 
groups. In some cases, these groups are comprised or n mixture of account managers in 
terms of both organizational affiliation and type of plan reviewed. however, subgroups 
comprised exclusively of bankers, government account managers, generalists, those 
with a KUR focus, and those that reviewed the traditional proposal also demonstrate 
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Table 6.25 
Culturally Correct Response Keys - Post Review 
Variable flank Govt Trad I0313 Spec Gen All 
Market potential 4.25 4.47 3.74 4.77 5.08 4.01 4.31 
Business plan 4.17 4.11 3.95 4.34 5.02 3.84 4.14 
C ollatcral/security 2.03 2.65 2.07 2.40 2.29 2.16 2.24 
Proven product/service 2.37 2.81 2.13 2.78 4.11 * 2.06 2.50 
Potential funding available 4.15 3.92 3.49 4.47 4.88 3.59 4.03 
Stage of devclopn»cnt or firm 2.92 2.79 2.45 3.19 2.72 2.75 2.83 Track record of cntrc prencurs 2.66 4.02* 3.05 3.22 4.27 2.79 3.14 
Uniqueness of product/service 5.08 5.16 5.19 5.06 4.65 5.13 5.13 
Potential cash flow 3.54 3.49 2.81 3.91 5.12 3.03 3.417 
Management team 4.26 4.14 3.90 4.54 _ 4.45 4.15 4.20 
Demonstrated market acceptance 2.64 2.90 2.29 3.03 4.17 2.35 2.73 
Logistics and facilities 2.85 3.05 2.38 3.55 3.79 2.50 2.95 
General economic conditions 4.07 4.25 3.24 4.82* 3.95 4.05 4.13 
Spec - accounl nºanager with a KIIIl liºcus; (; en - acaºunl in. ºnagcr willº It noiº-KIIII locus 
* sig. p<. O5 - based on t-tests of mcans, not weighted averages. 
indicates significant differences in eight of the 13 variables with the ratings of the KI3I3 
specialists higher for all eight of these variables. 
Comparing the post response keys to those generated at the initial review stage 
also reveals some interesting diFferenccs. Overall, perceptions appear to be less 
I ivourablc at the later stage, following the due diligence process, cxccpt in the case of 
collateral/security, potential lünding available and cash flow. In terms of specific 
subgroups, bankers, government account managers, and those who reviewed the 
traditional proposal have generally become more negative, while account managers 
who rcvicwcd the K1313 proposal and those with a KI3ß focus have generally become 
more positive. 
In addition to ratings of the business plans at the post review stage, account 
managers were asked to indicate whether or not they had concerns with the proposals in 
the following areas: insufficient collateral/security, insufficient cash flow, insufficient 
income or revenue, business too risky, limited management expertise, and tit with their 
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organization's rules/requirements. Interviewees were also asked to identify atiy 
additional concerns. Table 6.26 includes a summary of affirmative responses. 
Table 6.26 
Account Manager Concerns with Business Proposals 
Affirmative Responses 
(n=23) 
Issue Number Percent 
lnsuIlicient collateral/sccuril 17 73.9 
Insufiicicnt cash flow 13 56.5 
Insuflicicnt income or revenue lU 43.5 
Business too risky 15 65.2 
Limited management ex crtisc 13 56.5 
Didn't lit my organization's rules/requirements 12 52.2 
Other 17 73.9 
It is apparent From a review of Table 6.26 that, with the exception of insufficient 
revenue or income, the majority of account managers had concerns with all six aspects 
of the proposals. Although insufficient inconic was not identified as an issue by the 
majority of respondents, there were significant concerns expressed that the revenue 
projections were overly optimistic. As one account manager suggested "sensitivity 
analysis with a more conservative approach would strengthen the proposal. " 
In addition, almost three-quarters of tlhe group identified additional concerns 
x 
a 
with the proposals, including insuflicicnt equity, too highly leveraged, difficulty 
accessing other financing (especially from the banks), and a host of marketing, human 
resource and technical issues. It is noteworthy that seven account managers (30 
percent) iclcntitied insufficient equity as n problem and six of tlicsc wert bankers. A 
cross tabulation between type of'account manager and ideutilied issues with the 
proposals revealed three significant differences (based on Pearson chi-square) as 
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liollows: insuflicient collateral/security (92.3% vs. 50.0%: p<. 05)", business too risky 
(84.6% vs. 40.0%: p<. 05)'", and did not fit organization's rules/requirements (76.9% vs. 
20.0%: p<. ()I )39. In all three cases, affirmative responses by bank account managers 
were significantly greater than the government group. A comparison between type of 
proposal reviewed and identified issues revealed no significant dif Kielces. 
To determine the relative importance of identified issues and concerns, account 
managers were asked to indicate the three most important, in order of importance. A 
number of observations can be made concerning the summary results presented in 
Table 6.27. First, collateral/security and cash flow are the major concerns followed by 
business risk and management. Second, insufhicier, t income and fit with organizational 
requirements were not considered to be major issues. Third, additional issues, 
identified by account managers as one of the three most important, accounted liar 30 
percent of the total number of mentions. Again, lack of equity topped the list of 
additional concerns followed by issues related to marketing and access to operating 
credit. 
Bankers were much more likely than government account managers to identify 
collateral/security, cash flow and business risk as major issues, while the government 
group were more concerned with marketing and technical issues and economic benefit 
to the Province. These findings reinforce results presented earlier with respect to 
additional information requests, indicating bankers place greater emphasis on financial 
aspects of the proposals, while the government group place more emphasis on the non- 
financial areas. The concern with economic benefits expressed by government account 
managers also reinforces previous conclusions with respect to differences between the 
" I'carson chi-square = 5.247 (III) p- . 022 'x Pearson chi-square = 4.960 (I II) p- . 026 " Ilearson chi-square = 7.340 (1 dl) p= . 007 
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mandates or government agencies and banks. 
Table 6.27 
Most Important Concerns with Busincss Proposals 
(n=23)4' 
Issue 
Most 
Important 
Second Most 
I11111o1'taut 
Third Most 
I1111)ortant 
11 % 11 %p Il 'º o 
Insullicicnt collateral/security 6 26.1 2 8.7 2 8.7 
Insufficient Cash Iluw 4 17.4 5 21.7 2 8.7 
Insuflicicnt income or revenue I 4.3 1 4.3 1 4.3 
Uusincss too risky 3 13.0 3 13.0 1 4.3 
Limited nmana ement expertise 2 8.7 4 17.4 I 4.3 
Didn't lit organization's rules 1 4.3 1 4.3 3 13.0 
Other 6 26.1 6 26.1 7 3 O. 4 
The issue of risk was explored further with account managers by asking them to 
rate the overall level ol'industry risk and the overall level of 'firm risk (on a scale of I to 
7, where i= well below average and 7= weil above average) tier the proposal they 
reviewed. In both cases, the comparison was to all loans/investments in their individual 
porti'olios. Results indicate perceptions of high levels of risk for both the industry 
(mean = 5.59) and the firm (mean = 5.98). T-tests for equality of means for the various 
a priori groups (account manager type, plan type and account manager Focus) revealed 
no significant diffcrcnccs in terms of industry risk. I lowcvcr, there were significant 
differences in terms of perceived firm-level risk between government account managers 
(mean = 5.40) and bankers (mean = 6.42)4' and between account managers with a K1313 
focus (nmean = 4.70) and generalist account managers (nmean = 6.33)d2. The perception 
ol'signilicantly lower risk levels by account managers in government is not surprising 
""Not all respondents indicated a second and/or third most important issue. 
11 Mein difference = 1.02 sig. (2-tailed) p= . 035 '' Mean difference = 1.63 sig. (2-tailed) p= . OU3 
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and is consistent with the previously reported finding that they did not co11si(1 risk to 
be a Major issue. 'I'lhis Finding is also consistent with the previous discussion 
concerning the mandates of the various government agencies (except as noted for UDC) 
to Facilitate economic development and thus emphasize net economic benefit to the 
Province. 
More noteworthy, and certainly more interesting in the context of lending to 
K[3[3s, is the finding that account managers with a Kill focus perceive a significantly 
lower level of risk with the knowledge-based firm than do the more traditional account 
managers for risk associated with the traditional firm. This was true even though (lie 
coi»I, a1risoll by type of'pwposal revealed no significant differences in [perceptions of 
firm risk. These findings suggest account managers with a K1313 Ibcus do not place as 
much weight on traditional risk assessment practices and support previous findings or n 
shared lending culture in the context of KURs. 
III summary, analysis of the culturally correct responses keys and account 
managers' concerns and risk ratings at the post review stage provide a number of 
additional insights into risk assessment by account managers. First, account managers 
in banks are more concerned with financial aspects of the proposals, especially 
collateral, equity, cash (low, leverage and risk, while the government group is more 
concerned with non-financial issues related to the marketing and technical aspects of 
the ventures. Bankers also expressed more concern with the lit with organizational 
rules and requirements, while government account managers focused more on net 
economic benefit to the area. Overall, collateral/security and cash flow are the two 
most important concerns identified by account managers. 
Second, account managers who reviewed the KBB proposal and those with a 
KULI locus are significantly more positive in their perceptions of the proposal than are 
221 
other groups of account managers. 
Third, account managers' perceptions of industry and firn-level risk are 
generally high for both proposals. However, bankers perceive a significantly higher 
level of firm risk than do government account managers and K13l3 specialists perceive a 
significantly lower level of firm risk than generalist account managers. The latter was 
true even though there were no significant differences between account managers' risk 
perceptions ol'the two plans. 
Results indicating more positive ratings by those who reviewed the K1313 
proposal and by those with a KBI3 Incas, combined with the finding that the latter 
group also perceive a significantly lower level of firm risk than the traditional account 
manager group, indicate differences in risk assessment of Kt3[3s. 'T'hus, in terms of 
research question Q6", it would appear that account managers with a Kt313 focus do not 
Fellow traditional risk assessment practices exclusively. Findings concerning risk 
ratings and risk assessment also help to explain differences in lending decisions 
between banks and government agencies as posited in research question Q81'. The 
findings of hither levels of risk perception by bankers and their emphasis on financial 
aspects of the proposals support and explain results, reported previously, indicating 
account managers in batiks were less supportive of financing both ventures than were 
government account managers. It would appear loan evaluation and risk assessment by 
account managers in banks are influenced more by financial variables, especially 
collateral and cash flow, and that concerns in these areas may explain their perceptions 
of higher risk levels. The finding that account managers in banks place more emphasis 
'" Q6: Does risk assessment of knowledge-based firms differ from risk assessment of less knowleclge- 
intcnsivc firms and, if so, flow? 
"" Q8: Are there differences between lending decisions of chartered banks and lending decisions of 
government agencies? If differences exist, to what extent can they be explained by diflcrcnces in 
institutional structures, loan evaluation and decision-making processes? 
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on the linancial aspects of the proposed venture confirms Fletcher's (1995a) lfnding of 
dependence on financial information in risk assessment by Scottish bankers. 
6.4.2.3 Comparison between Initial and Post Reviews 
In addition to comparisons that have already been made on the basis cif the 
results of the CA, the MDS and the IIC, the initial and post review data were compared 
using I etor analysis and correlation analysis. Factor analysis was employed initially to 
gain additional insight into key variables. Table 6.28 includes the results of the factor 
analysis for the initial review data and Table 6.29 presents the post review results. 
'falble 6.28 
Factor Analysis - Initial Review 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Market potential 2.258E-02 . 196 . 93 7.723E-02 -8.763E-02 
Business plan . 130 . 254 . 756 8.446E-02 4.284E-02 
Collateral/security -5.160E-02 . 813 . 266 -. 128 -1.229E-02 
Proven product/service . 207 . 883 . 206 -1.985E-02 -. 238 Potential funding 7.682E-02 -2.463E-03 . 371 -. 132 . 708 Stage of development . 935 . 202 3.963E-02 -. 232 5.937E-02 
Entrepreneurs' track record . 311 . 561 2.050E-02 . 631 . 334 Unique product/service -. 603 -. 306 -1.474E-02 -. 193 . 646 Cash flow -. 159 3.580E-02 . 419 1.222E-02 -. 831 
Managementteam . 271 . 522 . 527 . 251 . 111 Market acceptance -. 119 -. 218 . 337 . 840 -6.946E-02 
Logistics and facilities 2.892E-02 3.935E-02 -4.105E-02 . 891 -. 204 
Economic conditions -. 958 2.968E-02 -. 163 -. 176 -. 10 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
I'hc variables group into Tour (actors at the initial review stage and only three at the 
post review stage. The flour groupings at the initial stage are as follows: 
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1. Factor 1: collateral/security, proven product/service, and general economic 
conditions" 
2. Factor 2: market potential, business plan, cash flow, and management team 
3. Factor 3: track record of the entrepreneurs, market acceptance, and logistics and 
t iciIiticS 
4. Factor 4: potential funding available and uniqueness of product/service 
In addition, the variable stage cif development of the lirm loaded separately at the initial 
review stage. 
Table 6.29 
Factor Analysis - Post Review 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Com Bonncut 
Variable 1 2 3 
Market potential . 65 . 223 . 177 
Business plan . 34 . 711 -5.577E-02 Collateral/security -4.627E-02 . 70 . 280 Proven roduct/service . 83 . 19 -7.838E-02 
Potential funding available . 839 -7.233E-02 . 185 Stage of development of firm . 32 . 416 . 554 
Entrepreneurs' track record . 364 . 743 . 256 Uniqueness of product/service -. 131 . 27 . 632 Cash flow . 789 . 379 -. 225 Management team 8.279E-02 . 79 . 275 Market acceptance . 652 . 513 -4.989E-02 Logistics and facilities . 643 -1.643E-02 . 487 General economic conditions 9.699E-02 9.198E-02 . 819 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Variniax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in II iterations. 
The three groupings at the post review stage arc: 
1. Factor l: market potential, proven product/service, potential Funding available, cash 
flow, market acceptance, and logistics and facilities 
"The reader should note the extremely low loading of the variable general economic conditions. 
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2. Factor 2: the business plan, collateral/security, track record of the entrepreneurs, 
and the management team 
3. Factor 3: stage of development of the firm, uniqueness of product/service, and 
general economic conditions 
A number of observations can be made concerning the results of the factor 
analysis and the comparison between the two stages. Groupings at the initial review 
stage reflect considerable diversity. An examination of the Lour factors in (lie context 
of the literature on risk assessment by commercial lenders and venture capitalists 
provides little insight into the basis for the groupings. This is consistent with the 
findings of the consensus analysis and multidimensional scaling which indicated low 
levels of agreement and a significant degree of heterogeneity and turbulence among all 
groups at the initial review stage, except the two related to the knowledge-based 
business proposal (Tables 6.11 and 6.12). 
Post review results indicate account managers perceive a greater degree of 
similarity among the variables, as evidenced by the loadings onto fewer factors. 
Further, post review groupings appear to more closely resemble elements of the risk 
assessment models identified in the literature which focus on variations of the 
traditional "Cs" of credit - capital, capacity, collateral, character, and conditions. 
Capital and capacity are clearly evident in factor I variables, potential funding and cash 
flow. Market related variables, such as market potential, market acceptance, and 
proven product/service, also fit well in this category since they represent the capacity to 
generate cash flow. Factor 2 encompasses collateral and aspects of character and 
management, such as the track record of the entrepreneurs, the management team and 
the overall business plan. The third hi ctor includes a combination of internal and 
external conditions, such as the stage of development of the firm, uniqueness of the 
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product/service, general economic conditions, and to a lessor extent, logistics ärid 
Ilicilitics. Although the latter variable loads more heavily onto the first factor (. 643), it 
also loads %vcll onto factor 3 (. 487). Overall, post review factor analysis results are 
consistent with the findings of the CA and MUS which confirmed a shift in the 
direction of more agreement and consensus among all groups of account managers. 
As a final step in the analysis of the ratings of the business proposals, initial 
ratings were compared to post review ratings by computing correlations. A review o! ' 
the results presented in Table 6.30 indicates the correlation between ratings at the two 
stages was significant on six of the 13 variables as follows: proven product/service, 
truck record of the entrepreneurs, the management team, the business plan, 
collatcral/sccurity. and gencral economic conditions. 
't'able 6.30 
Correlation Between Initial and Post Review Ratings 
Variable H Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) 
Market potential 19 . 035 . 886 Business plan 20 . 492* . 027 Collateral/security 18 . 517* . 028 Proven prod 18 . 610** . 007 
Potential funding available 20 -. 061 . 799 Stage of development of firm 20 . 309 . 184 Entrepreneurs' track record 17 . 677** . 003 Uniqueness of product/service 19 . 384 . 105 Cash Ilow 18 . 411 . 091 Management team 20 . 667** . 001 Market acceptance 18 -. 005 . 984 Logistics and facilities 20 . 412 . 071 General economic conditions 20 . 493* . 027 
" Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
" Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
It would appear initial perceptions of the proposals in these six areas are 
coiilirmaf on further deliberation. Ilowever, the low correlation on the remaining 
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variables suggests subsequent due diligence has a significant impact on account 
managers' perceptions and likely plays an important role in overall risk assessment and 
loan evaluation. 
In summary, results of the factor analysis and the correlations indicate some 
very significant differences between initial review and post review ratings. Factor 
analysis indicates convergence among the variables at the post review stage and 
supports findings from the consensus analysis and multidimensional scaling indicating 
a shift in direction towards increased agreement among account managers in all groups. 
Also noteworthy is the low correlation between the ratings at the two stages on seven 
variables, suggesting initial perceptions of account managers in these areas are 
moclilied signilicantly after further clue diligence and risk assessment. 
6.5 Summary of Supply-Side Findings 
This chapter presented results and discussed findings in the three primary 
supply-side areas of the study, namely, organizational framework, decision-making and 
loan evaluation. 
Research question Q4 raised the issue of'thc impact or organizational 
framework on loan evaluation and decision-making by account managers. Findings 
based on an analysis of interviews, verbal protocols and account manager information 
requests indicate organizational variables, such as strategies, structures, and policies 
and procedures affect lending decisions. However, there was no evidence the effects 
are different for knowledge-based firms compared to less knowledge-intensive firms. 
To address research question Q5 concerning the information acquisition 
S° 
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strategies employed by account managers to support decision-making, interview data 
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related to the availability and utilization of internal and external resources wert; 
analyzed. Findings concerning support for decision-snaking indicate the existence of a 
range of internal and external resources specifically designed to facilitate loan 
evaluation and risk assessment of KBBs, particularly in banks. Notwithstanding the 
availability of such support, there was limited evidence of differences in approach 
taken by account managers when assessing the proposal from the knowledge-based 
firm. Account managers in government rely more on external resources when 
assessing the KBP"" proposal, while bankers rely more heavily on internal sources of 
assistance. The latter clearly are more developed in banks than in government. 
Fhc third, and arguably most critical supply-side component of thc study, was 
loan evaluation, more specifically, risk assessment. The remaining research questions 
f'ocuscd on loan evaluation and risk assessment in an attempt to determine the 
ý_ lolloýving: 
0 Does risk assessment of K13Bs differ from risk assessment of less 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
0 Does loan structuring and loan management by banks differ in the context of 
KBBs? 
0 Are there differences in lending decisions between banks and government 
agencies, and if so, why do they differ? 
" Is there a shared tending culture among account managers in banks and 
governmcnt? 
0 Does the, lending culture in banks and government reflect the needs of 
K1313s? 
To investigate process and content elements of loan evaluation and to address 
these specific questions, it was necessary to examine account managers' lending 
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decisions and recommendations, proposal ratings, risk ratings and identified concerns. 
The analysis of lending decisions and recommendations in light of research question 
Q8 indicates government account managers were more favourably disposed to both 
proposals than the, bankers. The reasons for this relate more to the mandates of 
government agencies and the types of support available than to any diflerences in 
institutional structures and processes. Similarly, there was no evidence the type of 
firm, whether KI313 or traditional, was an explanatory factor in the lending decisions 
and recommendations. Unfortunately, it was not possible to address research question 
Q7 concerning loan structuring and loan management by banks in the context of KB13s. 
since there were too fi v cases where bank account managers were prepared to 
recommend financial assistance. 
Results of the analysis of the business plan reviews and associated ratings 
confirm it is possible to measure culture using consensus analysis. ANTIIROPAC 
software was able to assess the extent of intra-cultural variability within the various 
groups of account managers and to determine whether or not a common lending culture 
exists. A summary of CA findings is included in Table 6.31. Results of the analysis of 
ratings at the initial review stage indicate account managers are a diverse group of 
individuals but also provide limited evidence ofa shared lending culture among 
account managers that reviewed the KUR proposal and among the small group of 
account managers with a Kß[3 focus. A high level of agreement among the members 
of these groups provides an initial indication of the existence or a lending culture in the 
context of knowledge-based businesses. I lowever, the uiulerlying basis li)r agree mienit 
is somewhat mixed reflecting account managers'uegative perceptions, as much, if not 
more than support fr the Kill) proposal. 
229 
Table 6.31 
Consensus Analysis Summary Findings 
Analysis of Account Manager Group 
Cigenvalue 
Ratio 
Level of Agreement 
Found 
Initial review stage: 
All account managers 2.199 Weak agreement 
Government account managers 1.536 Weak agreement with 
subcultural ºrou in s 
Government minus I3DC 1.119 Low agreement 
Batik account managers 1.678 Weak agreement and 
turbulent domain 
Traditional bankers 1.028 Low agreement and 
turbulent domain 
Traditional Proposal 1.494 Turbulent domain 
KBB Proposal 3.687 Consensus 
KBB Specialists 4.687 Consensus 
Generalists 2.100 Weak agreement and 
turbulent domain 
Post review stage: 
All account managers 2.761 Weak agreement 
Government account managers 2.398 Turbulent domain 
Government minus BDC 100.0%^6 Consensus 
Bank account managers 2.450 Turbulent domain 
Traditional bankers 3.494 Consensus 
Traditional Proposal 3.301 Consensus 
KI3B Proposal 2.272 Weak agreement with 
subcultural groupings 
K13ß Specialists 100.0% Consensus 
Generalists 3.221 Consensus 
Results at the post review stage confirm an overall increase in the level of 
agreement among all account managers and an increase in the number of subgroups 
demonstrating consensus. In a number of casts, these groups are comprised of a 
mixture of account managers in terns of both organizational affiliation and typc of plan 
reviewed, indicating the influence of the clue diligence process on all account managers. 
I lowevcr, there is also an indication of high levels of agreement within a number of 
notable subgroups, such as government agencies with a shared economic development 
" Indicates all of the variance is cxplaincd by one factor. 
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mandate, traditional commercial bank account managers, and account managers with a 
K1313 focus. In response to research question Q9, findings support the conclusion or n 
shared lending and risk assessment culture at the post review stage but, in response to 
research question Q 10, findings provide only limited evidence among the small group 
of account managers with a KBB focus of a culture that reflects the needs of Kßl3s. 
To explore the underlying basis of consensus among groups of account 
managers and to determine differences in risk assessment as posited in research 
question Q6, the study analyzed account managers' proposal ratings and related 
concerns, and risk ratings at the post review stage. Findings confirm bankers are more 
concerned with financial aspects of the ventures, especially collateral, cash flow, and 
equity and perceive higher levels of firm risk than government account managers. 
More significant, in the context of knowledge-based businesses, are the findings that 
those who reviewed the KUR proposal and those with a K13I3 focus were more positive 
in their ratings at the post review stage than other groups and that the KI3I3 specialists 
perceived significantly lower levels of risk. Thus in response to research question Q6, 
it appears risk assessment of KI3I3s does differ from risk assessment of more traditional 
firms. 
Finally, there were two significant findings resulting from the comparisons 
between the initial and post review data using Factor analysis and correlations. First, 
factor analysis demonstrates convergence among the rating variables at the post review 
stage compared to the initial review, providing support for the finding of an emerging 
lending culture. Second, the very low correlations between the initial and post review 
ratings for seven of the 13 variables, indicates initial ratings are modified siginificantly, 
suggesting subsequent clue diligence has a significant impact on account managers' 
overall risk assessment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.0 Introduction 
This thesis is an exploratory study of institutional lending to knowledge-based 
businesses in Newl'oundland and Labrador. It draws upon literature From several 
cognate areas, II1ClLI(I111g capital structure. credit rationing, commercial lending, venture 
capital and intellectual capital. A research framework and supporting research 
questions were developed from the literature to facilitate the study ol'institutional 
lending From both the demand-side perspective of knowlc(Ibe-basal businesses and the 
supply-side perspective of lending institutions. 
The demand-side perspective, based primarily on a mail survey to 
entrepreneurs. addresses the roles played by the chartered batiks and government 
agencies in financing (lie start-up ol'knowledge-basal businesses, as well as the 
experiences and perceptions of entrepreneurs in terms of their dealings with financial 
institutions. Survey data enabled a comparison between high knowlecige-firms and Tess 
knowledge-intensive firms to determine differences in their borrowing experiences and 
in their perceptions of lending by chartered banks and government agencies. 
The study explores supply-side perspectives by examining lending decisions of 
chartered banks and government agencies using an exploratory model comprised or 
three main components: organizational framework, decision-making process and loan 
evaluation. Simultaneous verbal protocols and semi-structured interviews are utilized 
to examine lending processes and decision criteria of account managers at two stages of 
assessment: during the initial review of the business plan and following the due 
ä 
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diligence and loan evaluation process. Account managers also identified information 
gaps in the two business proposals designed for the study. In addition, interviews with 
senior managers provide details of institutional strategies aimed at the knowledge-based 
sector and institutional structures designed to serve the needs of KBBs. Consensus 
, analysis From the Iieki cif cognitive anthropology is used to explore the existence and 
pervasiveness ofa lending culture within chartered banks and government agencies and 
among various subgroups oi'account managers. 
The remainder of this chapter presents the key findings from the study, 
identifies the limitations ol*thc research, discusses the implications ol'thc work For 
theory. management practice, and policy making, and makes recommendations liar 
future research. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The key findings are organized and presented according to the two train 
0ý 
F 
components of the study: the demand-side perspectives of knowledge-based businesses 
and the supply-side perspectives of lending institutions. 
7.1.1 Summary of Demand-Side Findings 
The mail survey was undertaken to collect data necessary to address three Ia 
critical research questions concerning the demand-side as follows: 
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Q1: What roles have the chartered banks and government agencies played in 
financing knowledge-based firms and how do they differ from the roles 
played in financing less knowledge-intensive firms? 
Q2: What have been the experiences of K13[3s with obtaining debt financing hum 
chartered banks and government agencies and how do they compare to the 
experiences cif less knowledge-intensive firms? 
03: What are the perceptions of KBBs with respect to chartered bank and 
government Iinancing and how do they compare with the hcrcrhticms of*Icss 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
1'o address the first research question, survey data related to sources of' start-up 
capital were analyzed. Results indicate three signilicaut differences between high 
knowledge Iirnms and less knowledge-intcnsivc firms: 
"I ugh knowledge firms rely more heavily on personal sources of'capital than less 
knowledge-intensive firms (i»ean difference = 20.4, p<. 001). 
0 Less knowledge-intensive businesses make greater use of chartered bank financing 
than high knowledge firms (mean difference = 10.3, p<. 05). 
" Less knowledge-intensive businesses make greater use of government loans than 
high knowledge firms (mean difference = 7.4, p<. 01). 
These findings are consistent with results of prior research indicating K1313s rely 
more heavily on equity and use less debt from financial institutions (Thompson, 
Lightstone and Company, 1998). On the basis of these findings, it appears chartered 
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banks and government agencies do not play as significant a role in linancing high 
knowledge firms at start-up as they do in financing less knowledge-intensive firms. 
To address the second question concerning experiences dealing with chartered 
banks and govcrnmcnt agencies, it was necessary to analyze survey data on the timing, 
nature and outcome ol'attcmpts to access financing from chartered banks and 
government agencies. The Following notable differences were found between K13L3s 
and less knowledge-intensive firms in these areas: 
9A significantly lower perce ntage ofhiglh knowledge lirms sock financing li-um 
government agencies at the idea/start-up stage than less knowledge-intensive firms 
(Pearson chi-square = 16.504 (5di) p=. 00G). 
"I ligh knowledge firms are more likely to seek operating credit and less likely to 
request term financing From chartered banks than less knowledge-intensive firms 
(Pearson chi-square = 10.348 (7d1) p=. 170). 
0 1ligh knowledge firms request significantly lower amounts of operating credit liom 
hanks than less knowledge-intcnsivc firms (nican difibrencc = 73663 1)=. 033). 
Iigh knowledge lirms request lower amounts of terns financing from banks than 
less knowledge-intensive firms (mean di(7crence = 161995 p=. 142). 
"1 ligh knowledge firms are more likely to request It and D financing and less likely 
to request term financing liom government agencies than less knowledge-intensive 
Iinns (Pearson chi-square = 11.155 p=. 084). 
01 ligh knowledge firms are less successful obtaining chartered bank financing than 
Less knowledge-intensive Iirms (Pearson chi-square = 4.430 (2d[) p=. 109). 
01 ligh knowledge firms arc more successful obtaining financing from government 
agencies than less knowledge-intensive firms. 
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Although not all these findings are statistically significant, they combine to 
provide an overall picture of KUBs compared to less knowledge-intensive firms in 
terms of access to chartered bank and government financing. The picture that emerges 
is one of a knowledge-based business that is more likely to need operating credit to 
finance working capital and research and devclolmicnt costs compared to a traditional 
Iium that is more likely to need tcnn linancing to purchase tangible assets. While 
chartered banks appear to he the choice of Kl3[3s for operating credit, KBBs turn to 
government agencies to finance research and developnictit costs. Financial theory 
concerning capital structure suggests thcrc should be independence between asset 
selection and choice oh'linancing. This is clearly not the case with the small firms in 
this study. 
KBB attempts to secure financing also have achieved different results than more 
traditional firms. On the one hand, KI Bs have experienced greater difficulty obtaining 
Iinancing From chartered banks, suggesting efforts by banks to cater to their needs have 
been less than successful. On the other hated, KBBs have been more successful 
obtaining financing From government agencies than traditional businesses. Government 
support of KBBs may be an indication the knowledge-based sector is seen as a strategic 
growth area, one that is considered to be more consistent with government's emphasis 
on economic development. 
It is also apparent irons these lindiings that KU13s request signilicaintly lower 
amounts of operating credit and lower (although not significant) amounts of term 
financing liom chartered banks than less knowledge-intelnsive firms. However, it is not 
clear whether these differences reflect different needs or different expectations. In 
other words, do K[313s require less financing in these areas or do they request less 
because they assume they will encounter difficulty obtaining larger amounts? The 
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li)rn1er explanation appears reasonable for term financing given hie intangible nature of' 
many of the assets of these firms. However, the latter explanation also seems plausible 
in light of the findings that K13Bs experience more difficulty obtaining financing and 
given the perceived emphasis placed on collateral by the chartered banks. 
In terms of the third and final research question concerning demand-side 
perspectives, study findings reveal only one notable difference between the high 
knowledge group and lirms in the medium and low knowledge category as follows: 
0 K1313s perceive chartered banks place greater weight on collateral and security than 
less knowledge-intensive Iirms (Pearson chi-square = 15.393 (I I dl) p -. I65). 
As. just discussed, this finding has implications not only for risk assessment by 
banks, but also in terms of the potential impact on the borrowing behaviour of 
prospective clients. Notwithstanding initiatives undertaken by chartered banks to better 
serve the needs of KBBs, this finding suggests chartered banks continue to take a 
traditional approach to risk assessment. Further, the perception by KI3Bs that chartered 
hanks emphasize collateral could contribute to Icwcr requests Rain KI3Us Ibr support 
or to requests for reduced levels ofsupport. 13inks el al. reached a similar conclusion in 
their study ol'banks in (lie United Kingdom. 
Overall, survey findings provide considerable insight into the experiences and 
perceptions of KBBs compared to less knowledge-intensive firms concerning access to 
chartered bank and government financing. However, future research is required to 
determine if the trends identified in this survey yield statistically significant results. 
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7.1.2 Summary of Supply-Side Findings 
On the supply-side, the study examined three primary components of 
institutional lending, namely, organizational framework, decision-making and loom 
evaluation. The specific research questions and summary of related findings are 
presented in each ol'thcsc areas. 
7.1.2.1 Organizational Framework 
The study examined organizational strategies and structures of chartcrcd banks 
and government agencies in an attempt to answer the following question: 
Q4 Arc loan evaluation and decision-making affected by organizational variables 
and are the cil'ccts dillcrent for knowledge-basal lirºns compared to less 
knowledge-intensive lirms? 
I- 
I, -, 
Findings, based primarily on a review of verbal protocols and follow-uh 
inllormation requests by account managers, indicate loan evaluation and decision- 
making are affected by organizational variables, such as strategies, structures, policies 
and procedures. These findings are consistent with those of McNamara and I3romiley 
(I997) indicating standardization of the loan review process sensitizes account 
managers to the risk presented by borrowers. While the effects in the present study are 
evident in the differing approaches taken by bank account managers compared to those 
taken by account managers in government agencies, there was no evidence to indicate 
ally differential effects by type offiriin. On the contrary, standardized policies and 
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procedures were evident in the review and assessment of the KBB proposal, as well as 
the proposal from the traditional firm. This was true, even though lending institutions, 
especially banks, had established strategies and structures to cater specifically to the 
kuowkdgc-based sector. 
7.1.2.2 Decision-Making Process 
To address the following research question, the study examined the decision- 
making processes ol'account managers, including iinlormatiou acquisition strategies and 
use UI* resourccs: 
Q5 What are the information acquisition strategics employed by account 
managers to support credit decision-making and are there difierenees 
between the in(ornmation acquisition strategies used by account managers in 
making lending decisions to knowledge-basest businesses compared to less 
knowledge-intensive firms? 
Findings indicate a number 01difFercnccs between government account 
I,, 
managers and account managers in banks. in terms of both frequency and types of 
support used. Government account managers consult more external sources, while 
bankers rely more on internal resources available in specialized departments. Bank 
account managers also place more emphasis on client credit information. The more 
noteworthy Findings, however, concern decision-making in the context of K1513s. Study 
findings confirm the existence or a well-established network, especially in the case of 
the chartered banks, to support risk assessment of KI313s. I lowever, the study Found 
only limited evidence of dil7crences in approaches utilized by account managers who 
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reviewed the KI3B proposal. It may be that using hypothetical business cases limited 
account managers from taking full advantage of available resources in this experiment. 
7.1.2.3 Loan Evaluation 
The final supply-side component examined in the study was loan evaluation, in 
particular, risk assessment. The remaining research questions' deal primarily with loan 
evaluation and risk assessment and the extent to which they differ between knowledge- 
based businesses and more traditional Iii-ins. 
Q6 Does risk assessment of knowledge-based firms dif('er from risk assessment 
of less knowledge-intensive firms and, if so, how? 
QR Are there diiicrences between lending decisions of chartered banks and lending 
decisions of government agencies? If differences exist, to what extent can they 
be explained by differences in institutional structures, loan evaluation and 
decision-making processes? 
Q9 Does a common or shared lending culture exist among account m anagers in 
chartered banks and government agencies? 
I _- -- 
QI0 To what extent does the lending culture within chartered banks and government 
agencies reflect the needs of K1313s? 
' Research question Q7 is not included since data limitations prevented the analysis necessary to address 
this issue. 
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To determine whether or not differences in risk assessment exist bctwcen KBBs 
and less knowledge-intensive firms, the study analyzed account managers' risk ratings 
and I1roposal ratings. FiDdinbs indicate there are significant differences in risk 
assessment between bank account managers and account managers in government 
agencies. Bank. account managers perceive higher levels of liriii risk (mea n (fil'lcrcnce 
-= 1.02, p<. 05) and are more concerned with the financial aspects ol'the proposals, 
namely collateral, cash flow, and equity. Findings also indicate differences in risk 
assessment ol'KB13s. Specifically, KB13 specialists perceived significantly lower levels 
of risk with the K1313 proposal than (lie generalist account managers who reviewed the 
more traditional proposal (mean diflerencc = -1.63,1i<. O1). Further, those who 
reviewed the K1313 proposal and those with a K1313 focus were significantly more 
positive in their ratings than were account managers who reviewed the traditional plan. 
(i the basis ol'these findings, it is reasonable to conclude risk assessment o(' KUl3s 
differs From risk assessment of more traditional firms. 
The review ol'the decisions and recommendations of account managers 
indicates government account managers were more favourably disposed to both 
proposals than bank account managers. This is consistent with the survey findings 
indicating entrepreneurs have been more successful obtaining financing from 
government agencies than From chartered batiks. Further investigation also confirms 
that the basis for government support relates largely to institutional mandates of. and 
types of financial assistance available from, government agencies compared to 
chartered banks. There was no evidence to indicate that differences in support between 
chartered banks and government agencies had anything to do with differences in 
institutional structures and processes. Similarly, there was no evidence lending 
decisions and recommendations were influenced by the nature of the proposal. Thus, 
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based on the lindings of this study, differences in lending decisions cannot bý explained 
by diflcrenccs in institutional structures, loan evaluation and decision-making 
processes. 
this thesis also attempted to determine whether or not a common lending 
culture exists within financial institutions and to assess the extent to which the lending 
culture reflects the needs of K1313s. To do this, the study employed consensus analysis 
to assess the extent of intra-cultural variability within various a priori groups of' account 
managers at two stages ol'assessment, initial review and post review. Summary results 
cif the consensus analysis at both stages are presented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 
Consensus Analysis Results - Initial and Post Reviews 
All Account Manager Groups 
Initial Review I'ost Review 
(: rout) Itsttio I Uni in II 
OvcrýilI 2.199 20 2.761 23 
Government 1.536 7 2.308 9 
Banks 1.678 12 2.450 13 
Traditional Proposal 1.494 10 3.301 10 
KUR Proposal 3.687 9 2.272 12 
KUR Specialists 4.687 4 100.0% 5 
Generalists 2.100 15 3.221 17 
Gov't minus 13DC 1.119 5 100.0%º 
Banks minus K13B 1.028 10 3.494 I1 
Note: cases highlighted in bold indicate consensus. 
Results at the initial review stage indicate considerable diversity among account 
managers, with the exception of two groups, those that reviewed the KBB proposal 
(cigenvalue ratio = 3.687) and those with a KBB focus (cigenvalue ratio - 4.687). A 
high level of agreement among the members of these groups is an indication of 
Indicates all of'thc variance is explained by one factor. 
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consensus. [ lowever, agreement does not necessarily imply a lending culture. rellective 
of the needs ofKBBs. Findings based on further investigation of the factors underlying 
consensus at the initial review stage indicate consensus is reflected in a very mixed 
view 01 proposal attributes with approximately half of the variables viewed more 
positively by these two groups ot'account managers and hall'viewed more negatively. 
As a result, although there is agreenºent, the lending culture at this stage is not 
supportive or the needs of KBBs. 
A review of'I'able 7.1 confirms the level of agreement among all groups of' 
account managers, except those that reviewed the KI3ß proposal, increased from the 
initial review to the post review stage. In addition, findings indicate consensus at the 
post review stage among account managers in a number of notable groups, such , is 
government agencies with a shared economic development mandate (100%), traditional 
commercial bank account managers (cigenvalue ratio = 3.494), and account managers 
with a Kl313 focus (I00%). Results ol'the factor analysis, demonstrating convergence 
among the rating variables at the post review stage compared to the initial review, also 
provide support for the finding of an increased level of agreement and consensus. 
Overall, these findings provide strong support for the conclusion of a shared lending 
and risk assessment culture at the post review stage. Again, further investigation ol'the 
factors underlying consensus reveals mixed results among the groups concerning the 
extent to which the culture reflects the needs of KBI3s. Nonetheless, the positive 
perceptions of specialist account managers, those with a KUß focus, provide some 
support for the existence of a Kßl3 lending culture. 
Finally, study results confirmed very low correlations between account 
managers' initial, and post review ratings of the majority of proposal attributes. This 
finding indicates' account managers modily their perceptions of certain aspects of the 
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proposals significantly based on the results of their due diligence. In cases where there 
are significant correlations between ratings at the two stages, at least two explanations 
are possible. On the one hand, it may be that subsequent due diligence conlirms initial 
(perceptions. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that account managers are 
predisposed to particular views and are reluctant to modify initial perceptions, for 
whatever reasons. In any event, it is reasonable to conclude that, at least in some areas, 
subsequent clue diligence has a Significant 
impact on loan evaluation and risk 
assessment. 
7.2 I. iniilaliuins 
A study ofthis magnitude is hound to have limitations and this fficsis is 00 
exception. As with the findings, limitations are presented and discussed under the two 
train components of the study: the demand-side survey and the supply-side interviews 
and verbal protocols. 
7.2.1 'I'Irc Survey 
Three interrelated issues concerning the sampling procedure and 
representativeness of respondents were identified. First, sampling was done on a 
purposeliil rather than random basis. The database chosen 1'or the mail survey was 
intended to ensure adequate representation of high knowledge firms or K13Bs. The liri» 
population in Newfoundland and Labrador was 17,776 firms in December of 1999. 
Random sampling from a population this size would require an extremely large sample 
size to mitigate the risk of inadequate representation of critical cases necessary to the 
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investigation. 
'hic second issue concerns the response rate of 16 percent, low by survey 
standards and certainly less than ideal for statistical inference. The issue of the 
representativeness of respondents was discussed previously but deserves mention again. 
No data were available on the database used For the mailing. Thus, it is not possible to 
determine the extent to which respondents are representative of firms surveyed. The 
comparison of respondents to Iirm population data using number of employees, 
geographic location and industry sector confirms survey respondents are not 
representative of the entire population of firms in this Province. This is not surprising 
since the primary objective of the sample selection was to ensure critical cases were 
included to facilitate comparison among firms by level of knowledge-intensity. The 
study achieved the desired heterogeneity in terms of level of knowledge-intensity. 
Nonetheless, potential response bias and gencralizability are limitations to the external 
validity of the survey findings. 
The third issue regarding the sample concerns the exclusion of certain cases. 
specifically non-starts, which include entrepreneurs that attempted to access financing 
but were unsuccessful, and businesses that have closed. None of these groups were 
included in the survey. As a result, study findings concerning access to institutional 
financing do not consider differences that may exist between Kl3Bs and traditional 
firms that do not make it to the start-up stage or that subsequently cease operations. 
A Iinal issue concerns the data and the impact of large outliers that distort 
means for some of the financial figures. High standard deviations are a clue to this 
problem and have been noted in Table 5.11 and Table 5.21 for (lie amounts of financing 
requested from chartered banks and government agencies. Medians, as well as means, 
have been reported in both instances to provide a more complete picture of the data. A 
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review ol'the data indicates outliers are represented in the high knowledge grhup and in 
the medium and low knowledge group. As a result, the impact orthese outliers on 
comparisons between groups is likely to be minimal. 
7.2.2 Itºlcrvic«"s and Verbal Protocols 
There are also a number of limitations concerning the supply-side interviews 
and verbal protocols used in the study. First, the volume of data hosed a significant 
challenge to analyze. While considerable effort was made to systematically describe, 
interpret and link various qualitative data, there is always the potential for researcher 
bias. Second. interviewer bias can also be a problem with the collection of data. The 
use of verbatim transcripts liar interviews and verbal protocols, and the use ofsenmi- 
structured interview protocols mitigated the potential errors resulting 1iom 
noninteractional effects, such as errors in observation. The more problematic bias, 
involving the potential effects of the researcher on the behaviour of account managers 
during the conduct of' the simultaneous verbal protocols, was minimized by clistil-ilig 
the researcher did not intervene in the process. Further, as indicated in the 
methodology chapter. Sehweiber (1983) and Ericsson and Simon (1980) addressed the 
obtrusive nature of the simultaneous verbal protocol and concluded their use is unlikely 
to have any effects on participant performance. 
Third, the time frame over which the interviews and business plan experiments 
were conducted is a limitation that poses a potential threat to the internal validity of*the 
study. Interviews with senior managers took place in March and April, 2000. Verbal 
protocols and interviews with account managers were completed over the period from 
November 2000 to May 2001. Two developments occurred during that timeframe that 
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may have affected institutional lending decisions. As indicated previously, three 
chartered banks reported that their strategies for dealing with KBBs were evolving and 
that restructuring underway during this time period might affect their approach to the 
K1313 market. A number of changes at the senior management levels within the 
chartered banks and government agencies over the study period compounded this issue. 
Post review interviews with account managers who reviewed the KU13 proposal 
provided a check on these developments. Nonetheless, it is possible that changes in 
organizational Frameworks, including strategies and structures, occurred that arc not 
reported here. 
The second development of sonic concern was the significant market decline of 
publicly traded technology-based firms that occurred during the period when the 
business plan reviews took place. This is unlikely to have affected ratings of the vast 
majority of account managers from the initial to the post review stage, since the process 
with each individual took place over a relatively short timte Frame. I lowevcr, it may be 
a litctor explaining differences among account managers, especially those participating 
in November 2000 compared to those who completed their reviews in April 2001. 
Al urth limitation with the supply-side component of the study is the relatively 
small sample size. As indicated previously, Weller and Romney (1988) provide 
support irr using, consensus analysis with small groups. Nonetheless, there are a 
number of subgroups of account managers, most notably the KI3B specialists, where 
the number of participants is extremely small and where caution should be exercised in 
interpretation as a result. The small sample size is also a limitation to the use of 
standard multivariale analysis and statistical tests. In some cases, for example when 
using discriminant analysis to identify potential explanatory variables underlying the 
business plan assessments by various subgroups, no statistical dilThrences were found. 
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In these cases, the absence of dilierences may be explained by the low power'of the 
statistical tests. Thus it is not possible to state conclusively that significant differences 
do not exist. Conversely, low power increases confidence in findings where significant 
differences were Ibund. 
Small sample size is also a limitation to gencralizahility. As all exploratory 
study, findings from this thesis must be interpreted in the context ol'institutional 
lending in Newfoundland and Labrador. Thus, not only are there limitations associated 
with the small sample size but there are also limitations arising from the geographic 
setting. The research confirmed there arc other locations where institutional 
approaches to K13ß lending are more highly developed than in this Province. Findings 
From this study would not apply in those situations. 1lowever, a more reasonable 
question is the extent to which findings from this study are generalizable to other 
peripheral locations, where K13ß lending is Icss highly developed? 
A filth limitation concerns the experimental nature of the business plan review 
process and the use of hypothetical cases. Observation in a field setting through the use 
of simultaneous verbal protocols was designed to increase reliability and to provide 
details of the lending process. This was achieved in the present study. 1 lowever, as 
mentioned previously, the hypothetical nature of the business plans may have limited 
account managers From engaging in the Füll due diligence and clecision"making process. 
It also prevented consideration of the role of the entrepreneurs and their relationships 
with financial institutions in the lending decision. Given the importance accorded the 
entrepreneur in previous research dealing with risk assessment criteria (Petty and 
I Ipton, 1997; Thompson, Lightstone and Co. Ltd., 1998), the absence of, the 
entrepreneurial element must be acknowledged as a limitation of this thesis. Otherwise, 
conclusions are based on the assumption all account managers treated the experiment in 
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a professional manner and acted, insofar as possible, in accordance with their normal 
credit decision-making processes. 
7.3 IInl)lications 
In any rcscarch endeavour, it is important to identity the implications of the 
findings and their contribution to the development ol'theory, management practice and 
policy making. Each of these is addressed below for this thesis. 
7.3.1 Implications for 'Theory 
fhe exploratory framework utilized in this study builds on previous research in 
the venture capital area by recognizing the potential multi-dimensional and multi-stage 
nature of institutional lending. The framework explores the importance of 
interrelationships within and among the various components of the lending process by 
integrating the supply-side dimensions ol'organizational liameworks, decision-making 
processes, and loan evaluation processes of lending institutions with the demand-siele 
experiences of entrepreneurs. This thesis makes an important contribution by using this 
Framework to examine lending decisions in context and with reference to specific 
proposals, rather than in isolation and retrospectively, as has been the case with the vast 
majority of previous studies dealing with institutional lending. The study is also one of 
very Im to explore lending und borrowing in the context or knowledge-based 
businesses. Similarly, no prior studies have examined risk assessment From the 
perspective of government agencies. 
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In terms of the demand-side, the findings from this research provide aUditional 
empirical evidence of the experiences of knowledge-based businesses with obtaining 
Iinancing from chartered banks and government agencies. To date, research in this area 
has been extremely limited. Findings concerning the roles played by the chartered 
banks and government agencies provide confirmation or previous research (Thompson. 
Lightstonc and Company, 1998, Industry Canada, 1994a), indicating the role of 
Iifancial institutions has not been as prominent in financing K1Us as it has been in 
Iiiiancing more traditional firms. Findings concerning the experiences of KBIIs with 
obtaining financing from chartered banks and government agencies and with Kß13 
perceptions of lending institutions provide new insights fundamental to understanding 
the needs of knowledge-based firms. Evidence indicates KBBs have experienced 
greater difficulty obtaining chartered bank financing and attribute much of that 
di fficulty to the banks' emphasis on collateral. Previous studies by links el erl. (1992) 
and Thompson, Lightstone and Company (1998) report similar problems for Kills in 
their dealings with banks. Given the growing importance of the KBB sector to the 
economy, these findings provide both confirmation and valuable insights. 
Survey findings also raise important questions concealing the financing nerds 
of K1313s and the extent to which requests liar financing may be influenced by assumed 
outcomes and by expectations ol'how they will be received by financial institutions. 
especially chartered banks. Recent work by Levenson and Willard (2000). measuring 
1 credit rationing experienced by small firms in the United States, similarly argues for the 
need to include creditworthy firms that decide not to apply for desired external 
Re l 
8 ý., 
Iinancing For a variety ol'reasons. Unfortunately, their study was unable to distinguish 
empirically between creditworthy and non-creditworthy firms. Questions concerning 
the financing needs and expectations of SMEs generally, and Kß[3s in particular, 
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require additional research. 
Notwithstanding the importance of demand-side findings, this thesis makes its 
most significant contribution to understanding the supply-side of institutional lending, 
especially loan evaluation and risk assessment. The literature review identified only 
three previous studies (Leblebici and Salancik, 1981; Fletcher, 1995; McNamara and 
Bromiley, 1997) that use a grounded approach, as in this study, to examine lending 
processes of banks. The study by Fletcher (1995) is the only one of these that 
investigates lending decisions at two-stages, as done in this thesis. Further, none ol'the 
previous studies examined lending in the context of Kß[3s and no studies were 
identified that deal with the lending processes of government agencies. As a result, this 
exploratory study represents an important step in developing theory on lending to 
knowledge-based businesses. 
In terms of contribution to the wider body of knowledge, findings from this 
thesis confirm the multi-dimensional nature ofthe lending process in terms of mulli- 
stages. multi-pcr^ons and multi-criteria. Findings also support the need to integrate 
multiple theoretical perspectives tiom financial theory, credit rationing theory and 
commercial lending to understand lending and financing processes. As suggested 
recently by Zingales (2000,1623), "... although existing theories have delivered very 
important and useful insights, they seem quite inelYective in helping us cope with the 
new type of firms that is emerging. " To Zingales, these new firms are human capital- 
intensive entities where financing and governance choices can easily change 
organizational boundaries, thus necessitating new theoretical perspectives. 
Thesis findings confirm the existence and importance of information asymmetry 
and adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) to the lending decision. I lowever, the 
information asymmetry problems do not relate to issues such as moral hazard, incentive 
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cflccts and monitoring and bonding costs as posited by agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) but rather to the uncertainties and differing expectations associated 
with predicting future outcomes (Philpott, 1995). Although not limited to knowledge- 
based businesses, these uncertainties are more evident and more problematic for new 
lirnms operating in innovative growth sectors, as is the case for many K13Bs. Given the 
research design and the Fact banks were unwilling to extend credit to either of the two 
proposed ventures, the study was not able to determine the influence of agency costs 
and the associated problems of moral hazard. 
Findings also support credit rationing theory, as posited by . IW ile and Russell 
(1976), confirming that batiks ration credit in response to information asymmetry and 
adverse selection. Collateral is necessary but not sufficient, except perhaps at the 
extreme, and does not mitigate the need to ration credit as suggested by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) and others (Bester, 1987; Chan and Kanatas, 1985). Banks rely on 
organizational frameworks, especially structures and processes, to deal with 
inlörtnation asymmetry. Study findings confirm the work of McNamara and Bromiley 
(1997) indicating the importance of stich organizational variables to loan evaluation 
and decision-making, altltough not specifically to KBBs. While the influence cif 
cognitive factors, such as the fads-and-fashions effect (McNaumara and l3romiley, 1997) 
?_;. cannot be ruled out, the research 
design likely would have minimized Such effects oll 
ý_ 
ýý; 
lending decisions. especially between the two proposals. 
This study also makes a noteworthy contribution to research methodology. 
Perhaps, the most significant contribution concerns the use or cultural consensus theory 
to describe and measure the extent to which there is shared knowledge and a lending 
6 culture among account managers in chartered banks and government agencies and the 
1 extent to which the lending culture differs For knowledge-based businesses. The 
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literature review indicates no similar application of consensus analysis has Uccn 
attempted by others. 
The use ol'consensus analysis in this study reveals significant findings 
concerning loan evaluation and risk assessment. While the consensus model cannot 
confirm the existence of common culture, it can demonstrate when data are inconsistent 
with its existence. At the overall level, data front this study are inconsistent with the 
existence of a common lending culture among all account managers. I lowever, at the 
more critical subgroup level, findings demonstrate the data are not inconsistent with 
consensus and a shared lending culture. There are groups of account managers that 
demonstrate a high level of agreement in terms of risk assessment. This is the case for 
account managers in government agencies that have a shared mandate to support 
economic development in the Province. The same is true For traditional account 
managers in chartered banks where lending policies and procedures are well 
established. Finally, and most importantly to KBBs, findings provide some support for 
consensus among the specialist account managers, and for the existence of a lending 
culture that is consistent with the needs of knowledge"based businesses. This 
consensus is reflected in perceptions of lower risk levels by KI3I3 specialists and by 
significantly more positive ratings or the Kß13 proposal, findings that indicate risk 
assessment of KBI3s differs from risk assessment of more traditional firms. 
Findings concerning risk assessment by bank account managers also provide 
confirmation of results From previous research (Fletcher, 1995) indicating the 
importance of financial variables, especially collateral, cash flow and equity (leverage). 
In contrast, government account managers emphasize non-financial variables, appear to 
be less risk averse, and are generally more forthcoming with financial assistance. 
Although somewhat intuitive, the findings concerning government account managers 
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provide new insights into risk assessment in the context of government agencies. 
Finally, use of the two-stage approach to risk assessment in this study revealed 
important findings concerning the clue diligence process and its impact on loan 
evaluation and risk assessment. Low correlations between ratings at the two stages for 
some variables confirm the importance of subsequent due diligence. On the other hand, 
there are a number of potential explanations for high correlations between ratings for 
other variables. One possibility is the due diligence process confirms initial 
perceptions. A second possibility is the initial assessment of certain attributes is more 
heavily influenced by predispositions. Still a third explanation is that account 
managers, For whatever reasons, are hesitant to modify initial perceptions, even when 
due diligence might suggest otherwise. Further research is needed to explore each of 
these, as well as other potential explanations For variations in risk assessment , It various 
Stages UI' loan evaluation. 
7.3.2 Implications for Management Practice 
The research findings also have significant implications For lending institutions 
und 1'or entrepreneurs in knowledge-based businesses in search of debt financh g. 
Lending institutions, particularly chartered banks, have made efforts to modify lending 
practices to accommodate the needs ofknowledge-basal businesses. Most oller 
products and services designed specifically to meet the needs of KIBs. In some 
. 
jurisdictions, they also have established lending centres with account managers trained 
to handle specialist aspects of loan evaluation, such as technology assessment and 
intellectual capital valuation. 
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Notwithstanding these efforts, KBBs in this study report a number of fiigniiicant 
differences in their dealings with chartered banks compared to more traditional firms 
that should be of particular interest to the banks. Specifically, KBBs rely less on 
chartered banks for financing, experience more difficulty obtaining financing From 
chartered banks. and perceive the banks to place greater emphasis on collateral. These 
findings suggest the banks have been less than successful in their efforts to cater to the 
needs of K1313s. at least in the opinion of'this sample of clients. Assuming these 
findings represent the experiences and perceptions of Kß13s generally, the banks may 
wish to examine the extent to which they practice what they preach in terms of lending 
to the knowledge-based sector in this Province. 
Study findings also have a number of important implications for entrepreneurs 
in knowledge-based businesses in search of financing in this Province. First, chartered 
banks are low risk lenders that emphasize financial criteria, especially, collateral, cash 
flow and equity. As a result, they arc unlikely to represent a significant source of 'start- 
uh capital. especially lbr K13L3s. Second, while Kl3I3s are more likely to be successful 
obtaining financing From government agencies, the types of financing available usually 
are not appropriate or not suflicient to meet operating requirements. Some government 
agencies are excellent sources of financing for soft costs, such as research and 
development expenditures but government agencies generally are not potential sources 
of f inancing For working capital or operating capital requirements. Thus, personal 
sources sind chartered banks continue to be important to KL3[3s. Alternatively, small 
firms are forced to rely on financial bootstrapping methods3 as outlined by Winborg 
and Landstrom (2001). To date, there has been limited research on the role and 
importance of financial bootstrapping to small firms. 
' '1'hc authors idcntily 32 bootstrapping methods consisting of internally oriented and socially oriented 
resource acquisition strategies used in lieu of external long-term finance. 
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'I'Iiird, the lending practices of chartered banks and government agcllclcs arc 
evolving tee meet the nieecis cif KUlis. 't'his study has provided evicletnce thýit risk 
assessment cif K13ßs differs 1iom that of traditional firms. The study also demonstrated 
support Irr the existence ofa lending culture consistent with the needs orKI3Bs. 
tJnli)rlunatcly li)r entrepreneurs, there is limited evidence to date that these practices 
and this culture have been successful in meeting the needs of KBBs, likely because the 
culture is confined to a very sclcct group ol'account managers. This study was able to 
confirm only three account managers in this Province with a locus on knowledge-based 
businesses. Entrepreneurs in K1313s are well advised to ensure their proposals garner 
the attention of these specialists. 
7.3.3 Implications for Policy 
Considering the importance of knowledge-basal businesses to the economy, 
findings from this study also have important implications lbr the development of public 
policy. As indicated previously, knowledge-based businesses are especially important 
to peripheral regions and areas with marginal economies, such as Newfoundland and 
Labrador, since they offer the potential to overcome many of the barriers to entry and 
competitive disadvantages faced by traditional businesses. Nonetheless, it is apparent 
from the findings of this study that access to financing, especially operating capital 
lrom chartered banks, presents a major challenge to KUBs, particularly at the start-up 
stage. Since the Province is not in the mainstream of economic activity, it is unlikely to 
see the chartered banks respond by establishing specialized lending centres as they 
have in other locations where there are significant clusters or K1113s. Thus, alternative 
approaches are needed. Government should continue to encourage the chartered banks 
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to extend cfTorts to provide the specialized expertise needed to deal with financing 
applications Ilom knowledge-based businesses. Initiatives need not be as grandiose as 
establishing dedicated lending centres. They could consist of merely providing 
specialized training to a fl' v select account managers. I Iowcvcr, at a inininium, the 
objective should be to ensure specialized expertise is available in the Province to meet 
the needs of KBBs. 
Second, government should also take steps to ensure the availability ol'similar 
requisite expertise aincºfb account managers in the vuriuus agencies that provide 
assistance to knowledge-based businesses. While there is some limited specialization 
and locus on K1313s in government agencies, only one provides specialized training to 
account managers to support their dealings with knowledge-based businesses. 
Finally, government should identify and address supply-side financing gaps to 
support the start-up of knowledge-based businesses. Such efforts should not be limited 
to the direct provision of financing but should include ways of supporting and 
encouraging the flow of private capital to this critical sector of the economy. 
Guarantee mechanisms4, such as the Canada Small Business Financing Program 
(formerly the Small Business Loans Act) in Canada, have been shown to be an 
effective mcans of supporting the start-up, growth and survival orncw and risky 
ventures (Riding and I laines, 2001) and should be continued. 
7.4 Future Research 
As an exploratory study, it is not surprising that this thesis raises numerous 
questions in the process of providing answers to others. Some of these represent new 
' Under the terms of the Canada Small Business Financing Program, the federal government guarantees 
85% of term loans by designated financial institutions to small firms to n maximum of $250,000. 
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but related opportunities for inquiry. Others represent issues addressed in thi§ thesis 
but requiring further study, largely as a result of limitations identilicd previously. It is 
this latter area that is the focus of the following discussion of future research. As a 
result, these suggestions are designed primarily to enhance the present study or to 
provide confirmation ol'its lindiiºgs. 
(liven the low response rate to the mail survey, replicating the study, especially 
in other peripheral regions, could not only provide confirmation ol'tinelings but also 
enhance generalivability. Also, it would be most useful to COI1clLICt sonic Iolluw-ul) 
interviews or possibly case studies to explore financing issues and perceptions in 
greater depth. For example, the question of the potential impact of perceived outcome 
on amount of financing requested, mentioned previously, would be an ideal issue to 
explore further in an interview with entrepreneurs. Including some non-starts and some 
cases where firms have ceased operations also would be useful but ollen impractical, 
given the difficulties ofcontacting the principals involved and of obtaining their co- 
operation. 
Replication of the supply-side of the study is also necessary to confirm findings 
and address gencralizability. It is especially important to conduct the business plan 
experiments with a larger group of specialist account managers, since liiulings I- 
i, = 
concerning this group are critical to establishing whether or not consensus and a 
lending culture exist in the context of knowledge-based businesses. Including more 
KI3B specialists From chartered batiks would be particularly helpful, since only two 
participated in the present study. 
A final suggestion concerns methodology. In this study, the risk assessment 
criteria, or elements of the lending domain, were drawn from the literature. Ideally, 
the cultural domain should be defined by the study participants. Doing so ensures the 
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dimensions reflect the experience and reality of account managers. Respondents were 
given the opportunity to add to the list of variables, however, lbw chose to do so. Thus, 
it is unlikely that there are critical omissions. Nonetheless, utilizing an approach, such 
as the Free List technique', to elicit risk assessment criteria From account managers 
would strengthen this aspect of the study. 
7.5 Conclusion 
A major goal of this research has been to increase our understanding of lending 
to knowledge-based businesses. Given the lack of a theoretical framework, an 
exploratory research approach was utilized to examine the supply-side perspectives of 
lending institutions and the demand-side perspectives of entrepreneurs. The study 
employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, including field 
observations using simultaneous verbal protocols, semi-structured interviews and a 
mail survey. As with any exploratory study, there are limitations but, overall, study 
findings provide important insights into institutional lending and have significant 
implications for theory, management practice and public policy. however, these 
findings are by no means definitive. The challenge is to continue the research 
undertaken in this study to provide confirmation of results and to increase 
generalizability ot'study findings. 
Small firms have traditionally faced problems accessing financing, especially at 
the start-up stage. It appears those problems may have grown with the shill to a 
knowledge-based economy. Part of the problem is traditional lending models are no 
longer appropriate. At the same time, these new economy firms oller significant 
` According to liorgatti, -me technique basically consists of asking a small sct of respondents (say 30) to 
name (or. ideally, write down) all items matching a given description" (1996b, 1). 
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potential li)r economic development, especially in peripheral locations, such A 
Ncwlbundland and Labrador. To stimulate growth of these knowledge-based 
businesses, it is essential for lending institutions to increase their activity in this sector. 
Research, such as that undertaken in this study, provides the foundation fundamental to 
achieving this goal. 
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Part 1. This section Includes questions about you and your business. 
1. Please briefly describe the primary type of business that you operate. 
2. Please indicate the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) codes for your business In order of importance. 
ii. Check here if you are not aware of the applicable codes. I' 
3. In what year was this business established? 
4. Are you the principal owner of this business? Yes Iý 
your position 
5. Did you start I- or buy l' or inherit F this business? 
6. How long have you been involved in this business? 
No I' (If no, please specify 
and go to question 6) 
7. What is your gender and age? Male r Female r Age: 
8. How many years of previous business experience did 
you have before getting involved in this business? 
9. How many years of previous experience did you have in this type of 
Industry (or related Industry) before getting involved in this business? 
10. Please indicate your educational background at the time of getting involved in this business. 
did not complete high school 
high school graduate 
trade school or college graduate 
university undergraduate degree 
university graduate degree 
professional designation 
r 
r 
r 
F (specify: ) 
11. Please indicate the ownership structure of this company. 
corporation r (year incorporated ) 
partnership r 
proprietorship h 
other 1ý (specify: 
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12. What is the postal code in your business address? 
1" 
13. How many people did you employ during your last fiscal year and during your first fiscal 
year? 
Last Year First Year 
full-time people full-time people 
part-time people part-time people 
14. Please indicate the firm's approximate gross sales or revenues for the last fiscal year. 
No revenues F' >$500,000 to $1,000,000 1' 
Less than $250.000 r >$1,000.000 to $5,000,000 F 
$250,000 to $500,000 1" over $5,000,000 1, 
15. Please provide the following information for this business for the last fiscal year: 
a. the dollar amount of research & development (R & D) expenditures 
b. research & development expenditures as a percent of gross sales or revenues 
c. the percent of all employees employed in the research & development area 
d. percent of R&D employees with university-level degrees 
e. scientists and engineers as a percent of the total number of employees 
f. percent of all employees with bachelors degrees 
g, percent of all employees with graduate degrees (masters & PhDs) 
h. percent of all employees with post-secondary diplomas 
16. In your opinion how important is each of the following to success in this type of industry? 
1=not Important 5=very Important 
a. research & development activity 1 2 3 4 5 
b. patents obtained 1 2 3 4 5 
c. innovative products and processes 1 2 3 4 5 
d. intangible assets (whether or not they 1 2 3 4 5 
appear on the balance sheet) 
e. highly educated work force 1 2 3 4 5 
f. ability to compete internationally 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Please indicate the extent to which each of the following statements applies to your firm. 
1= does n ot apply 5=applies very well 
a. invests heavily In R&D 1 2 3 4 5 
b. exhibits a high level of Innovation 1 2 3 4 5 
c. depends heavily on human capital 1 2 3 4 5 
d. has the potential to grow rapidly 1 2 3 4 5 
e. has a high proportion of Intangible assets 1 2 3 4 5 
f. success is based primarily on knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 
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Part 11. This section includes questions about your firm's access to financing, in particular 
financing from chartered banks and government departments and agencies. 
18. What was the initial capitalization (the amount of capital 
borrowed and invested, including assets transferred to 
the business) of this business at start-up? 
19. Please indicate the dollar amount or percent of total start-up capital (including assets 
transferred to the business) obtained from each of the following sources: 
$ OR % 
personal sources 
loans from friends and relatives 
investment by friends and relatives 
chartered bank loans 
loans from government departments or agencies 
grants from government departments or agencies 
venture capital 
other private investors 
other (specify: 
20. Have you attempted to access chartered bank financing for this business at any time? 
Yes I' 
No F (if no, please explain why not and then go to question 39) 
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FINANCING FROM CHARTERED BANKS 
PLEASE RESPOND TO QUESTIONS 21-38 ON THE BASIS OF THE FIRST TIME THAT 
YOU ATTEMPTED TO ACCESS BANK FINANCING FOR THIS BUSINESS. 
21. Please indicate the age of this business at the time you 
first attempted to access bank financing for the business. 
22. Please indicate the firm's approximate annual gross sales or revenues at the time you 
first attempted to access bank financing for the business. 
No revenues F >$500.000 to $1,000,000 
Less than $250,000 I' >$1,000,000 to $5,000,000 I$250,000 
to $500,000 I' over $5,000,000 I' 
23. Please indicate the stage of development of this business at the time you first attempted 
to access bank financing for this business. 
idea/startup 1' product/market development l' growth/expansion I' mature/stable I' 
24. How many banks did you contact in the attempt to obtain financing? 
25. Were any of the bank branches and account managers you dealt with located outside 
Newfoundland & Labrador? 
Yes I' (please indicate location 
No r 
F 
f 
L 
F 
k 
F 
ý, 
ý, 
ý, E` ý; 
ý' 
-ý 
., 
F `, 
26. Please indicate the types and amounts of financing requested. 
Amount Amount 
Operating line of credit Iý 
Term financing 1, 
Contract financing f 
Commercial mortgage r 
Export financing I- 
R&D financing r 
SBLA financing r 
Other IT 
(specify: ) 
27. How many banks were willing to provide financing? 
285 
28. In your opinion how important were the following factors to the bank(s) in making Ia 
decision on your application for financing? 
1=not important 5=very important 
a. past relationship with the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
b. market potential 1 2 3 4 5 
c. completed business plan 1 2 3 4 5 
d. type of industry 1 2 3 4 5 
e. collateral/security available 1 2 3 4 5 
f. proven product/service 1 2 3 4 5 
g. other funding available 1 2 3 4 5 
h. stage of development of the business 1 2 3 4 5 
i track record of the entrepreneur 1 2 3 4 5 
j. uniqueness of product/service 1 2 3 4 5 
k. potential cash flow 1 2 3 4 5 
1. management team 1 2 3 4 5 
m. demonstrated market acceptance 1 2 3 4 5 
n. general economic conditions 1 2 3 4 5 
o. other (specify 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. From the previous list, please indicate the two most important factors (insert letters). 
1.2. 
30. Please indicate which statement best describes your first attempt to access bank 
financing. 
Eventually obtained the full amount requested 
Eventually obtained some financing but less than requested I' (% obtained: 
Was not successful at obtaining any bank financing I' (go to question 38) 
31. Please indicate which bank provided financing. 
32. Are you still dealing with this bank? Yes r No 
(if no, please indicate the reason for the change) 
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33. Was the initial bank financing obtained on satisfactory terms? 
Yes I- 
No F (if no, please indicate in what way the terms were not satisfactory) 
i 
34. Was the business required to provide collateral as security? 
Yes I' (if yes, please specify the security 
No t' 
35. Were you required to provide a personal guarantee? Yes I' No I' 
36. Was any other family member required to provide a personal guarantee? 
Yes F (please specify relation 
No F 
37. Please indicate how difficult it was for your firm to obtain bank financing. 
1=very difficult 5=very easy 
12345 
38. If you were turned down by a bank(s) or received less than requested, please indicate the 
reason(s) given by the bank, as well as what you perceive were the real reasons. Check 
only those that are applicable. 
Insufficient collateral/security 
No guarantor 
Insufficient cash flow 
Insufficient income or revenue 
Business too risky 
Poor credit history 
Limited management expertise 
Bank rules/requirements overly strict 
Account manager didn't understand my business 
Not willing to lend to this type of business 
Don't know/can't recall 
Other (specify: 
No reason given 
reason(s) given 
by the bank(s) 
1' 
1' 
r 
1' 
1' 
r 
your perception 
of real reasons 
1, 
1, 
I' 
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FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
AND AGENCIES 
39. Please indicate which of the following organizations you have approached for financing. 
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) F 
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) I' 
(formerly Federal Business Development Bank - FBDB) 
Department of Development and Rural Renewal (DDRR) I' 
(or the former Enterprise Newfoundland & Labrador - ENL) 
Department of Industry, Trade & Technology (DITT) I' 
Industry Canada I' 
National Research Council (NRC) 
Other (specify )1 
If you did not seek funding from any of these organizations, please indicate why not and then 
please go to question 53. 
PLEASE RESPOND TO QUESTIONS 40-52 ON THE BASIS OF THE FIRST TIME THAT 
YOU ATTEMPTED TO ACCESS FINANCING FROM ANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS. 
40. Please indicate the age of this business at the time you first 
attempted to access financing from any of these organizations. 
41. Please indicate the stage of development of this business at the time you first attempted 
to access financing from any of these organizations. 
idea/startup F product/market development 17 growth/expansion F mature/stable F 
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42. Please indicate the firm's approximate annual gross sales or revenues at the timr~ you 
first attempted to access financing from any of these organizations. 
No revenues F >$500,000 to $1,000,000 I, 
Less than $250,000 1' >$1,000,000 to $5,000,000 I' 
$250,000 to $500,000 I' over $5,000,000 
43. Please indicate the types and amounts of financing requested. 
Amount 
Operating line of credit I' 
Term financing l' 
Contract financing t' 
Commercial mortgage I, 
Amount 
Export financing 
R&D financing F 
SBLA financing L' 
Other I" 
(specify: 
44. For those organizations contacted, please indicate which statement best describes your 
attempt to access funding. 
received full received did not 
funding partial receive 
requested funding funding 
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
Business Development Bank of Canada 
(formerly FBDB) 
Department of Development and Rural Renewal 
(or the former ENL) 
Department of Industry, Trade & Technology 
Industry Canada 
National Research Council 
Other (specify ) 
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I' I' I' 
r 
I" 
1' 
r 
I' 
I' 
r 
F 
I' 
`; 
45. In your opinion how important were the following factors to the above organizations in 
making a decision on your application for financing? 
I=not important 5=very important 
a. past relationship with the organization 
b. market potential 
c. completed business plan 
d. type of industry 
e. collateral/security available 
f. proven product/service 
g. other funding available 
h. stage of development of the business 
i. track record of the entrepreneur 
j. uniqueness of product/service 
k. potential cash flow 
1. management team 
m. demonstrated market acceptance 
n. general economic conditions 
o. other (specify 
-, 
e 
Eý 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
46. From the previous list, please indicate the two most important factors (insert letters). 
1.2. 
If you did not receive funding from any of these organizations, please go to question 52. 
° 47. Were you able to obtain the funding on satisfactory terms? 
Yes1 
No 1' (if no, please indicate in what way the terms were not satisfactory) 
48. Was the business required to provide collateral as security for any funding received? 
Yes I- (if yes, please specify the security ) 
No Iý 
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49. Were you required to provide a personal guarantee to any of these organizations? 
Yes 1' No 1' 
50. Was any other family member required to provide a personal guarantee? 
Yes I' (please specify relation 
No l' 
51. Please indicate how difficult it was for your firm to obtain financing from these 
organizations. 
1=very difficult 5=very easy 
12345 
52. If you were turned down by any of these organizations or received less than requested, 
please indicate the reason(s) given, as well as what you perceive were the real reasons. 
Check only those that are applicable. 
reasons given your perception 
by organization(s) of real reasons 
Insufficient collateral/security 
No guarantor 
Insufficient cash flow 
Insufficient income or revenue 1' I' 
Business too risky FF 
Poor credit history I' I, 
Limited management expertise 1' 1' 
Government rules/requirements overly strict I' 1' 
Account manager didn't understand my business I' F 
Not willing to lend to this type of business I' 
Don't know/can't recall l' I, 
Other (specify: ) I' 1' 
No reason given 1' 
53. Do you have any suggestions that would improve access to financing for small and 
medium-sized firms in your industry? 
i '" 
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Additional comments: 
OPTIONAL RESPONSE 
Your Name: 
Company: 
Address: 
Telephone: 
In order to explore issues in greater detail, a small number of respondents will be selected for a 
follow up interview. If you are willing to spend one hour in an Interview at your place of 
business, please check here. r 
If you would like to receive a summary of the results of this survey, please check here. C 
Thank you for your time and assistance! 
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Please return to: 
Gary Gorman, Associate Professor 
Faculty of Business Administration 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
St. John's, NF AI B 3X5 
Phone: 709-737-3311 
Fax: 709-737-7680 
E-mail: guormin ci morgan, ucs. mun, ca 
ý. ý . 
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PROTOCOL FOR PILOT TEST OF MAIL SURVEY 
ýS= 
. 
Was the purpose of tlic study clear? 
2. Were the instructions clear? 
3. Were any 0l'the questions dill icult to understand? 
4. Was any of the information difficult to obtain or recall? 
5. Did you have any difficulty with the explanation of initial capitalization (Q. 19)? 
G. Lit the statics of business development (Q. 24 & 42) appear reasonable und 
sufficient fier you to dif7crcntiatc among them? 
7. Were you familiar with the acronym (S13LA) used in Q. 27 & 44? 
H. Were there any other terms that were difficult to understand? 
9. I)icl the 5-point rating scales provide sufficient variation lur your responses? 
10.1 low long did it take to complete (lie survey? 
1 1. Diel you have any other concerns or problems with the survey? 
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February 15,1999 
«Contact_Name», «Position» 
((Address k 
((Address _2)> «City)), NF «I'ostal_Codc» 
Dear ((Contact Name»: 
Survey of the Financing Experiences of Firms in Newfoundland and Labrador 
Many entrepreneurs face problems in obtaining adequate financing for their firms. The 
enclosed questionnaire, which will take approximately twenty minutes to complete, is 
designed to record your own experiences with financing your firm. It will provide 
valuable information to further our understanding of how firms are financed. It also 
will enable government departments and lending agencies to target their assistance 
more effectively to firms with special finance needs. 
The survey is part of a larger research project on Lending to the Knowledge-Based 
Sector in the Province and is part of my doctoral studies. Financial support for this 
research is being provided by the Centre for International Business Studies and the 
Canada/Newfoundland Agreement on Economic Renewal. In addition, the Department 
of Development and Rural Renewal and the Department of Industry, Trade and 
Technology are providing collaborative support. 
Special Instructions 
The questionnaire should be completed by the principal owner of the business or 
alternatively, by the senior financial manager. If you own or operate more than one 
business, please respond on the basis of the company to which this survey is addressed. 
]'lease return the questionnaire in the postage paid envelope provided. 
Confidentiality 
Inlbrmation provided by you will be held in strictest confidence. Data will be 
combined and reported for all respondents such that individual responses cannot be 
identified. The survey is coded to permit tracking and follow tip. 
If you have any questions please contact inc by phone (collect) at 709-737-3311 or by 
c-mail at ggorman a morgan. ucs. mun. ca. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Gary Gorman 
Associate 1'rol'cssor 
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March 10,1999 
«Contact_Nainc», «Position» 
«Company» 
((Address-1» 
((Address-2)) 
«('ity», NF ((Postal_Codc)) 
I)car «Contact Namc»: 
You may recall recently receiving a Survey of (lie Financing Experlences of Small 
and Medium-Sized Firms in Newfoundland and Labrador. Your input is essential 
tu understanding the needs ol'small and medium-sized firms in the Province. As cº 
result, I would like to encourage you to complete and return the survey if you have not 
clone so already. 
The survey is part or a larger research project on Lending to the Knowledge-Based 
Sector in the Province and is part of my doctoral studies. The results of this research, 
which will be shared with government, will provide valuable information to support the 
establishment and growth of the small firm sector in the Province. A summary of the 
results of this survey is also available to participants. 
Ifyou have already returned the survey, I would like to thank you again for your 
assistance. If you require another copy of the survey or if you have any questions about 
my research, please contact me by phone (collect) at 709-737-3311 or by e-mail at 
ggorman u morgan. ucs. mun. ca. 
I urge you to participate in this study and I look forward to receiving your completed 
survey in the near future. 
Thank you For your assistance. 
Sinc: crcly, 
Gary Gorman 
Associate Professor 
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April 2,1999 
«Contact_Namc», «Position» 
Coitthany» 
((Address I)> 
Address-2» 
«C'ity», NF «I'ostal_Code» 
Dear ((Contact-Name)>: 
I would like to extend another invitation to you to participate in the research project on 
the Financing Experiences or small and medium-Sized Firms In Newfor ndburrl 
and Labrador. You may recall receiving tlie survey in the mail and an earlier letter 
requesting your participation. You may have felt the survey did not apply to your 
business because the business is too small. The primary purpose of the research is to 
learn about your financing experiences. If your business has ever obtained financing 
from a bank or government agency, I'd like to hear about that experience. The size or 
nature of the business is not important. In fact, it's essential to hear from a mix of 
firms. 
Your input is important to this project and to understanding the needs of small and 
medium-sized firms in the Province. As a result, i would like to cticourage you to 
complete and return the survey if you have not done so already. 1'leasc be assured that 
the information will be held in strictest confidence. 
if you have already returned the survey, I would like to thank you again 11or your 
assistance. If you, require another copy of the survey or if you have any questions about 
my research, please contact me by phone (collect) at 709-737-3311 or by e-mail at 
ggorman@morgan. ucs. mun. ca. 
I urge you to participate in this study and I look forward to receiving your completed 
survey in the near future. 
Thank you (or your assistance. 
Sinccrcly, 
Gary Gorman 
Associate Professor 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR 
SENIOR BANK AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
The primary purpose of the present study is to further our understanding of the 
debt financing requirements of knowledge-based small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and the processes employed by lending institutions in meeting these needs. To 
achieve this, it is necessary to determine the financing experiences of knowledge-based 
SMEs, and to examine the risk assessment approaches utilized by the banks and 
government agencies when assessing applications For Iinancing Ilona firms in 
knowledge-based industries. 
More specilically, this study is intended to achieve the following research 
objectives: 
i. to investigate the experiences of entrepreneurs in knowledge-based liri»s 
who have sought financing from chartered banks and government 
agencies; 
ii. to facilitate understanding or tim process of lending to knowledge-based 
businesses in Ncwtoundla nd and Labrador; 
iii. to identify and compare the present practices of government departments 
and agencies with respect to risk assessment of knowledge-basal firms; 
iv. to identify and compare the present practices of Canadian chartered 
banks with respect to risk assessment of knowledge-basal firms; and 
v. to compare the lending processes and criteria utilized when lending to 
high knowledge-intensive firms to those used in lending to less 
knowledge-intensive businesses. 
To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to collect information from three key 
sources, namely entrepreneurs, senior ollicials in the chartered banks and government 
agencies, and account managers in lending institutions. Input from entrepreneurs is 
required to determine financing experiences and to compare those of high knowledge 
firms to those in less knowledge-intensive businesses. Senior banking and 
government officials provide the content for overall institutional policy and 
commitment to the SME sector, including knowledge-based firms. Finally, account 
managers serve as the primary data source for examining credit decision-making 
hroccsses and for determining criteria used to evaluate lending applications. 
The following questions are directed primarily to senior banking and 
government officials and deal with aspects of the institutional framework, including iü 
strategies, structures, systems, policies and procedures for lending to knowledge-based 
firms. 
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1. Does your organization use a definition of knowledge-based business (KI3l3) or 
knowledge-based industry (KBI)? If yes, what is it? 
2. Does your organization's mandate include a component specifically designed to 
address the needs of knowledge-based SMEs? (obtain a copy of organization's 
mission or mandate statement) 
3. If yes to 112, how is this aspect of the mandate communicatecl within and outside the 
organir1tion? (i. e. bank-wide policies and initiatives, published brochures, 
pamphlets, and information circulars) 
4. Does your orgaºiization target spccilic kºiowlcclgc-basal sectors or KI3Is7 II'ycs, 
which sectors'? 
5. Does your organization oller products/services targeted specifically to K1313s7 If 
yes, what are these products/services and how do they differ from conventional 
operating loans, term loans, and government guaranteed loans? 
6. Does your organization have specific goals or objectives For the kimwledgc-Lased 
sector? (target for risk exposure, profitability and revenue growth) 
7. To what extent are account managers or business development officers and/or 
others in the organization encouraged to attract K13I3s? 
8. I low is the organization structured to deal with Ki3[3s? (types and configuration of 
branches and outlets, specialized lending units, management structure, 
partnerships/collaborations with outside organizations) 
9. To what extent do these structures differ from those in place to deal with traditional 
SM Es? 
10. Do you have account managers who specialize in, or locus on, KU[3s'? 
1 1. What are the recruitment strategies used for account managers who deal with KL3Us 
and how do they differ From those used to recruit traditional account Hinnagers? 
(sources, background of account managers - experience, education, training) 
12. Do account managers who deal with K[3I3s have special training? IC yes, please 
describe the training and how it is provided. 
13. To what extent are there differences between the systems, policies and procedures 
for dealing with K[313s and those for dealing with traditional SMI3s? (loall 
evaluation, decision making) 
14. Are account managers who deal with KU13s provided with any additional support? 
If yes, what type? (internal and/or external) 
15. Are there differences in the lending limits of account managers who deal with 
KBBs and those who deal with more traditional SMEs? 
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16. Are account managers who deal with KBBs required or encouraged to consult more 
widely than traditional account managers? 
I` 
17.1 low would you describe your organization's experience with Kils? (risk/return 
profile, share of business in the region, experience with loan losses, attractiveness 
of the business) 
18. Do you have any other comments or observations? 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This business plan demonstrates the feasibility of harvesting and processing glacier ice 
to produce specialty products, such as ice blocks, cubes and crushed ice for ultimate 
sale to industrial, institutional and retail consumers. There are it number of distinct 
qualities that allow glacier ice to be presented as a specialty product. 'I'hcse include the 
age of the product, its appearance, and the overall purity of the water obtained from 
glacier ice. The results or n quality analysis of glacier ice samples indicate an extremely 
high quality product when compared to standard drinking water. To date, a number of 
firms have capitalized on the harvesting and processing of glacier ice to produce and 
distribute bottled water and other iceberg-based beverages. However, none are 
presently producing ice products as proposed by Glacier Ice Incorporated. 
'fhc ice processing industry in North America is in a relatively mature stage. Product 
development and innovation have been slow-paced because of the nature or the product 
and the stability of customer requirements. However, one new trend in the industry is 
the production of, higher quality ice using filtered water. This correlates to the growth 
trend in the bottled water industry and consumer demand for high quality, natural 
water. The production and sale of products processed from glacier ice fit well with 
these trends. 
The business, Glacier Ice Incorporated, has two owners who will act as directors and be 
involved in the management of the business. The combination of their educational 
background and their technical, entrepreneurial and management experience provide 
key ingredients to the company's success. The owners have also made provision For 
other key management and administrative personnel and for a Board of Directors 
comprised of individuals with a balance of professional, technical and business 
acum ten. 
The owners have completed research on the market potential, customer demand, 
barriers to entry, competition, and viable distribution options for this initiative. Results 
of this assessment indicate a venture with significant growth and profit potential. 
Discussions with a limited number of ice distributors in Florida and Toronto indicate a 
high level of interest in Glacier's products and confirm the market potential. Sales 
requirements of distributors in these two locations alone exceed the company's current 
projected production volume. To date, Glacier has signed orders for 15% of projected 
first year revenues. Glacier will focus on established ice distributors in these two 
locations as the initial customer base for glacier ice products. Longer term potential 
exists for geographic market expansion, for direct distribution to end-use customers 
under the Company's own brand name, for sale of glacier ice to bottled water 
companies and for exports to the United Kingdom, Europe and South America. 
In order to launch this venture and capitalize on demonstrated market potcntial and 
customer acceptance, the owners require term financing at startup of $200,000, 
additional term financing of $100,000 in each of the second and third years of 
operation, and an operating line of credit of $1, O00,000. Operating credit requirements 
are significantly reduced in the second and third years. 
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1. TIIC BUSINESS 
Dcscrihtion 
Glacier ice is a new specialty product that will be entered into the established ice 
supply industry in North America. This industry involves the processing and 
distribution of ice products (blocks, cubes, crushed) and sales to industrial, institutional, 
and retail markets. Producers in the industry also tend to control the distribution 
channels for their products. 
To a degree, the industry operates on a seasonal cycle where demand fluctuates with 
temperature and consumer social activities. Regional climates also define geographic 
markets for the ice supply industry. The southern states of the U. S. provide a year 
round market for ice products. 
The ice processing industry is in a relatively mature stage where most producers have 
been in operation for many years. Product development and innovation are slow-paced 
because of the nature of the product and the stability of the customer requirements. Ice 
companies tend to focus on more efficient production technology in efforts to reduce 
freezing and packaging costs. One new trend in the industry, however, is the 
production of higher quality ice using filtered water. This correlates to the growth 
trend in the bottled water industry and consumer demand for high quality, natural 
water. 
Product 
Glacier ice is Formed in northern climates where the winter snowfalls exceed the 
summer melting. As the snow accumulates over thousands of years, it is compacted by 
its own weight and Forms a very dense sheet of ice. The ice is formed by snow and is 
therclbre freshwater ice. In the formation, air bubbles are trapped in the ice and this 
accounts for the glistening sparkle and gentle fizz when the ice melts in a drink. 
The primary source of glacier ice along the Labrador Coast is Greenland which 
produces approximately 10,000 icebergs each year From over two dozen glaciers. 
Greenland's ice sheet measures 1.7 million square kilometers and over the past 10,000 
years it has accumulated to a thickness of up to three kilometers. 
Ice sheets, which are in perpetual motion towards the sea, move under their own 
massive weight. At the glacier/occan interface there are various forces at work that 
cause huge chunks of the ice to break off and discharge into the sea. These forces 
include gravity, tides, sunlight, winds and waves. 
h lie southern route traveled by icebergs that originate in Greenland is ollen indirect. 
Currents are the primary force driving icebergs due to the seven-eighths of its mass 
located below water. As a result, icebergs tend to follow the West Greenland current to 
the top of Baffin Bay and then follow the Arctic Ocean currents southwest until they it 
the Labrador Current. It is the Labrador Current that carries the bergs along the coast 
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of Labrador to their final demise in the warmer Atlantic waters. A journey of two to 
three years is typical. 
There are a number of distinct qualities that allow glacier ice to be presented as a 
specialty product. These include the age of the product, its sparkling appearance. the 
fizzing sound as it melts and the overall purity of the water. It is this last feature that 
represents the greatest potential marketing appeal. The glacier ice was formed when 
the earth was Uncontaminated by pollution and industrial chemicals. Since that time it 
has been trapped in a purified state. Appendix A provides a quality analysis of glacier 
ice samples. The results of the test indicate an extremely high quality product when 
compared to permissible contaminant levels in standard drinking water. A bacterial 
analysis of the ice also revealed no contaminants. 
1I au ages nent 
An important aspect in the success of this venture is the background and expertise of 
the owners. It is envisaged that two key positions related to the project, plant manager 
and general foreman, will be performed by William Brewer and Paul Williams. 
Mr. Brewer has an MBA degree from Memorial University of Newfoundland and 
significant management experience in the fishing industry, having worked as a lisle 
plant manager and as a marketing manager with Fishery Products International. Mr. 
Williams has had broad experience as an owner/operator and foreman in various 
industries including long-liner building, highway construction and fur farming. Both 
have excellent credit ratings and proven histories of debt repayment having borrowed 
significant amounts in the past for personal and business purposes. 
The combination of their educational backgrounds, technical, entrepreneurial and 
management experience provide key ingredients to the company's success. 'I'lhcy have 
also made provision for other key management, technical and administrative personnel 
and for a Board of Directors comprised of individuals with a balance of professional 
and business acumen. 
Since the company was formcd in May 2000, the shareholders have been working 
jointly on the development aspects of the venture. Considerable elThrt has gone into 
the design and costing of the harvesting and processing operations. A feasible 
operating plan has now been developed. Company members have also been working 
on securing processing facilities, identifying any regulatory obstacles, assessing market 
Potential, developing a marketing plan and obtaining initial orders. 
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11. TIIC MARKET 
Potential Customers 
4. 
In general terms, the end use customers for ice products include hotels, restaurants, 
catering services, nightclubs, convenience stores and service stations. These customers 
purchase their products through a wholesale distribution network. Typically, the 
distributors are also involved in the production of ice products. 
For the purpose of the market assessnmctit, this business plan focuses on established ice 
distributors as the initial customer base for glacier ice. Market research identified the 
following potential North American distributors/customers: 
" Crystal Ice Company, Scarborough, Ontario 
" Lake Sinncoe Ice, Islington, Ontario 
" Kanemotsu - Gosho Canada Inc., Mississauga, Ontario 
" Ice Enterprises, Orlando, Florida 
" Aardvark Ice and Beverages, Orlando, Florida 
" Reddy Ice/Sparkle Ice, Davis, Florida 
" Royal Palm City Ice, Hollywood, Florida 
" Apolo Ice Company, Miami, Florida 
" Independent Ice, 'T'ampa, Florida 
" Century Ice, Clearwater, Florida 
" Ancient Ice & Beverage Company, Des Plaines, Illinois 
" Consiglio Communications Ltd., Montreal, Quebec 
Discussions with a number of ice producers/distributors in Toronto and Florida indicate 
a high level of interest in glacier ice and demonstrate its market potential. These 
distributors have established access to hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, convenience 
stores, service stations, grocery store chains and thence parks. Sales requirements of 
distributors in these two locations alone exceed the company's current projected 
production volume. To date, Glacier has confirmed orders from distributors for 15% of 
first-year projected sales. 
Market Size and Potential 
The size of the commercial and retail ice market in North America is extremely large, 
as supported by the sales figures obtained for some of the companies noted above. 
Although a specific figure for the size of the market could not be obtained, the total for 
five of the companies gives a good basis for approximation (sec Table 1). 
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Finally, the major barriers affecting "me too" operations and entry into this i«tdustry are 
access to physical and financial resources. As a result, the most significant potential 
competitor for Glacier Ice is Iceberg Industries which markets n number of iceberg- 
based products including water, vodka and beer. However, Iceberg Industries does not 
presently market ice products. Indeed, there may be some potential to sell raw material 
to Iceberg Industries. With the uncertainty of the market, it is not possible to gauge 
how many companies can operate successfully in the harvesting and distribution of ice 
products, particularly cubes, blocks and crushed ice. Ilowever, first-mover advantage 
should provide Glacier with the opportunity to enter and dominate the market before 
any other competitors enter. 
Estimated Market Share and Sales 
The estimates prepared on the ice supply market in North America are useful in 
demonstrating the potential for this project. Also, the assumption that glacier ice will 
acquire market share from commercially produced ice is logical. The problem is that 
estimating market share is not feasible without a detailed market plan and test market 
results. For the sales estimates to be used in the balance of this proposal, it is more 
realistic to look at specific production levels and assume that sales agreements can be 
obtained for the company's output. Preliminary discussions with distributors support 
this assumption. 
As a starting point, the owners have identified a first year production level of 2.5 
million pounds. This output can be doubled in the second year with the addition of a 
second shift in the plant. Expansion of processing facilities and the hiring of additional 
staff could easily double production again in the third year. Based on these 
assumptions the production/sales schedule for the first three years of operation is as 
follows: 
2001 2002 2003 
Sales/Production (lbs. ) 2,500,000 5,000,000 10,000,000 
Future Market Potential and Growth Opportunities 
Initial efforts carried out for this project have been directed primarily at assessing the 
market potential for the sale of glacier ice products to North American ice distributors, 
especially those located in Toronto and Florida. In terms of future growth, there are no 
obvious impediments from the production side. There is an unlimited supply of raw 
product and sufficient labour resources in the region for harvesting and processing 
expansion. Future marketing plans include a detailed market assessment in the 
following additional areas: 
1. I)evelopment of regional markets for glacier ice. 
2. Direct distribution to end-usc customers under the Company's own brand name. 
3. Sales of glacier ice to bottled water companies. 
4. Exports to the United Kingdom, Europe and South America. 
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111. MARKETING STRATEGY 
Target Market 
;; 
The initial marketing strategy being pursued by the company is to secure distribution 
agreements for the first three year's production with established ice distributors. This 
approach will allow the owners time to establish the physical operation and develop 
expertise in the harvesting and processing of glacier ice. As an entry strategy, the 
company will offer chipped and block ice to one or two major distributors serving 
specific regions. In the second year, the company plans to increase production with the 
addition of a second shift. It is also planned to offer ice cubes through the installation 
of*specialized cutting equipment. 
Direct sales and marketing of the glacier ice products to cud users will be under the 
control of the companies awarded distribution rights. Sales commitments for the 
company's production will also provide financial stability For the project and strengthen 
investor confidence. This is an important factor in light of anticipated operating costs 
and the need to secure an operating line of credit. 
Promotion 
In promoting glacier ice the company will focus on two areas. The first will be to 
develop a specific image that captures and highlights the quality of the product. This 
will be accomplished through a distinctive name, colourful packaging and promotional 
literature. The objective is to have glacier ice promoted as a repeat purchase product 
and not just as a novelty. This will require an emphasis on the quality and purity of the 
product. 
The second aspect to be emphasized in the promotion is to heighten awareness of the 
product and company. This will be accomplished through media publicity, attendance 
at trade shows, supplying samples and information to potential distributors and the 
utilization of trade commission services in foreign markets. 
A targeted advertising campaign focusing on potential end-users will support direct- 
marketing efforts to distributors. This campaign will include the use of television. 
magazine and radio. Targeted programs, timeslots, and publications will ensure 
effective reach to the various target groups. Glacier has enlisted the services of a major 
advertising agency to assist in this regard. 
Based on discussions, it is anticipated that the distributors of glacier ice will support the 
regional and local promotion of the product. This would include local advertising, 
introductory specials, and a communication program to educate their customers on the 
product's qualities. Where possible the company will utilize resources and financial 
support of both levels of government to For the promotional requirements of this 
project. 
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Distribution 
f 
A 
The major sales effort for this project will be during the negotiation of initial 
distribution agreements. It is vital that the company establish a solid distribution base. 
In evaluating potential distributors and negotiating a distribution contract it is important 
that the following points be considered: 
F ý. 
6L° , 
" Distributors must have the resources to effectively promote glacier ice. 
" The volume of purchases by distributors must be large enough to minimize 
freight costs and also motivate promotion of the product. 
" The distributor's client network should be broad so that glacier ice can be 
evaluated in different market segments. 
" The growth potential of each distributor must be assessed. 
" Terris of agreement should allow lbr price reviews on the basis of production 
costs and market conditions. 
" Geographic areas of distribution should be specified for each distributor. 
"A termination clause should be included to deal with the situation of a 
distributor not fulfilling its obligations. 
" Shipping arrangements must be clearly specified for each distributor. 
Pricing 
A tentative price of $0.70/lb. has been assigned to the first year production and sales of 
glacier ice. This price is F. O. B. the processing facilities in Plum Point and is 
considered to be competitive by a sample of distributors surveyed. During negotiations 
for distribution agreements, however, this price will have to be reassessed based on the 
actual ice product (i. e. chips, block) sold and the associated production costs. 
Renegotiations and adjustments of prices in future years will be required to compensate 
for production costs and new competitors. 
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Iarvesting : uºº1 Processing Operations 
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The first stage in the overall operation is the harvesting of iceberg bits from coastal 
waters and stockpiling in an impound area close to the plant. This process will be 
accomplished through a charter arrangement with local lishcrpersons. Two charter 
boats will operate over a ten-week period to collect bits, growlers and small bergs and 
transport the product to a holding area. A holding boom will ensure that the iceberg 
bits remain in the designated area until the product is transported to (lie plant at Plum 
Point. Sufficient product will be stockpiled during this period to meet the season's 
production quota. Expansion of production capacity in future years will necessitate an 
increase in the number of charter vessels supplying glacier ice fragments. 
The next step in the harvesting process will involve the transport of the iceberg bits 
from the holding area to the plant, a distance of approximately 10 kilometers. Two 
barges, which will be purchased in the United States and customized locally, will relay 
the glacier ice to the plant (sec Appendix 13). The, barges will be capable of either 
carrying or towing the ice. Local crews will be hired to operate these vessels. 
As the glacier ice chunks arc delivered to the wharf at the processing site it is necessary 
to remove them from the water. This step will be accomplished through the use of a 
floating slipway and powered winch assembly. The ice will be pulled up to the slipway 
onto the dock (sec Appendix C). 
The ice chunks will then be cut into blocks measuring 2 ft. x2 ft. x2R. and weighing 
approximately 500 lbs. Workers will cut these blocks manually with powered ice sews. 
Each block will then be lined by a forklift onto a holding table in the plant. The blocks 
will then be put through a cleaning process using a high-pressure steam cleaner. Aller 
cleaning, the blocks will be fed by conveyor into a rotary crusher that will create ice 
chips in a size range of'/2 to 2 inches. These ice chips will then be packaged in 20 Ili. 
capacity plastic-lined boxes and transported by conveyor and forklift to the cold storage 
area in the plant. Monitoring for quality control and proper package weight will be an 
integral part of the process. 
The plant arrangement will be a dual line with two conveyors and two crushers. This 
allows for equipment downtime and scheduled maintenance requirements. The 
crushing equipment will be selected on the basis of future production requirements. 
Based on Year 3 production forecast of 10 million pounds and an operating season of 
2,400 hours (6 days x 20 weeks x 20 hours), the units will have a throughput of 2 
tons/hour. 
Production flan 
The basic strategy being followed by the company is to begin operations in the spring 
of 2001 and setup the plant to provide both ice chips and ice blocks. Processing 
facilities will be sized to handle the production volume of 10 million lbs. per year 
through one crusher assembly. The peak capacity for the plant will be twice this 
volume when operating both processing lines. Increases in output can be handled 
easily through the hiring of additional crews and the establishment of a second shill. 
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The simplicity of the production facilities allows easy expansion should future sales 
warrant. 
The development of a cubed product (1'/2"x l'/2"xI Vi") will be under evaluation during 
the first two years. The equipment design to produce this product is complete but the 
market requirements must first be assessed. If there is a demand for glacier ice cubes, 
the specialized cutting equipment will be fabricated and installed in either the second or 
third operating season. 
'I-lie lbllowing is a list of production assumptions underlying the venture's first three 
years of operation: 
" Production season 
"( )hcrating days 
"I larvcst volumes (lbs. ) 
" Final yield 
" Production Output (lbs. ) 
0 Ice chips 
" Ice blocks 
Regulatory Issues 
20 weeks (late May to early October) 
120 clays 
10 million Year 1 
20 million Year 2 
40 million Year 3 
25% 
2.5 million Year 1 
5 million Year 2 
10 million Year 3 
, /2 
- 
2" 
20 lbs. /bag 
2 11. x 211. x 211. 
500 lbs. /block 
The company is not confronted with any major regulatory concerns in the production or 
distribution of their product. Compliance with F1)A regulation for exports into the 
United States does not appear to be a problem. The International Trade Centre of 
Industry Canada in St. John's has confirmed through conversations with Canadian 
Consulate officials in the US and with Ottawa-basal trade officials of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade that the only requirement will be for Glacier 
Ice to prove that there are no contaminants in the ice. The quality analysis attests to 
this fact. 
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V. FINANCIAL 1'LAN 
I" -- 
A financial review of the venture was completed on the basis of the sales projections, 
production volumes, cost estimates, and pricing information identified in this report. 
The emphasis is on demonstrating the financial viability of the business through a profit 
and loss evaluation over the first three years. A cash flow analysis has also been 
completed to show the necessary operating financing and time to reach positive cash 
Ilene. The detailed financial statements are presented in Appendix I). 
Profil and Loss Analysis 
The results From the preparation of the pro forma profit and loss statements for the 
venture indicate that the company can be profitable under the given assumptions. A 
profit ofapproximately $10,000 is projected for the first year of the venture. ICI years 2 
and 3, the company's profitability increases significantly resulting in aller tax profits of 
$429,764 and $1,809,716 respectively. 
lt should be noted the assumptions for interest expense and taxes are based on a full 
cost scenario. The project may be eligible for linancial assistance that could reduce the 
borrowing requirements and therefore reduce interest costs. Also, there may be 
additional tax concessions that could reduce the tax liability. 
Any variation in either the sales price or sales volume will have a direct impact on the 
profitability of the venture. There is the potential to reduce production volume if sales 
are not obtained but it should be realized that some of the costs are fixed and because of 
the short season it may be necessary to stockpile product. 
Cash Flow Analysis 
The project's cash Flow was evaluated for the first year of operation. it was assumed 
that the project would start in April and capital funding of $200,000 would be 
approved. The harvesting and processing operation would begin in June and terminate 
in October. The first sales would occur in August and are assigned evenly to each 
month thereafter. Based on 30-day credit terms, it was assumed receivables would 
come in over the period September through December. Overhead expenses were 
prorated for the first year and assigned evenly to each of the months. 
Based on these parameters, the cash flow analysis is presented in Appendix U. The 
project will have a short-term cash requirement of approximately $1,000,000 to cover 
the first year of operation. If the sales for the product are achieved and receivables 
collected, then a positive cash flow should be realized by the end of the year. 'I'lic 
critical assumption in this analysis, however, is that product sales and collections of 
receivables will be achieved. Any collection delays or sales shortfalls will greatly 
increase the operating credit requirements for the first year. 
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Financing Considerations 
The owners o! ' Glacier Ice have indicated they are in a position to contribute $100,000 
equity to the venture. Based on the capital cost estimates and proposed operating 
scenario for the company it would appear the company will require additional financial 
support as follows: 
Term Loans: $200,000 at startup and $100,000 in each of years 2&3. 
Operating Loan: $1,000,000 in year I and an average requirement of $200,000 for 
the first three months of years 2 and 3. 
'I'ltis level of financing is the niinimuni required to initiate and to support the venture's 
first three years of operations. 
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VI. CRITICAL RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Inherent in the nature and status of this project are some basic risks that should be 
specified for both the owners and potential investors. The main areas of concern arc as 
loIlows: 
" Schedule - Glacier ice has a specific season where it can be harvested along the 
Labrador coast. if the venture is to be initiated in 2001, then the necessary funds 
must he secured k) allow setup of the processing facilities and harvesting of this 
season's ice. 
" Location - The area of operation is dictated by climatic conditions such as tlhe 
annual ice pack. This can delay startup of annual operations and result in 
transportation problems. Also, the remoteness of the operation requires planning 
and contingency arrangements Ihr equipment Iüilurc. 
" Processing-The ice processing system is not complex but will still have startup 
problems that could delay productions in the short term. 
" Product - Glacier ice is a perishable product which requires freezer containers for 
shipment. The distance From major markets results in a high degree of dependence 
on the carriers. 
" Competitors - lt is inevitable that other companies will follow the lead of Glacier 
Ice. Consequently, there could be price-cutting as competitors try to establish sales. 
" Sales - To date, the company has obtained sales commitments for 15% of first-year 
projected revenues. Therefore, the decision to begin operations has been reached 
largely on the basis of market potential. 
" Cash Flow - The success of the venture depends on sales and cash flow. To 
produce glacier ice requires a large outlay of operating funds in the short term and 
delays in cash receipts will result in requirements for additional operating credit. 
1 11 
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APPENDIX A 
LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF GLACIER ICE 
322 
COMPARISON OF GLACIER ICE ANALYSIS WITH ALLOWABLE 
POTABLE WATER S'T'ANDARDS AND LOCAL DRINKING WATER 
.; 
Parameter Units Glacier Ice Regular Allowable 
'I'an Water Standards 
I lardness mg/1. Ca C03 3.2 10-20 100 
p11 Units 4.59 6-7 5.5-8.5 
('alciuiuu ms/L Ca 0.41 5 N/A 
Magnesium mg/l, Mg 0.54 1-2 N/A 
Manganese mg/L Mn <0.005 0.01 0.05 
Iron mg/L Fc 0.01 0.05 0.30 
Copper mg/L Cu <0.005 0.02 1.0 
Zinc mg/L Zn <0.005 0.02 5.0 
Cadmium mg/L Cd <0.0005 <0.0005 0.005 
Lead m6/l, Pb 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Chloride mg/1. Cl 8.9 10-20 250 
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APPENDIX B 
DETAILS ON ICE TRANSPORT VEHICLES 
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QUALITY BOATS COM1'AY, INC. 
361FOOT LANDING CRAFT FOR VEHICLE OR PERSONNEL (LCVI') 
o. ircttui, 
IZAMI' WJI'ICII 
I7AMh ('ACI! 1*, '1' 
_-, - 
Li --l' 
,I 
--1 . 000 
ol, 
1--EAJU-. Ij TANKS 
ý%a I 111V-Wit L'1.11'CC 
IIN-11' I JVIU I 
IWIP 
I W1 PM IJUU1"I 
Uli IG PAD 
I'hc LCVI' is a vcc-bottom landing crall constructed of blass-reinforced plastic, 
t 
and suitable liar carrying vehicles, personnel, or cargo. It is powered by a diesel engine 
burning a single screw in a recessed tunnel. This craft was designed for transporting 
cargo, troops, or a vehicle from ship-to-shore, or shore-to-shore during amphibious 
operations. "I'hcy are suitable for lighterage and other utility work in Ihnrbours and have 
been utilized as passenger ferries, ptish boats, diving-salvage boats and for river 
minesweeping. 
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APPENDIX C 
DIAGRAM OF FLOATING SLIPWAY 
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DIAGRAM OF FLOATING SLIPWAY 
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APPENDIX D 
FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS 
I 
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Glacier Ice 
Sales Forecast 
2001 2002 2003 
Estimated Production (lbs. ) 2,500,000 5,000,000 10,000,000 
Price per lb. 0.70 0.75 0.80 
Total Revenue $ 1,750,000.00 $ 3,750,000.00 $ 8,000,000.00 
Assumptions: 
1. Sales in the first year are spread evenly over the period August - November 
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Glacier Ice 
Income Statement for Three Years 
Revenue 
Ice Sales 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 
Less Cost of Goods Sold 
Harvesting Costs 
Processing Costs 
COST OF GOODS SOLD 
GROSS MARGIN 
Expenses 
Owners' salaries 
Management and staff salaries 
Rent 
Utilities 
Professional fees 
Taxes & licences 
Insurance 
Interest on term loan 
Interest on operating line of credit 
Advertising and sales 
Depreciation on capital equipment 
Telephone & equipment 
Vehicle lease, maint. & operating 
General office expenses 
Micellaneous 
Total Expenses 
Net Income Before Tax 
Tax Expense 
Net Income After Tax 
$ 1,750,000 (1) $ 3,750,000 $ 8,000,0001 
$ 340,800 (2) $ 535,560 $ 803,784 
$ 700,660 (3) $ 1,451,130 $ 2,456,553 
$ 1,041,460 $ 1,986,690 $ 3,260,337 
$ 708,540 (4) $ 1,763,310 $ 4,739,663 
$ 130,000 (5) $ 143,000 $ 157,300 
$ 100,000 (6) $ 200,000 $ 300,000 
$ 50,000 (7) $ 55,000 $ 60,000 
$ 35,000 (8) $ 70,000 $ 120,000 
$ 10,000 (9) $ 15,000 $ 25,000 
$ 10,000 (10) $ 11,000 $ 12,000 
$ 20,000 (11) $ 22,000 $ 24,000 
$ 21,120 (12) $ 27,840 $ 32,640 
$ 61,161 (13) $ 7,500 $ 7,500 
$ 125,000 (14) $ 200,000 $ 275,000 
$ 40,000 (15) $ 60,000 $ 80,000 
$ 10,000 (16) $ 15,000 $ 20,000 
$ 10,000 (17) $ 20,000 $ 30,000 
$ 5,000 (18) $ 5,500 $ 0,000 
$ 60,000 (19) $ 85,000 $ 110,000 
$ 687,281 $ 936,840 $ 1,259,440 
$ 21,259 (20) $ 826,470 $ 3,480,223 
$ 10,204 $ 396,706 $ 1,670,507 
$ 11,055 (21) $ 429,764 $ 1,809,716 
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Notes to Income Statement 
Note 1: 2,500,000 lbs. x $0.70/lb. 
Refer to Sales Forecast 
Note 2: Refer to attached harvesting Cost Schedule 
Note 3: Refer to attached Processing Cost Schedule 
Note 4: $1,750,000 - $1,041,460 = $708,540 
Note 5: The owners' salaries are $65,000/person in the first year. The 
salaries increase by 10% in the second and the third year. 
Note 6: In addition to the two owners, Glacier Ice will employ 2 Füll-time 
administrative people (management & stall) in the first year. 
This does not include the 26 people employed in the processing 
side of the operation. Employee wages have been increased in 
years 2 and 3 in proportion to the increase in sales since 
expansion will require additional personnel. This figure also 
includes provision for hiring, training and skill maintenance Ices. 
Note 7: Rental fees for plant and office space have been increased in 
years two and three by 10% in accordance with the agreement 
with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 
Note 8: Utilities have been increased in years 2 and 3 to reflect the 
increase in production. 
Note 9: Allocation For auditing and legal lees increased to rcllect 
increases in the level of activity in years 2 and 3. 
Note 10: Allocation for property taxes as per agreement with DF7U. 
Note 11: Allocation for property insurance as per agreement with UFO. 
Note 12: See attached interest calculation for term loan. 
Note 13: See attached interest calculation for operating loan requirements. 
Note 14: Expenses relate primarily to the advertising campaign and are 
lower than otherwise as a result of promotional support provided 
by distributors. 
Note 15: Sec attached depreciation schedule for capital equipment. 
Note 16: Fees include telephone and telecommunication equipment and 
associated usage costs. Increases in the second and third years 
reflect increases in the level of sales activity. 
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Note 17: Vehicle expenses have been increased in years 2 and 3 
1n 
proportion to the increase in sales activity. 
Note 18: These expenses are projected to increase at 10% a year. 
Note 19: 10% additional allocation. 
Note 20: Net Income = Gross Margin - Expenses 
Note 21: The income tax rate is 48%. 
Assumptions: 
Assumption 1: No dividends will be paid for the first three years. 
Assumption 2: All dollars are in Canadian funds. 
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Harvesting Cost Schedule 
Year 1 Year 2 
Charter boats to supply ice $ 96,000 $150,000 
(10 weeks x6 days/week) 
Transport ice to plant by barge $244.800 $385,560 
Total $340,800 $535,560 
Notes: 
I. Charter boats at 60 tons/day (2 small growlers of 30 tons each) 
Year 1- 500 tons/weck/6 days = 83 tons/day; 2 boats required 
Year 2-1,000 tons/weck/6 days = 166 tons/day; 3 boats required 
Year 3-2,000 tons/week/6 (lays = 333 tons/day; 5 boats required 
2. Rates per clay: $800 year 1; $840 year 2; $880 year 3 
3. Operating costs for barges: 
Captain - $25/hr. x 10 hrs. _$ 250/day 
Crew -2 at $15/hr. x 10 hrs. $ 300/day 
Fuel -8 gal. /hr. x 10 hrs. x $4/gal. $ 320/day 
Maintenance - $15/hr. x 10 hrs. /day =$ 150/day 
Total $ 1,020/day 
4. Barges -2 in year 1,3 in year 2,4 in year 3 
5. Cost escalation of 5% applied in years 2 and 3 
S 
Year 3 
$264,000 
$539.784 
$803,784 
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Processing Cost Schedule 
Year 1 Year 2 
Direct Labour $561,600 $1,179,360 
Equipment Operation 59,760 105,240 
Packaging 79,300 166,530 
Total $700,660 $1,451,130 
Notes: 
M' 
Year 3 
$1,995,840 
111 , 000 
349.713 
$2,456,553 
1. Operation = 20 weeks x6 days week = 120 clays/year 
2. Basic Shill is 12 hours at $15/hour = $180/shi11 
3. Year I require only I day shill to produce 2.5 million lbs. 
4. Year 2 require 2 shills/day to produce 5.0 million lbs. 
5. Year 3 require doubling of crew on 2 shill basis to produce 10 million lbs. 
6. Equipment operation is for 2 forklills - cost as follows: 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 
Lease $ 70/day $ 75/day $ 80/day 
Proposal $ 15/day $ 31.50/day $ 33/day 
Maintenance $ 20/day $ 30/day $ 31.50/clay 
Operation $144/day $302/day $318/day 
Total $249/day $438.40/clay $462.50/day 
7. Packaging for the product is cost as follows: 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 
Plastic liner (20 lbs. capacity)$ 7,800 $ 16,380 $ 34,398 
Boxes (20 lbs. capacity) $71,500 $150,150 $315,315 
Quantity required is 130,000 (year 1), 260,000 (year 2), 520,000 (year 3) 
Unit cost is $0.06 for plastic and $0.55 box, 5% increase in years 2 and 3 
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8. Direct labour costs are based on the following: 
Year 1 
4 persons on winch = $ 720 
4 persons cutting cubes = $ 720 
2 persons on feed table = $ 360 
2 persons on wash = $ 360 
6 persons on crusher line = $1,080 
6 persons on packaging = $1,080 
2 persons in storage = 360 
Total Shift $4,680 
Year 2 
second shill added at 5% increase = $9,828 
Year 3 
Additional workers added, rate = $15.75/hr. 
8 persons on winch = $1,512 
8 persons cutting cubes = $1,512 
4 persons on iced table = $ 756 
4 persons on wash = $ 756 
8 persons on crusher line = $1,512 
8 persons on packaging _ $1,512 
4 persons in storage = 756 
Total shift $8,316 
Total day $16,632 
M' 
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Interest Expense Schedule 
1. Terin Loans 
Assumptions: 5 year loans @ 15% 
Interest expense = 33% in year 1,27% In year 2 and 21 % In year 3 
Loan 1 $200,000 @ 15% = monthly payment of $4,400 
Total payment = $264,000; interest = $64,000 
Year 1: 0.33 x 64,000 = $21,120 
Year 2: 0.27 x 64,000 = $17,280 
Year 3: 0.21 x 64,000 = $13,440 
Loan 2 $100,000 @15% for 5 years = monthly payment of $2,200 
Total payment = $132,000; Interest = $32,000 
Year 2: 0.33 x $32,000 = $10,560 
Year 3: 0.27 x $32,000 =$8,640 
Loan 3 $100,000 @15% for 5 years = monthly payment of $2,200 
Total payment = $132,000; Interest = $32,000 
Year 3: 0.33 x $32,000 = $10,560 
Term loan interest: Year I Year 2 Year 3 
Loan 1: $21,120 $17,280 $13,440 
Loan 2: $10,560 $8,640 
Loan 3: $10.560 
Total term loan interest $21.120 $27.840 $32,640 
R 
.- 
I" 
E 
2. Operating Line of Credit 
Assumptions: Based on cash flow projections the operating credit requirements vary between 
$100,000 and $1,000,000 
Interest on the operating line of credit is based on the average closing balance 
requirements over the 7 months 
6 months 
15% interest rate 
Calculation $4,892,888/11 months = $444,808 
of Operating Line 
of Credit: 
Interest In Year 1: $444,808 x 15% x 11/12 = $61,161 
Interest In years 2&3: Assumes operating credit requirements for the first 3 months of each year: 
($200,000 x . 15 x . 25 = 
$7,500) 
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Depreciation Schedule 
The estimate for depreciation is based on the straight line method for capital expenditures. 
Year 1: $200,000/5 years = $40,000/year 
Year 2: $100,000/5 years = $20,000/year 
Year 3: $100,000/5 years = $20,000/year 
Year l Year 2 Year 3 
Depreciation expense $40,000 $60,000 $£30,000 
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Glacier lee 
Balance Sheets 
Opening Balance 
Sheet 31-1)ec-01 
Current Assets 
Cash $ 100,000 
Accounts Receivable $ 350,000 
Inventory $- $ 191,250 
Total Current Assets $ 100,000 $ 541,250 
Total Fixed Assets 
Capital Equipment $- $ 160,000 
(net after reserve for depn. ) 
Total Assets $ 100,000 $ 701,250 
Liabilities 
Term $- $ 163,337 
Loan 
Tax Payable $- $ 10,204 
Operating Loan $- $ 307,204 
Accounts/Accrued Payables $- $ 109,450 
Total Liabilities $ 590,195 
Equity 
Owners' Equity $ 100,000 $ 100,000 
Retained Earnings $- $ 11,055 
Total Liabilities and 
Owners' Equity $ 100,000 $ 701,250 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This business plan demonstrates the feasibility of offering a private sector 
tclemedicinc-based initiative - medical diagnosis, consultation, and monitoring of 
patients with cardiovascular disease at a distance. Telemedicine is telecommunication 
that enables the connection of a patient and a health care provider through live two-way 
audio and two-way video transmission, and permits effective diagnosis, treatment and 
other health care activities. As with other medical-based services, there are a number of 
barriers and restrictions that must be investigated and understood prior to entering the 
market. This venture plan identities the critical entry barriers and demonstrates how 
'1'eleCare can minimize their impact and establish a profitable venture with significant 
short and long-term growth potential. 
'I'lse business, TcleCare Incorporated, has two owners who will act as directors, be 
involved in the management of the business, and provide key professional services. 
The experience and education they bring to the venture, as well as the knowledge and 
expertise of the management and staff they plan to hire, are key factors in determining 
the profitability and sustainability of the company. The owners have also made 
provision for a Board of Directors comprised of individuals with a balance of 
professional, technical, and business acumen. 
As this is a service-oriented venture the way in which TeleCare differentiates itself 
from existing services, the service image, the expertise of the staff, and the knowledge 
and experience of the management group will be the determining success factors. 
Market potential, customer demand, barriers to entry, competition, and viable 
distribution options have been evaluated for this initiative. Results of this assessment 
indicate a venture with significant growth and profit potential. Discussions with a 
number of healtli management organizations, physicians, and major employers in 
Florida indicate a high level of interest in TeleCare's service package and confirm the 
market potential. To date, TeleCare has signed orders For 15% of projected first year 
revenues. 
'l'cleCarc has selected a target group on the basis on geographic location and medical 
illness. This report identities considerable potential in the United States. In the short- 
term one state, Florida, will be targeted, as it presents the greatest opportunity due to 
their high population density, low level of competition and established Health 
Management Organization structure. In addition, data support a telemcdicine initiative 
targeting those with cardiovascular disease in the short term. Longer term potential 
exists for geographic market expansion, for expansion into customer segments based on 
additional forms of illness, and for the introduction of additional telcincdicine-based 
services. 
In order to launch this venture and capitalize on demonstrated market potential and 
customer acceptance, the owners require term financing at startup of $200,000, 
additional term financing of $100,000 in each of the second and third years of 
operation, and an operating line of credit of $1,225,000 in the first year. Operating 
credit requirements are significantly reduced in the second year. 
I 
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1. 'I'IIE BUSINESS 
Description 
4. 
The traditional definition of telemedicine is defined as medical practice across 
distances via telecommunications and interactive video technology. Telemeclicine 
enables the connection of patients with health care providers as well as the transfer of 
knowledge. The traditional form of telemedicine service consists of the interaction 
between health care professional and a patient who is located in a remote area. The 
patient is able to go to a local clinic and take advantage of expertise from a medical 
processional through telephone and computer technology. This expertise would not 
have been available to the client in this remote area except for this service. 
TeleCare will take traditional telemedicinc one step further. TclcCare will oiler its 
clients medical diagnosis, consultation, and monitoring without leaving their own 
homes. This business will be defined by a number of characteristics: 
I. Elimination of restrictions based on distance. 
2. Preventative medicine. 
3. Immediate medical attention. 
4. Ease through which patients are connected to health-care providers. 
5. Access to medical knowledge and information. 
Even though this is not a traditional medical practice the same barriers to entry exist. 
The three major barriers include: 
1. I. iccnsurc issues (licensing and malpractice issues are of primary concern), 
2. Confidentiality of patient records, and 
3. Various liability issues. 
This plan addresses these issues and other barriers that TeleCare must overcome in 
order to successfully establish this service. 
The Service 
Studies show that many people who experience heart attacks wait too long before 
seeking help. Recognizable signs are evident in the two-hour period prior to n heart 
attack and 95% of deaths could be avoided if people went to n hospital during this 
period. Unfortunately, most people discount the warning signals. The proposed 
service will eliminate this risk. For those individuals who have n history of heart 
problems, this service will ease their minds to know that if there are warnings signs 
they can quickly and conveniently confirm whether or not there is a problem. If there 
isn't a problem then the client is saved the inconvenience of going to an emergency 
room. if there is a problem then quick attention increases their chances of survival. 
This is a service that can be used anytime the client wishes. Clients can monitor their 
heart at home, in the office or even in the car. This is a business that eliminates 
restrictions based on distance. The service will enable patients to access 
knowledgeable heath care providers all over the world. Live connection between 
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patient and health care providers is possible as well as the ability of health care 
providers to consult on a case. There are also benefits such as case of exchange of 
inlormation, increased knowledge of patients, and improved access to medical 
information. These benefits contribute to an overall increase in the quality of health 
care. For example, people living in rural locations can take advantage of 
knowledgeable experienced health care professionals that they would not have been 
able to otherwise. 
This service will belt, case the minds of those with cardiovascular tliseasc (C. 'VI)) aas 
well as their family and friends. TelcCare's service will be targeted initially to those 
with existing heart problems who may live in fear that any activity will aggravate their 
condition. The service will alleviate some of that fear and allow the person sulTering 
from CVD to enjoy life with the knowledge that they can monitor their condition at 
anytime of the day and get assistance immediately if needed. Further, studies have 
shown telemedicinc-based services can achieve considerable cost savings in areas such 
as patient consultations with physicians, emergency room treatments, 
hospital 
admissions, and ambulance dispatches. This factor will be extremely important to 
health management organizations and employers that are not only potential clients for 
the service but are also critical to the successful promotion and distribution of the 
service to end-users. 
TeleCare's medical staff will offer consultation, diagnosis, and emergency assistance to 
its patients. Each client will receive equipment necessary to monitor and report heart 
activity. A small portable electrocardiogram (ECG) device, that can be takelt 
anywhere, will monitor any unusual heart activity. The device has three wires with 12 
leads that attach to the chest area. As soon as clients have palpitations or chest 
discomfort, they take their own ECG, telephone the medical call centre using n toll-lice 
number and replay the ECG over the phone to the 24 hour call centre staffed by nurses 
and supported by doctors on call. 
'1'cleCare will have a call-centre located in the selected geographic location that will 
monitor their clients. As a part of their service, TclcCare will maintain n database with 
the complete medical history of each patient and a record of previous CCGs. These 
records can be accessed immediately by the nurse who can quickly compare the ECG 
against a previous base line. If there is any change, the nurse will advise the client to 
see a doctor. If needed, they will arrange an ambulance to pick them up and call the 
hospital to let them know they arc on the way. 'rclcCarc will then transmit the patient's 
medical history, most recent ECG and their base-line ECG to the hospital immediately 
via fax or e-mail. 
There are two types of telemedicinc systems: real-time (live) interactions between 
patient and health care provider or between two health care providers consulting on a 
case or store-and-forward technology, which involves the transmission of clinical data 
via a wide variety of media (i. e. disk, film, or tape) that are acted upon at a later time 
and then transmitted back to the originating site. While TcleCarc will utilize store-and- 
lorward technology to access baseline data, its primary systems will be real-time or live 
interactions between patient and health care provider. 
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Management 
The two primary shareholders in TeleCare are Ken Thompson and Kathy Smith. Ken 
and Kathy are both medical doctors that specialize in cardiovascular disease. They will 
serve as directors of TclcCare, provide necessary professional expertise from the 
company's head. ollice in Clarenville and be involved in (lie management of the 
business. Both have experience with telemedicine-based initiatives through their 
involvement with the telemedicinc facilities at Memorial University of Newfoundland. 
Ken also completed his MI3A degree at Memorial and has worked its a marketing 
manager with a major pharmaceutical firm. Kathy conics from an entrepreneurial 
family and together with Ken has successfully established and managed other business 
ventures. Both have excellent credit ratings and proven histories of debt repayment 
having borrowed significant amounts in the past for personal and business purposes. 
The combination of their educational backgrounds, entrepreneurial and management 
experience, and familiarity with telemedicine services provide key ingredients to the 
company's success. The owners have also made provision for other key management, 
professional and administrative personnel (details provided later in the report) and for a 
Board of Directors comprised of individuals with a balance of professional, technical 
and business acumen. 
Since the company was lormcd in May 2000, the shareholders have been working 
jointly on the development aspects of the venture. Considerable effort has gone into 
technology assessment and the design of the emergency monitoring system. A feasible 
operating plan has now been developed. Company members have also been working 
on securing facilities, identifying any regulatory obstacles, assessing market potential, 
developing a marketing plan and obtaining initial orders. 
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II. THE MARKET 
Potential Customers 
In general terms, the end use customers For TelcCarc services include individuals 
sul'Icring From CVI). however, l1MOs and major employers represent key customers 
for bulk/group orders. An I-IMO is a managed care entity that provides, offers or 
arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members Ibr a 
fixed, prepaid premium. Together with physicians, 1-IMOs and major employers will 
also play important roles in the promotion and the distribution of TcleCarc's services. 
11MOs have access to a significant portion of the potential end-user market. 
Discussions with a number of IIMOs indicate a high level of interest in TeleCure's 
services and demonstrate its market potential. To date, TcleCare has signed orders froh 
I IMOs and major employers representing 15% of projected f irst-year revenues. 
Market Size and Potential 
CVI) is defined as all diseases of the circulatory system according to the International 
Classification of Disease (lCD). The diseases included in this classification arc: 
" acute myocardial in('arction (AMI), 
" ischemic or coronary heart disease (II ID), 
" valvular heart disease, 
" peripheral vascular disease, 
" arrhythmia, 
" high blood pressure, and 
" stroke. 
Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death in Canada accounting for 
approximately 37% of all deaths in 1995 (Heart Disease and Stroke in Canada, 1996). 
In the United States cardiovascular disease has been the leading cause of death since 
1900. In 1995,41.5% of all deaths occurring in the U. S. ,. vcre attributed to CVD (I leart 
and Stroke Statistical Update, 1998). 
Canada: 
It is estimated that 4.4% of Canadians over the age of 20 suffer from some form of 
CVI). Sec Appendix A liar population by province and calculation of market potential 
of those individuals suffering from CVD. Population figures are taken from 1999 
Statistics Canada Census. Statistics Canada groups the population figures into three 
categories, 0-14,15-64, and over 65. The 15-64 and over 65 age categories were used 
to estimate the percentage of persons suffering frone CVD in Canada. 
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Table 1: Estimated Number of Individuals Suffering from CVI) in CaInndln 
Province Estimated number of individuals 
suffering from CVID in 1999 
Ontario 406,643 
Quebec 264,407 
British Columbia 144,308 
Alberta 102,626 
Manitoba 39,664 
Nova Scotia 33,669 
Saskatchewan 35,286 
New Brunswick 27,147 
Newfoundland 19,538 
Prince Edward Island 4,841 
North West Territories 1,332 
Yukon 1,051 
Nunavut 741 
Total 1,081,253 
United Slates: 
It is estimated that 22% of the population of the United States suffer from CVU (I Icart 
and Stroke Statistical Update, 1998). See Appendix B for population by State and 
calculation of market potential of those individuals suffering from CVI). Population 
figures are taken from the 1997 United States Census. California, Florida and New 
York have been selected based on their high CVU populations, high population 
densities and active I IMOs. 
Table 2: Estimated Number of Individuals Suffering from CVI) in California, 
Florida, sync[ New York 
State Estimated number of individuals 
suffering from CVI) In 1997 
Calilornia 7,098,960 
Florida 3,223,880 
New York 3,990,140 
'I'ota) 14,312,980 
As illustrated by the previous data there is sufficient market potcntial in both Canada 
and the United States to support a tclemedicine-based initiative. 
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CoUnuclition 
In 1989 there were only three telemedicine-based companies operating in the U. S. By 
1994 this number had increased to twenty. As technology becomes more and more 
advanced the number of companies entering in this industry will increase. As a result of 
this increasing conippetition, TclcCarc must have a targeted strategy when entering this 
market. The service that TclcCarc offers must stand-out from the competition. 
'I'cleCarc must difiercntiatc its service by employing high-quality medical professionals 
and by oficrinb quick professional service, thereby providing clients with the assurance 
that their emergency needs will be met. 
There are a number of companies presently providing a variety of tclcmcdicine 
services. The following have been identified as direct competitors for the services to be 
offered by TeleCarc. However, it should be noted none of these companies are 
currently servicing the CVD market in Florida. 
ý1. TcleMedisys 
TcleMedisys Corporation of Montreal is a privately owned company created in 1995 to 
provide tclemedicinc services to the general public and health care professionals, 
TcleMedisys is jointly owned by Medisys I health Group Inc, Bell Canada, and Imasco. 
TcleMedisys was one of the first privately owned medical call centres established in 
Canada. It is staffed by trained nurses who use the telephone system and instruments to 
monitor clients with a number of ailments. 'I'eleMedisys is currently operating in 
Quebec and Ontario. They charge their clients $25.00 tt month for its monitoring 
services. Prices for their monitoring devices range from $50.00 to $100.00. 
Though TelcCarc and '1'eleMedisys services are very similar, T'cleMcdisys' primary 
focus is on monitoring services for those suffering from asthma. Further, TclcMcdisys 
actively targets continuous monitoring for diagnostic purposes rather than real time 
emergency monituring. They are planning to enter the U. S. market late in 20U1. 
13. Shahal Medical Scrviccs Ltd. 
Shahal Medical Services Ltd., based in Israel, operates n medical monitoring centre that 
provides medical services including trans-telephonic diagnosing services and 
emergency treatment, through teams consisting of ICU and ER nurses, paramedics and 
physicians. They have developed a home-based emergency and telcmcdicinc 
communications system that currently has 50,000 subscribers. Shahal Medical Services 
service patients with cardiac problems, those surfering fron, asthma and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as hypertensive patients. Subscribers pay up to 
$50.00 per month for the service. The purchase price of the monitoring equipment 
ranges from $100.00-$175.00. Annual revenues are approximately $17 million. 
Sliahal does service the CVD market and they arc currently investigating the North 
American market. Short to medium term plans suggest a focus on the two largest 
potential markets, namely California and New York. 
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C. Mcclnction I Icalth Group 
Toronto-based MedAction's primary business involves a telephone triage whereby they 
charge subscribers a monthly fee for health information delivered by registered nurses 
over the phone. Subscribers dial a toll-free number and ask any medical questions that 
they want. 
The primary target market for this product is individuals over the age of 55. For $9.95 
a month your liunily can call 24 hours a day, seven clays it week, from anywhere in 
North America to obtain information and advice. The service is focused primarily on 
medical information and advice rather than providing diagnosis or emergency service. 
McdAction's primary challenge is to encourage Canadians to pay flor a service that they 
have For free if they are insured. 
Medi\ction has not entered the United States market; however, they are planning on 
launch date of September 2001 For expansion of services into California. 
TeleCarc has a number of advantages over its competitors, which will allow TelcCare 
to enter and dominate the Florida market, including first-mover advantage, professional 
and knowledgeable staff, and sophisticated quality services. Further, 'I'clcCnre can 
potentially move into California and New York if it successfully sells the I IMOs in 
Florida. These same organizations service the two larger states and n positive 
experience in Florida can be transferred easily to New York and California through the 
I IMOs. 
Estimated Market Share and Sales 
C'a, iacla: 
As illustrated in 'fable 3, a conservative estimate of 1.0% market penetration in the first 
year translates into 10,812 customers in Canada. 
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Table 3: Market Potential for Canada 
Province Estimated number of potential clients 
suffering from CVll based on achieving 
1.0% market )cnetration 
Ontario 4,066 
Quebec 2,644 
British Columbia 1,444 
Alberta 1,026 
Manitoba 396 
Nova Scotia 336 
Saskatchewan 352 
New Brunswick 272 
Newloundland 196 
Prince Edward Island 48 
North West 't'erritories 14 
Yukon IO 
Nunavut 8 
't'otal 10,812 
United States: 
Based on a conservative estimate or 1.0% penetration in the first year, the market 
potential in the three U. S. stales is 143.130 (sec Table 4). 
Table 4: Market Potential for California, Florida, and New York 
State Estimated number of I)otcutinl clients 
suffering from CV1) basal on nciiicving 
1.0% market Penctrntion 
California 70,990 
Florida 32,238 
New York 39,902 
't'otal 143,130 
Based on the analysis of the market potential TeleCare will enter the U. S. market with 
an initial short-term focus on Florida. A long-term strategy may include branching out 
and altering new markets such as California and New York. 
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future Maricet Potential and Growth Opportunities 
., 4. 
Initial efforts carried out for this project have been directed primarily at assessing the 
market potential for a telcmedicine-based initiative focusing on individuals sul7cring 
From CVU, especially those located in Florida. Future plans include a detailed market 
assessment of the following additional growth opportunities: 
1. Expansion of CVD services into other US states. 
2. Introduction ofserviccs targeted to those suflcring (coin other diseases. 
3. Expansion into overseas markets including the United Kingdom, Europe and 
Asia. 
4. Introduction of similar services into the Canadian market. 
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111. MARKETING STRATEGY 
Target Market 
The end-user is the ultimate target group. End-users arc those individuals with CVI) in 
the state of Florida. llowever, other groups will be targeted in an effort to effectively 
reach the end-users and to provide support for distribution and promotion. For 
example. IIMOs, major employers, physicians (cardiologists), and health service 
agencies will be targeted. I IMOs and employers, in particular, have vested interests in 
achieving the best health care for the lowest cost. IPA and combination model I IMOs' 
represent (lie best prospects for group/bulk sales and offer the potential to reach a large 
number of clients in a relatively short period of time. Appendix C includes a list of 
Florida's IIMOs ranked by enrollment. As indicated previously, diseussimis with 
IIMOs and major employers have resulted in TeleCare obtaining orders for 15% of' 
first-year projected revenues. 
Promotion 
A full-scale marketing campaign will be developed to effectively reach the end 
consumer and create awareness about TeleCare's services. A salesforce will be used to 
promote the benefits through individual and group presentations, especially to HMOs, 
major employers, and physicians. Promotional material will emphasize the advantages 
of the service to end-users and the potential savings to the health care system, 
especially to I IMOs and to employers. Referrals from cardiologists should enhance 
cud-user interest. 
In addition to the direct-marketing component, a targeted advertising campaign will 
support the efforts of the salesforce. This campaign will include the use of television, 
magazine and radio and posters/displays in doctors' offices. Targeted programs. 
timeslots, and publications will ensure effective reach to the various target groups. 
TeleCare has enlisted the services of a major advertising agency to assist in this regard. 
The public relations component of the campaign includes developing alliances with 
cardiactric, stroke and health agencies throughout the state of Florida. Developing 
alliances with reputable organizations will increase the credibility of TeleCare. Co- 
operative promotional campaigns may also be possible. 
Where possible the company will utilize resources and financial support of both levels 
of government for the promotional requirements of this project. 
1 Under the IPA model. the I IMO contracts with an association of medical professionals to provide 
medical services in return for a negotiated fee. The IPA in turn contracts with physicians who continue in 
their existing individual or group practices. Under the staff health model, the I IMO employs physicians 
to provide health care to its members. All premiums and other revenues accrue to the I IMO, which 
compensates physicians by salary and incentive programs. The combination model employs both IPA 
and staff approaches. 
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Distribution 
The service and ECG units will be distributed via direct sales through TcleCare's 
salesfurcc and through IIMOs and major employers. Florida is a managed care state 
with approximately 33% of the commercial population enrolled in HMOs. When using 
I IMOs as a primary method of distribution there is relatively easy access to a large 
client base in a short period of tine. lIMO's will facilitate early and quick access to the 
t). S. market. Furthermore, since some IIMO's operate in multiple states, 'l'clcCarc can 
bend-it from a reduction in the costs of promotional programs as the company expands 
into additional U. S. markets. 
Pricing 
Thcre are two components associated with TclcCare's service. First, there is the 
equipment. which can be purchased by individuals directly for $80.00 or for $70.00 on 
a bulk order or group purchase basis. 'I'lse second component is the actual monitoring 
service. For $27.50/month, or $22.50 in the case of group/bulk orders, clients can 
obtain a subscription for the monitoring service. 't'his subscription will enable them to 
call anytime of the day and consult with a qualified nurse with regard to any conecrus 
or questions they may have. If a patient has taken their ECG reading and it is abnormal 
they can call a nurse and will be advised immediately if they should seek medical 
attention. The nurse can quickly access the clients' medical history and previous ECG 
readings on computer to determine if there is a problem. 
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IV. OPERATIONS PLAN 
There arc three key requirements that are needed if TeleCare is to succeed: qualified 
health care professionals, knowledgeable and experienced management, and quality 
technology. 
Pcrsoniicl 
Table 5 outlines the management and stall' positions that arc needed to successfully 
operate TeleCare. The two owners will also act as directors of TeleCare. As Ken and 
Kathy arc both doctors that specialize in cardiology, they will also provide assistance 
with diagnosis and information to clients. Ken and Kathy both have experience related 
to the tclemedicine ticid. In addition to their combined cardiology experience of 20 
years, Ken and Kathy have worked with the telemedicine services at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland (MUN). This experience combined with their training in 
CVD is an excellent foundation on which to build TelcCare. Ken also has an MBA 
degree and significant marketing experience gained through various positions in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Both have been involved in previous successful 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
In addition, Ken and Kathy will hire a number of key management personnel, including 
a marketing manager, human resources manager and an operations manager. The 
operations manager, computer specialist, and nurse supervisor positions will be filled 
by individuals that work with Ken and Kathy and in whom they have a great deal of 
confidence with their skill and ability. 
Technical expertise is also available from other company directors who possess skills in 
project related areas. one director is part owner or a company that is currently engaged 
in contract work servicing Memorial University's telemedieine facilities. Another 
board member is president of a telecommunications firth and is very familiar with the 
systems TeleCare will use. A third director is the owner/operator of a biomedical firm 
with clients around the world. 
The reputation of the firm depends upon the knowledge and ability of the health care 
providers. Ten qualified nurses with experience in cardiology related problems will 
provide assistance to clients when they call the monitor centre. The centre will be 
starred 24 hours a day and at any one time 3 nurses will be working a shift. There will 
also be a salesforcc of 10 people responsible for contacts with HMOs, employer 
organizations. physicians and end-users. 
In addition to these 40 full-time employees TelcCare will also have cardiologists on 
contract in Florida who can be called on for patient consultation and diagnosis. 
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ýt 'fahlc 5: Pcrsonncl Rcquircmcnts 
Position Location Number of 
Positions 
Director/Cardiolo Specialist Clarenville, NF 2 
Operations Managcr Clarenville, NF 1 
I luman Resources Manager Clarenville, NF I 
Junior I lit Coordinator Clarcnville, NF 1 
Computer Specialist/ 
Technician 
Clarenville and Florida 2 
Marketing & Sales Mana er Florida 
Sales Staff Florida IU 
Medical Manager Clarcnvillc, NF 
Nurse Supervisor Florida 
Nurses Florida 10 
Call centre phone 
o crator/coordinator 
Florida 2 
Device Inventory Manal; cr Clarcnvillc, NF I 
Inventory Coordinator Florida 
Administrative Assistants Clarenville and Florida 4 
Accounting Clerks Clarcnvillc and Florida 2 
Total 40 
1)istribution/Sct-Up 
The service will be offered via a monitor call-centre in Florida that will service the 
entire population of the state. The headquarters will be situated in Clarenville. 
Newfoundland. The centre will have the medical history and ECGs of all their clients 
in a database. The centre will be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The 
headquarters will also house all patient information. A salesforce will be responsible 
for selling the ECG units and services. Once a customer signs-up for the service they 
will be contacted by the monitoring centre. 
Prior to activating the service the client must provide the centre with their medical 
history and relevant tiles and at that time an ECG reading will be taken and recorded. 
The monitor centre can coordinate the transfer of a copy of the client's medical history 
once the client has given authorization. Once the client is set-up in the system an ECG 
unit will be provided to them. 
The initial set-up time for the centre will be 2 to 4 months. The skort-ref; costs include 
both capital and non-capital investments. The capital investments include: 1) Monitor 
Centre Computing and Communication Equipment; and 2) Nurse Workstations. Non- 
capital investments include: 1) salaries; 2) marketing materials; 3) training and hiring; 
4) rent and utilities; 5) approvals and legal services. 
Ongoing expenses include variable costs, cost of service, and marketing & sales 
expenses. Variable costs include costs such as commissions and devices. Ongoing 
expenses also include the cost of service such as salaries and malpractice insurance. 
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The Florida Board of Medicine has stated that a physician providing the primary read 
of a diagnostic test or study for a patient located in Florida must be licensed to practice 
medicine in Florida. Any physician who provides such as service without a Florida 
license would violate the prohibitions against unlicensed practice outlined in Chapter 
458 - the Medical Practice Act, Florida Statutes. 
Florida's only current statute relating to telemedicine is section 458.3255, Florida 
Statutes which provides that only a Florida-licensed physicicanr may order elecironic- 
communications diagnostic-imaging or treatment services fin- a person located in 
bioriclu. The bill would require licensure of any physician, wherever located, who has 
primary authority over the care or diagnosis of a Florida patient. Exempt from the 
proposed liccnsurc requirement are certain physicians who arc in consultation with a 
Florida-licensed physician and who do not exercise primary authority over the patient's 
care. 
D. Confidentiality of Patient Records 
Another area of legal concern in (Ocnicclicine is the issue of patient confidentiality. A 
healthcare provider's duty to maintain the confidentiality of medical data is at least as 
old and well accepted as the I lippocratic Oath: "What I may sec or hear in the course of 
treatment or even outside the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no 
account must one spread, I will keep to myself. " 
The nature of telcmcdicinc encourages the creation and maintenance of electronic 
medical records, which arc accessed by several stakeholders. It is therefore important 
that the records are protected from potential hackers. This can be easily accomplished. 
A confidentiality statement is included in Appendix D. 
C. Liability Issues 
Ilealthcare professionals who arc involved in the practice of tclcmedicine arc tweed 
with a number of liability issues concerning their competence as healthcare 
professionals, as well as. the quality of the telemedicine transmission and equipment. 
These liability issues may potentially slow the advancement of tclcmcdicinc as 
healthcare professionals choose to limit their exposure to risk in a virtually uncharted 
territory. 
The licensing and liability issues identified above do not pose major impediments to 
undertaking the proposed venture. Nurses from Newfoundland frequently move to 
Texas and Florida to undertake work and experience no difficulty meeting liccusure 
requirements. Basically, they are required to sit a one-day exam. Similarly, there are 
two options available to TeleCare to ensure that doctors are able to provide services to 
patients resident in Florida. First, under a reciprocal arrangement, medical doctors 
from Newfoundland can register in Florida. Second, TeleCare can use doctors 
presently registered and practicing in Florida on a contractual on-call basis. In terms of 
liability, organizations such as Slhalhal have already demonstrated the feasibility of 
securing cost effective liability coverage from major insurers. There is no reason to 
believe that TcleCare's experience in this regard should be any different. 
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V. FINANCIAL PLAN 
A financial review of the venture was completed on the basis of the sales projections, 
cost estimates and pricing information identified in this report. The emphasis is on 
demonstrating the financial viability of the business through a profit and loss evaluation 
over the first three years. A cash flow analysis has also been completed to show the 
necessary operating financing and time to reach positive cash flow. The detailed 
financial projections are presented in Appendix E. 
I'rofilal, ilih. Ana1ysis 
i brie sue Iwo types of revenues: revenues (ruht the sale of services (suhscriptiun hxs) 
and revenues from the sale ofend-user devices. Subscription revenue accounts 1'or 75% 
of total revenue in the first year increasing to almost 94% in the third year. 
The results from the preparation of the pro forma profit and loss statements for the 
venture indicate that the company can be profitable under the given assumptions. A 
profit of approximately $11,000 is projected for the first year of the venture. In years 2 
and 3. the company's profitability increases significantly resulting in aller tax profits of 
$1, x08,000 and $3,074,000 respectively. 
It should be noted the assumptions for interest expense and taxes are based on a full 
cost scenario. "11ic project may be eligible for financial assistance that could reduce the 
borrowing requirements and therefore reduce interest costs. Also, there may be 
additional tax concessions that could reduce the tax liability. 
Cash Flow Analysis 
h is project's cash flow was evaluated for the first year of operation. It was assumed 
that the project would start in January and capital funding of $200,000 would be 
approved. The first sales would occur in April and arc assigned evenly to each month 
thereafter. Credit terms of 30 days are assumed for group/bulk sales. Overhead 
expenses were prorated for the first year and assigned evenly to each of the months. 
Based on these parameters, the cash flow analysis is presented in Appendix E. The 
project will have a short-term cash requirement of approximately $1,225,000 to cover 
the first year of operation. If the sales for the service are achieved and receivables 
collected, then a positive cash flow should be realized four months into the second year. 
The critical assumptions in this analysis arc that sales and collections will be achieved. 
Any collection delays or sales shortfalls will greatly increase the operating credit 
requirements for the first year. 
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Financing Considerations 
hic owners of TclcCarc have indicated they are in a position to contribute $100,000 
equity to the venture. Based on the capital cost estimates and proposed operating 
scenario for the company it would appear the company will require additional financial 
Support as Ii)Ilows: 
Term Loans: $200,000 at startup and $100,000 in each of years 2&3. 
Operating; Loan: $1,225,000 in year I and an average requirement of 
$250,000 for the first four months of year 2. 
'11iis level of financing is the minimum required to initiate and to support the venture's 
first three years of operation. 
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V1. CRITICAL RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Inherent in the nature and status of this project are some basic risks that should be 
specified for both the owners and potential investors. The main areas of concern are as 
follows: 
" Schedule - Timing of entry to market is critical since "first to market" results in 
significant competitive advantage. Any delays could result in the loss of such 
advantage and have a serious negative impact on the venture. 
" Legal - Licensing requirements for nurses and physicians are under the control of 
each state. Market expansion into additional states results in increased costs and can 
be very time consuming. 
" Service - The service is highly dependent on knowledgeable and professional staff' 
that are in great demand. tlunian resource management skills arc critical to 
ensuring effective recruitment and retention of key personnel. 
" Technology - The system is not complex but may still have startup problems that 
could delay service in the short term. 
" Competitors - It is inevitable that other companies will follow the lead of 
TeleCare. Consequently, there could be price-cutting as competitors try to establish 
sales. 
" Sales -To date, the company has obtained sales commitments for 15% of first-year 
projected revenues. ilicreforc, the decision to begin operations has been reached 
largely on the basis of market potential. 
" Cash Flow - The success of the venture depends on sales and cash flow. To 
develop the market requires a large outlay of operating funds in the short term and 
delays in cash receipts will result in requirements for additional operating credit. 
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APPENDIX A 
Population and Market Potential for Canada 
Province 1999 Population 
>15 years of age 
(Statistics Canada) 
Estimated Number of 
Individuals Suffering 
from CVI) in 1999 
Ontario 9,241,879 406,643 
Quebec 6,009,239 264,407 
British Columbia 3,279,737 144,308 
Alberta 2,332,405 102,626 
Manitoba 901,456 39,664 
Nova Scotia 765,207 33,669 
Saskatchewan 801,954 35,286 
New Brunswick 616,981 27,147 
Newfoundland 444,052 19,538 
Prince Edward Island 110,018 4,841 
North \Vcst Territories 30,269 1,332 
Yukon 23,892 1,051 
Nunavut 16,840 741 
Total 24,573,929 1,081,253 
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APPENDIX B 
Population and Market Potential for Unital States 
State 1997 Population 
(U. S. Census) 
Estimated Number of 
Individuals Suffering 
from CVU in 1997 
Alabama 4,319,000 950,180 
Alaska 609,000 133,980 
Arizona 4,555,000 1,002,100 
Arkansas 2,523,000 555,060 
California 32,268,000 7,098,960 
Colorado 3,893,000 856,460 
Connecticut 3,270,000 719,400 
Delaware 732,000 161,040 
District of Columbia 529,000 116,380 
Florida 14,654,000 3,223,880 
Georgia 7,486,000 1,646,920 
Hawaii 1,187,000 261,140 
Idaho 1,210,000 266,200 
Illinois 11,896,000 2,617,120 
Indiana 5,864,000 1,290,080 
Iowa 2,852,000 627,440 
Kansas 2,595,000 570,900 
Kentucky 3,908,000 859,760 
Louisiana 4,352,000 957,440 
Maine 1,242,000 273,240 
Maryland 5,094,000 1,120,680 
Massachusetts 6,118,000 1,345,960 
Michigan 9,774,000 2,150,280 
Minnesota 4,686,000 1,030,920 
Mississippi 2,731,000 600,820 
Missouri 5,402,000 1,188,440 
Montana 879,000 193,380 
Nebraska 1,657,000 364,540 
Nevada 1,677,000 368,940 
New I lam shire 1,173,000 258,060 
Ncw Jcrsey 8,053,000 1,771,660 
New Mexico 1,730,000 380,600 
New York 18,137,000 3,990,140 
North Carolina 7,425,000 1,633,500 
North Dakota 641,000 141,020 
Ohio 11,186,000 2,460,920 
Oklahoma 3,317,000 729,740 
Oregon 3,243,000 713,460 
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State 1997 Population 
(U. S. Census) 
Estimated Number of 
Individuals Suffering 
from CVU in 1997 
Pennsylvania 12,020,000 2,644,400 
Rhode Island 987,000 217,140 
South Carolina 3,760,000 827,200 
South Dakota 738,000 162,360 
ennessee 5,368,000 1,180,960 
Texas 19,439,000 4,276,580 
Utah 2,059,000 452,980 
Vermont 589,000 129,580 
Virginia 6,734,000 1,481,480 
Washington 5,610,000 1,234,200 
West Virginia 1,816,000 399,520 
Wisconsin 5,170,000 1,137,400 
Wyoming 480,000 105,600 
Total 267,637,000 58,880,140 
363 
ý. ý 
ý; 
ý ýý s ý4ý 
N 
APPENDIX C 
LIST OF FLORIDA'S HMOS RANKED BY ENROLLMENT 
Rank Name Model Stains Enrollment 
I Blue Cross Blue Shield/liealth Options IPA Profit 697,799 
2 1 lumana Medical Plan, Inc. Combination Profit 513,314 
3 AV-MED, Inc. IPA Non-Profit 335,544 
4 111111 ealth Plan of Florida, Inc. IPA Non-Profit 158,396 
5 Principal health Care of Florida, Inc. IPA Profit 137,375 
6 Neighborhood Ilealth Partnership, Inc. Combination Non-Profit 111,074 
7 CIGNA Ilealth Care of Florida Combination Profit 103,203 
8 1lealthplan Southeast IPA Profit 75,507 
9 Florida I Icalth Care Plan, Inc. Staff Non-Profit 50,158 
10 Total IIcalth Choice, Inc. ! 1'A Profit 28,398 
11 Preferred Medical Plan, Inc. Stall Profit 24,739 
12 JMII IIcalth Plan Combination Non-Profit 21,080 
13 1 Icalth First Ihealth Plans, Inc. I PA Profit 19,754 
14 Oxford I health Plans (FL), Inc. IPA Profit 15,285 
15 Anthem Ilealth Plan of Florida IPA frort 11,131 
16 Sunstar I Icalth Plan, Inc. Combination Profit 6,445 
17 Alpha Health Plan, Inc. N/A N/A - 
'I'otal 2,309,202 
Compiled from the Florida Associat ion of I IMOs, 1997 
I. I hcsc I IMOs arc members of the Florida Association of i IMOs (FAI IMO). 
2. II'A I Iß-10: The I IMO contracts with an association of medical professionals to provide medical services 
return llor it negotiated rec. Tbc II'A in turn contracts with physicians who continue in their cxIsiii 
individual or group practices. 
3. Combination: Sell-explanatory 
4. Stall': This health model employs physicians to provide health care to its members. All premiums ni 
other revenues accrue to the IIMO, which compensates physicians by salary and incenti, 
programs. 
5. Enrollment numbers as of December 31.1997. 
364 
APPENDIX D 141- 
confidentiality statement 
This policy has been developed to assure that patient confidentiality is maintained 
whenever medical history and care of a patient is discussed for the purposes of 
educating hospital medical staff of employees. It is important to maximize the 
educational experience while protecting the confidentiality of patient inFormation. 
1. All medical data presented (i. c. ECG reports) will have the patient's name and 
medical number masked. 
2. When a patient calls into the centre they will have a code number through which 
only a nurse can access the in[ormation. 
3. Any use of medical information for the purposes of case discussion among 
employees of TcleCare will disguise all names. 
4. The network that connects the two offices is secure within the 'fclcCarc system 
with no possibility for data loss or unauthorized `tapping' along this route. 
5. All client medical information shall be stored in a secure area that only the nurses 
can access. 
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FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS 
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TeleCare 
Sales Forecast 
2001 
Estimated Subscribers (1) 
Revenue from Sale of ECGs (2) 
Subscription Fee Revenue (3) 
TOTAL 
32,000 
2002 2003 
48,000 64,0001 
$ 2,400,000.00 $ 1,200,000.00 $ 1,200,000.00 
$ 7,200,000.00 $ 14,400,000.00 $ 19,200,000.00 
$ 9.600.000.00 $ 15.600.000.00 $ 20.400.000.00 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
(1) Estimated Sales/Subscribers: 
Population with CVD - 3,223,880 x% market share 
7,098,960 X% 
market share. 
1.0% of population suffering from CVD, the first year 
in the second year. 
1.5% of population suffering from CVD, the second year 
in the third year. 
2.0% of population suffering from CVD, in the third year 
(2) ECG Revenue: 
Average price of $75 unit x# of units to new subscribers 
Half of the subscribers will be private individuals @ $80 unit while the remainder will be business/bulk 
subscribers @ $70 unit 
(3) Subscription Fee Revenues: 
Average of $25.00/month x# of subscribers 
Half of the subscribers will be private individuals @ $27.50 month while the remainder will be 
business/bulk subscribers @ $22.50 
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i TeleCare 
Income Statement for Three Years 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Revenue 
ECG Sales $ 2.400,000 (1) $ 1,200,000 $ 1,200,000 
Subscription Fees $ 7,200,000 (2) $ 14,400,000 $ 19,200,000 
Total Revenue $ 9,600,000 $ 15,600,000 $ 20,400,000 
Less Cost of Goods Sold 
for ECGs $ 2,080,000 (3) $ 1,040,000 $ 1,040,000 
Total COGs 
Gross Margin $ 7,520,000 (4) $ 14,560,000 $ 19,360,000 
Expenses 
Owners Salary $ 160,000 (5) $ 176,000 $ 193,600 
Management & Employee Wages $ 2,500,000 (6) $ 3,375,000 $ 4,250,000 
Rent $ 250,000 (7) $ 375,000 $ 450,000 
Utilities $ 24,000 (8) $ 36,000 $ 48,000 
Professional Fees & Licensing $ 1,500,000 (9) $ 1,000,000 $ 1,000,000 
Taxes & Licenses $ 1,000,000 (10) $ 1,000,000 $ 1,000,000 
Insurance $ 1,000,000 (11) $ 1,500,000 $ 2,000,000 
Interest Paid on Term Loan $ 21,120 (12) $ 27,840 $ 32,640 
Interest on Operating Line of Credit $ 109,675 (13) $ 12,375 $ 
Advertising & Sales $ 1,000,000 (14) $ 1,750,000 $ 2,250,000 
Depreciation on capital equipment $ 40,000 (15) $ 60,000 $ 80,000 
Telephone + Equipment $ 450,000 (16) $ 600,000 $ 700,000 
Rental Equipment $ 500,000 (17) $ 750,000 $ 1,000,000 
Travel Expenses $ 300,000 (18) $ 315,000 $ 330,750 
Micellaneous $ 100,000 (19) $ 105,000 $ 112,875 
Total Expenses $ 8,954,795 $ 11,082,215 $ 13,447,865 
Adjustment for initial 3 months $ 1,456,000 
Net Income Before Tax $ 21,205 (20) $ 3,477,785 $ 5,912,135 
Tax Expense $ 10,178 $ 1,669,337 $ 2,837,825 
Net Income After Tax $ 11,027 (21) $ 1,808,448 $ 3,074,310 
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Notes to Income Statement 
Note 1: $80 x 16,000 + $70 x 16,000 = $2,400,000 
Refer to Sales Forecast. 
Note 2: $27.50 x9x 16,000 + $22.50 x9x 16,000 = $7,200,000 
Refer to Sales Forecast. 
Note 3: $65 x 32,000 = $2,080,000 
Note 4: $9,600,000 - $2,080,000 = $7,520,000 
Note 5: The owners' salaries arc $80,000/person in the first year. The 
salaries increase by 10% in the second and the third year. 
Note 6: In addition to the two owners/doctors, TeleCare will employ 40 
employees (management and stall) throughout the 2 offices in 
the first year. Employee wages have been increased in years 2 
and 3 in proportion to the increase in sales since expansion will 
require significant additional personnel. This figure also includes 
provision for hiring, training and skill maintenance fees. 
Note 7: Rental fees Irr office space have also been increased in years 
two and three to reflect additional space requirements. 
Note 8: On average, utilities are $1,000/month x2 locations x 12 months 
_ $24,000. Increased in years 2 and 3 to reflect additional space. 
Note 9: Asa result ol'getting permits and licenses to practice medicine in 
Florida the first year allocation is high compared to years 2 and 3 
when it is estimated expenses will decrease by approximately 
33%. Also, the allocation is high as a result of legal 
consultations regarding potential liability issues. 
Note 10: 'faxes and licenses would include such items as operating 
expenses and property taxes. Licenses also include all fees 
involved with permits and licenses required to practice medicine. 
Note 11: Approximately $1,000,000 needed to insure (including 
malpractice insurance) the call centre. Insurance requirements 
have been increased each year to reflect the increase in the 
number of subscribers. 
Note 12: Sec attached interest calculation for term loan. 
Note 13: Sec attached interest calculation liar operating line ofciedit. 
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Note 14: Expenses include advertising campaign, promotional ni itcrials, 
sales commissions, and public relations fees. The increase in 
years 2 and 3 is attributable primarily to the increase in 
commissions. 
Note 15: Sec attached depreciation schedule for capital equipment. 
Note 16: Fees include telephone and telecommunication equipment for 
both offices. Increases in the second and third years reflect 
additional requirements. 
Note 17: Rental equipment includes lease of monitor centre computing 
and communication equipment, nurse workstations, and medical 
equipment. Requirements have been increased in years 2 and 3 
in proportion to the increase in subscribers. 
Note 18: Travel expenses for sales stalrand travel between the two 
ollices. These expenses are projected to increase at 5% a year. 
Note 19: 10% a dditional allocation. 
Note 20: Net Income = Gross Margin - Expenses 
Note 21: The income lax rate is 48%. 
Assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Overhead expenses have been estimated at a reduced but 
gradually increasing amount for the first 3 months (January - 
March) and have been allocated evenly over the remaining 9 
months (April to December) of the first year. 
Assumption 2: No dividends will be paid for the First three years. 
Assumption 3: All dollars are in Canadian funds. 
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I Interest Expense Schedule 
1. Term Loans 
Assumptions: 5 year loans @ 15% 
Interest expense = 33% In year 1,27% In year 2 and 21 % in year 3 
Loan 1 $200,000 @ 15% = monthly payment of $4,400 
Total payment = $264,000; interest = $64,000 
Year 1: 0.33 x 64,000 = $21,120 
Year 2: 0.27 x 64,000 = $17,280 
Year 3: 0.21 x 64,000 = $13,440 
Loan 2 $100,000 @15% for 5 years = monthly payment of $2,200 
Total payment = $132,000; Interest = $32,000 
Year 2: 0.33 x $32,000 = $10,560 
Year 3: 0.27 x $32,000 =$8,640 
Loan 3 $100,000 @15% for 5 years = monthly payment of $2,200 
Total payment = $132,000; Interest = $32,000 
Year 3: 0.33 x $32,000 = $10,560 
Term loan interest: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Loan 1: $21,120 $17,280 $13,440 
Loan 2: $10,560 $8,640 
Loan 3: $10.560 
Total term loan interest $21.120 $27.840 $32.640 
2. Operating Line of Credit 
Assumptions: Based on cash flow projections the operating credit requirements vary between 
$355,000 and $1,225,000. 
Interest on the operating line of credit is based on the average closing balance 
requirements over the 11 months 
12 months. 
15% interest rate 
Calculation $8,774,128/11 = $797,648 
of Operating Line 
of Credit: 
Interest In Year 1: $797,648 x 15% x 11/12 = $109,675 
Interest in Year 2: $250,000 x 15% x 1/3 = $12,375 
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Depreciation Schedule 
The estimate for depreciation is based on the straight line method for capital expenditures. 
Year 1: $200,000/5 years = $40,000/year 
Year 2: $100,000/5 years = $20,000/year 
Year 3: $100,000/5 years = $20,000/year 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Depreciation expense $40,000 $60,000 $80,000 
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TeleCare 
Balance Sheets 
Opening Balance 31-Dec-01 
Sheet 
Current Assets 
Cash $ 100,000 
Accounts Receivable $ 480,000 
Inventory $ 355,560 
Total Current Assets $ 100,000 $ 835,560 
Total Fixed Assets 
Capital Equipment $ 160,000 
(net after reserve for depn. ) 
Total Assets $ 100,000 $ 995,560 
Liabilities 
Term $ 163,337 
Loan 
Tax Payable $ 10,178 
Operating Loan $ 461,841 
Accounts/Accrued Payables $ 249,177 
Total Liabilities $ 884,533 
Equity 
Owners' Equity $ 100,000 $ 100,000 
Retained Earnings $ 11,027 
Total Liabilities and 
Owners' Equity $ 100,000 $ 995,560 
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PROTOCOL FOR BUSINESS PLAN EXPERIMENT 
Introduce the research project 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project. This is the third and 
final stage in a study designed to further our understanding of the financing 
requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises and the processes employed by 
financial institutions and government agencies in meeting these needs. The two earlier 
stages of the project involved a survey of entrepreneurs and interviews with senior 
government and bank officials. The primary purpose of the present component of the 
study and the reason for your participation is to document the risk 
assessment/cvaluation processes utilized by banks and government agencies when 
assessing applications For financing. 
Provide assurance of confidentiality 
You have my assurance that the information collected for this study will be kept in 
strictest confidence. Your input will be aggregated with others to enable comparisons 
to be made among the various participating organizations. Results will be reported 
such that it will not be possible to identify specific individuals or specific organizations. 
Ascertain the stages of the loan/financing review process 
Before we proceed with the present experiment, could you please briefly outline the 
sequence ofevents or process that you normally follow when presented with a request 
for financing such as this one. 
On a scale of I to 7 where I= never and 7= always, how frequently would you do the 
following? 
Meet with client prior to initial review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conduct a preliminary review I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contact client for information I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contact others for information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Consult with colleagues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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PROTOCOL FOR BUSINESS PLAN EXPERIMENT 
375 
liricily describe the present experiment and outline the think aloud instructions 
The experiment today focuses on the initial review of a business plan. Following this 
review, I would like you to undertake the usual evaluation and due diligence. 
I will return at a later (late to obtain your input on that part of the process. 
For today's experiment I am interested in what you think about when you conduct 
your initial review of a business plan or financing proposal. In order to do this I am 
going to ask you to TI LINK ALOUD as you review a proposal. What I mean by think 
aloud is that I want you to tell nie EVERYTHING you are thinking while you review 
the business plan, including all thoughts, questions, opinions and issues. I would like 
you to talk aloud CONSTANTLY while you review the plan. I don't want you to try to 
plan out what you say or try to explain or justify to me what you are saying. Just net as 
if you are alone in the room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep 
talking. If you are silent for any long period of time I will remind you to talk. Your 
thoughts will be recorded for later transcription. Do you understand what I want you to 
do? 
Good, now we will begin with some practice problems. First, I want you to multiply 
these two numbers in your head and tell me what you are thinking as you get an 
answer. What is the result of multiplying 24 x 36? 
Good, now I will give you another practice problem before we proceed with the main 
experiment. flow many windows are there in your house? Please remember to 
vocalize what you think about as you try to answer that question. 
Good, now let's proceed to the experiment. here is a business plan for a new 
venture. I would like you to conduct the initial review. Please take the normal amount 
of time you would usually spend on this review. Feel free to make notes and/or to use a 
calculator. I will remain in the room while you complete the review but only to remind 
you to keep talking. Try your best to ignore the tape recorder and me and remember to 
please speak loudly and clearly to facilitate the recording and transcribing. If you have 
questions, please hold them until aller you've completed the review. 
Debrief account manager 
Thank you! I think that went very well. Do you have any immediate questions or 
points of clarification (also address any noted Q's during the verbal protocol process)? 
To what extent did that process (time & circumstances) parallel your usual initial 
review? 
Not at all =I Fairly similar =4 Virtually the same =7 
1234567 
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I would now Iike to get your initial reaction to a number of aspects of the proposal. 
Compared to other loans/investments in your portfolio to firms in the same or similar 
industry, how would you rate this proposal (on a scale of Ito 7 where 1=well below 
average, 4=average and 7=well above average) in each of the following areas? 
1=well below 4=average 7=well above 
average average 
a. market potential I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. business plan I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. collateral/security available I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. proven product/service I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. other funding available I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. stage of development of firm I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. track record of the entrepreneurs I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ii. uniqueness ol'product/service I 2 3 it 5 G 7 
i. potential cash flow I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j management team I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. demonstrated market acceptance I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. logistics and facilities I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in. general economic conditions (timing) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
n. other (specify 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Close the interview 
As I mentioned previously, I would now like you to complete your review of the 
business plan undertaking the usual due diligence process (confirm the process that was 
outlined at the beginning of this session). If you identify any information gaps could 
you please submit a written request (e-mail is fine) for additional information to me as 
the client. Once you've completed your assessment I will return to conduct a structured 
interview on various aspects orthe review process and the financing decision. At the 
end of the process, I would like to review the complete file, including the business plan, 
your notes and any supporting docunietntation. 
I low long do you think it will take you to complete your review? Can you contact 
nie as soon as you have identified any additional information you require? Perhaps we 
can arrange the follow-up interview at that tinge. 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR ACCOUNT MANAGERS 
Section 1- Questions Concerning the Risk Assessment and Review Process of 
Business Plans/Financing Applications 
. Please 
indicate the decision on the financing application: 
recommend approval of amount requested Q referred up Q 
recommend approval of lessor amount Q 
do not recommend approval Q more information required Q(spccify) 
2. Which o1'the Following, ifany, did you identity as issues/problems (shortcomings) 
with this proposal? If applicable, which were the key factors in your decision to 
reject the application or reduce the amount of linancing approved? 
Issue/Problem Key Factor 
a. Insufficient collateral/security Q Q 
b. Insufficicut cash flow Q Q 
c. Insuflicient income or revenue Q Q 
d. Business too risky Q Q 
e. Limited management expertise Q Q 
f. Didn't tit my organization's rules/requirements Q Q 
g. Other (specify: ) Q Q 
3. Of the factors noted above which are the three most important in order of 
importance? 
1.2.3. 
4. Compared to all loans/investments in your portfolio, how would you rate the overall 
risk of grins in this industry? 
Well Below Average Well Above 
Average Average 
1234567 
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5. Compared to all loans/investments in your portfolio, how would you rate tlic overall 
risk ol'this firn? 
Well Below Average Well Above 
Average Average 
1234567 
6. If you recommend financial support in this case, please indicate the details of the 
proposed financing package: 
i. type of financing and purpose (note any that are CS13FA with gov't. 
guarantee) 
ii. amount oI f nancing 
iii. interest rate 
iv. term 
V. Fees charged 
vi. security required: 
  personal guarantee and amount 
  charge against personal assets 
  registered assignment of book debts 
  other business collateral 
  types of security instruments used 
vii. loan/financing conditions: 
viii. monitoring provisions: 
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7. Compared to other loans/investments in your portfolio to firms in the same or 
similar industry, how would you rate the overall risk of this loan? 
Well Below Average Well Above 
Average Average 
12345G7 
8. Please provide the following Information on the review process that you followed 
in this case: 
i. Internal sources used/consulted: 
ii. External sources used/consulted: 
iii. Were any terms imposed/changed by your manager or regional/head ollice? 
Please specify: 
iv. To what extent were your recommendations influenced by the likelihood of others 
(i. e. manager or regional/head ollice) approving or making changes to the 
financing terns? 
O=Not at all 
0123 
5=very iiiuch 
45 
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9. Compared to other loans/investments in your portfolio to firms in the S-. 111 11b 
similar industry, how would you rate this proposal in each of the following areas? 
a. market potential 
b. business plan 
c. collateral/security available 
d. proven product/service 
e. other funding available 
f. stage of development of firm 
g. track rccoid of the entrepreneurs 
Ii. uniqueness of product/service 
i. potential cash flow 
j management team 
k. demonstrated market acceptance 
1. logistics and facilities 
in. general economic conditions (timing) 
n. other (sl)ecil'y _ 
I=wcll below 4=avcrngc 7=well above 
average average 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 S G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 'I 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
12 3 4 5 G 7 
12 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 ä 6 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 G 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Any additional comments concerning factors mentioned during the evaluation or 
risk assessment process and any clarification of information obtained from the 
review of verbal protocols/documentation (including the importance of idcntilied 
information requirements): 
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Section II - Questions Concerning Account Managers 
{ 
1. I low long have you worked in your present capacity (account manager, industrial/ 
business development officer, etc. ) 
with your current employer? with a previous employer? 
2. In your present capacity do you specialize in or focus on particular industry sectors? 
Yes 0 No O (go to 113) 
i. If yes, please indicate which sectors 
I 
ii. Do you consider any of these sectors to be knowledge-based? 
Yes Q No Q 
iii. IF ' yes, which ones do you consider to be kiiowled ge-based? 
3. If you do h of specialize in particular sectors, do you have dealings with knowledge- 
based businesses'1 Yes[] No 0 
If yes, which types of husincsscs do you consider to be knowlcdgc-basal? 
4.1 low would you rate your knowledge of the type of business presented in this 
proposal? 
1=Vcry Low 7=Very High 
1234567 
5. Please provide the following information on yourself: 
i. lending approval limits 
ii. education (highest lcvcl) 
iii. any special training 
3 84 
6. Does your organization have specific goals or objectives for the knowledbg-based 
sector (target for risk exposure, profitability or revenue growth)? 
Yes Q No[] If yes, please provide details. 
7. Are you (as an account manager or industrial/business development officer, ete. ) 
encouraged to attract Kßßs any more than other businesses? 
Yes 0 No O If yes, please explain how. 
8. Do you have any special training to deal with KBBs? Yes [] No[] 
If yes, please describe the training and how it was obtained. 
9. Are there differences between your organization's systems, policies and procedures 
(loan evaluation, decision making, etc. ) for dealing with K1313s and those for 
dealing with traditional SMEs)? 
Yes Cl No 0 If yes, please brielly indicate the differences. 
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10. Are you provided with any additional support to deal with Kß [3s? 
Yes Q No Q if yes, what type of support (provide examples and explore both 
internal and external sources)? 
1. I(' yes to If 10, does this support differ From that available to you when dealing wills 
traditional firms? 
Yes Q No QI I' yes, how does it differ? 
12. Do you have any other comments or observations on the business proposal or on 
this survey? 
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